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Explain the difference between strategic, tactical, and operational controls. What tactical control reporting areas must be used to monitor the Human Resources department?

PLEASE READ AND FOLLOW ALL DIRECTIONS

***USE AS A REFERENCE: Kinicki, A., & Williams, B. (2013). Management: A practical introduction. (6th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin.***

1. Review the Better Health Association of Central Ohio Case Study, The Case Continues, the Organizational Overview and the Financial Statement (all items attached).
2. Review the Human Resources “PLAN” document (attached).
3. Review and be familiar with the Mission, Vision, and Strategic Goals (shown in the “CONTROL_template”, attached).
4. Use the “CONTROL_template” to write the paper (attached).
o Describe the steps of the control process.
o Discuss the control mechanisms and their function that you will put in place to monitor the performance of the plan. (“PLAN” document attached for reference/context)
o Explain the difference between strategic, tactical, and operational controls. What tactical control reporting areas must be used to monitor the Human Resources department?
5. Follow the instructions [RED, IN BRACKETS] in the attached “CONTROL_template” to complete the paper.
o Note: Keep in mind monitoring and evaluating the level of progress with a strategic or tactical plan is critical to its success since the business environment is constantly changing. Leaders or managers who fail to do this risk that their best developed plan fails.
6. The plan needs to be 3 pages in length, not including any appendices and references you may wish to include. Use APA format in the body and the references of your work.
7. Include a minimum of one reference and citation from the textbook (Kinicki, A., & Williams, B. (2013). Management: A practical introduction. (6th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin.) or a scholarly article.
o NOTE: Web sites are not scholarly articles.

What are the basic and central values of the educational technology professional community?

Ethics in educational technology: towards a framework for ethical decision making in and for the discipline

  1. Michael Spector1

Published online: 5 October 2016

Association for Educational Communications and Technology 2016

Abstract This special issue of ETR&D is devoted to ethics in the broad domain of educational technology. Many ethical issues arise involving the study and use of educational technologies. A well-known issue involves the digital divide and the degree to which the introduction of new technologies is increasing the digital divide and disadvantaging some students while benefitting others. The potential of educational technologies to improve learning and instruction is generally well known. Many of the problems associated with the successful implementation of educational technologies are also generally well known. However the ethical issues involved with educational technology implementation, use and research are not well explored nor widely known. This paper provides a preliminary framework for ethical decision making with regard to educational technologies.

Keywords Educational technology ethics  Ethics framework  Educratic oath  Ethics framework  Value-driven educational practice

Introduction

The definition of educational technology embraced by the Association for Educational Communications and Technology (AECT) is as follows: ‘‘Educational technology is the study and ethical practice of facilitating learning and improving performance by creating, using, and managing appropriate technological processes and resources’’(Januszewski&Molenda,2007, p. 1). This definition, developed and approved by the AECT definitions and terminology committee is striking due to the inclusion of ethics as an essential aspect of educational technology. Given that emphasis by such a prominent international association of scholars and professional practitioners,it is worth exploring the role of ethics in educational technology.This

& J. Michael Spector

mike.spector@unt.edu

1   Learning Technologies, University of North Texas, Denton, TX 76207, USA

article is a step towards creating a framework for the inclusion of ethical decision making in efforts aimed at facilitating, improving and supporting learning, instruction and performance. The discussion is primarily conceptual rather than being research based.

Professional practice, standards and values

As a precursor to the argument and framework to be presented, consider the broad domain of medical practice. There are many professions within that domain, within each of those professions there are specializations. Consider nursing, for example. A general definition of that profession is basically that it involves the practice of promoting health, caring for individuals and preventing illness, not unlike a parallel definition for physicians (see http://www.icn.ch/ who-we-are/icn-definition-of-nursing/). The word ‘ethics’ does not appear in the definition of the profession or discipline. Rather, the International Council of Nurses publishes a separate code of ethics that emphasizes respect for the rights and dignity of individuals(ICN,2012).That code begins with four basic value statements involving the promotion of health, the prevention of illness, restoring health and alleviating suffering. What follows those value statements are a number of elements comprising the code of ethics, which can be considered performance standards for ethical conduct as a professional nurse. One can find other such frameworks that distinguish professional practice, ethical standards and values. As a result, that general organizing framework that separates practice and ethics is adopted herein.

I believe that those who crafted the AECT definition of educational technology did so to emphasize the importance and centrality of ethics in the broad domain of educational technology. I share that general inclination but embedding ethics in what educational technology professional practitioners and scholars do glosses over the important distinction between performance and standards (ethical standards in this case but one could also include quality standards).

To make these distinctions concrete, consider a certified nurse performing a particular job task. The nurse is clearly a practicing professional and has gone through extensive training to become certified. Nonetheless, that nurse may be careless in drawing blood from a patient on an occasion. In such a case, a quality standard is relevant. If carelessness recurs, some kind of action or remediation may be required. On another occasion, a certified nurse may refuse to treat or interact with a patient on account of the patient’s race, religion or other characteristic. That is not a violation of a quality standard. It would be a violation of the nursing code of ethics and a failure to fully embrace the four values that guide nursing practice and ethical standards. While additional training may be appropriate for quality violations, ethical violations often require a different kind of response, including the loss of a job or certification.

One might then ask how far from such a framework is professional practice and scholarship in the domain of educational technology. Responding to that question is the specific task undertaken herein.

Defining ethics and values

The word ‘ethics’ is used by many people in a variety of contexts without an attempt to provide a definition. For that reason, many will separate ethics from morals, which this author believes is wrongheaded. Classically, ethics is a branch of philosophy that dates back thousands of years. Modern philosophers often divide ethics into three categories: (a) metaethics that focuses on the origin and meaning of ethical principles, (b) normative ethics aimed at establishing standards to distinguish and regulate right and wrong conduct, and (c) applied ethics that tends to focus on difficult to resolve cases and issues (see http:// www.iep.utm.edu/ethics/ for an elaboration of these categories).

What seems most appropriate for this discussion is the notion of normative ethics, as that category is typically associated with codes of conducts and distinguishing good or acceptable behavior and practice from unacceptable or harmful behavior and practice. The representative ethical statements presented in the next section clearly fall into the category of normative ethics. Normative ethics represent the specific behaviors and practices that a community, culture, institution, or profession expect all members to follow. In some cases, failure to adhere to an ethical principle is also a violation of the law. For example, delaying treatment of an individual in need of immediate attention may result in that patient’s death. In such a case, the medical practitioner who delayed treatment not only commited a violation of a basic ethical principle (e.g., do no harm), but may also be guilty of involuntary homicide. Regardless of the legal implications, ethical violations should be regarded as serious and reported to the responsible authorities, as a general rule (and perhaps also an instance of a normative ethics statement). The honor code at the United States Air Force Academy states that ‘‘we will not lie, steal, or cheat nor tolerate among us anyone who does’’ (see http://www.academyadmissions.com/the-experience/character/honor-code/). The implication of that code is that not reporting a violation is also a violation.

Codes of conduct and ethical principles can be found for many professional associations and communities of practice. A few are presented below. Such normative ethical statement cover a wide range of behaviors, including such things as taking unfair advantage of others, misrepresenting relationships, overlooking evidence, violating trust and confidentiality, and much more. Such statements are generally representative of the values of an association, community, or profession. That leads to several questions: (a) What are the basic and central values of the educational technology professional community? (b) How were those values established? (c) How are those values to be interpreted?

AECT’s TechTrends; Linking Research and Practice to Improve Learning periodically has a column on professional ethics written by Andrew Yeaman. Those columns provide insight into a number of aspects of normative and applied ethics in educational technology practice (see http://link.springer.com/journal/11528). For example, in a recent issue, Yeaman (2016) presented a scenario about problems in a training department that lead to a decision with regard to whom responsibility should be delegated to improve the situation. The value involved is commitment to the profession, and the ethics involved focus on fixing the situation rather than assigning blame.

One way to conceptualize values is in terms of a hierarchy of responsibilities and obligations. One interpretation of Plato’s early dialogues that recount Socrates’ trial and last day, is that Socrates had such a hierarchy which proceeded from self to family to state to the voice of the oracle. The reason a hierarchy is needed is that values can conflict. One may value one’s own well-being or prosperity, but that would be superseded by the well being of family or community or profession or society if there should arise a conflict. The most difficult cases when there are conflicts at the same level within such a hierarchy. Jonassen (2007) calls such ethical dilemmas the most challenging kind of problems because there is essentially a lose–lose aspect to such dilemmas—whichever choice is made, an ethical principle will be violated.

As an example, consider a professor who is supervising a doctoral student with a severe disability that prevents the student from writing and speaking clearly. The student’s speech is difficult to understand, and the writing often incoherent. Nevertheless, with support from the professor, friends and the medical profession, the student has managed to successfully complete all of the required coursework for the degree. The problem now is completing a dissertation. The student is passionate about completing the degree, and the professor wants to help the student succeed. However, the level of support from the professor to complete a dissertation given the student’s condition appears challenging (as much as 10 h a week based on recent experience). In spite of having spent a great deal of time with the student, there has not been much progress, and the date for the dissertation proposal defense is approaching. Failure to defend the proposal on that date will result in the student being put on probation; a previous extension has already been granted to avoid that outcome. Being on probation means that the student’s financial aid will be discontinued. Another extension could be requested, and that would support the professor’s commitment to the student. However, the professor believes that will only postpone the inevitable, which would violate the principle of being honest with students. What to do? Such decisions are not easy, and intuitions can often be misleading. Passionate and dedicated students can often far surpass one’s expectations.

The framework of ethical decision included herein is encapsulated in the Educratic Oath (see below). While specific categories and contexts are not mentioned, the general notion of doing no harm and respecting individual rights includes (a) not being persuaded by money but being persuaded by evidence, (b) recognizing that not every solution helps every student, (c) being fair to all while providing as much support for individual initiative as possible, (d) considering what is best in the long run for learners, teachers and the institution, (e) recognizing the impact of introducing any change into an educational context. In other words, this is intended to be the basis for a broad ethical decision-making framework.

Professional ethics statements

The international board of standards for training, performance and instruction (ibstpi) periodically conducts large-scale surveys of practice in a number of education professions (e.g., evaluation, instructional design, instructor, online learner, training management) that form the competencies and performance standards for the discipline. With regard to instructional design, there is one competency statement in the foundations area that ibstpi included in spite of lack of strong support from surveys – namely, identifying and responding to ethical, legal, and political implications of design in the workplace (Koszalka et al., 2013). It is worth noting that while AECT and ibspti place strong emphasis on ethical practice, that emphasis is not as evident in other educational technology associations (see, for example, the standards of the International Society for Technology in Education at http://www.iste.org/standards/standards).

The American Psychology Association has a set of principles and code of conduct that begins with five principles or values: (a) beneficence and nonmaleficence, (b) fidelity and responsibility, (c) integrity, (d) justice, and (e) respect for people’s rights and dignity (APA, 2010a). Section of the APA code of conduct pertains to education and training and has been considered in developing the educational technology ethical framework to be presented below. The APA publication manual (APA, 2010b) also has ethical guidelines pertaining to authorship—namely, authorship should include all those who have made a primary or significant contribution to the data collection, concepts, and interpretation of work to be published, including those who do not do the actual writing. Unfortunately, there are far too many violations of that ethical standard pertaining to authorship in the educational technology professional and scholarly community.

The Educratic oath

There is a great deal of commonality among the various ethics statements just reviewed. They bear a remarkable similarity to the Hippocratic Oath (attributed to a Greek physician who lived in the fifth century BCS; see https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath. html for the original version and http://guides.library.jhu.edu/c.php?g=202502&p= 1335759 for a modern version). While the first principle of the Hippocratic Oath is often cited as ‘‘do no harm,’’ that statement did not appear in the version attributed to Hippocrates. Nonetheless, that phrase does capture a general of medical practice in ancient Greece that still exists today.

Based on an interpretation of the Hippocratic Oath and the kinds of ethical principles reviewed above, Spector (2005) proposed a similar oath for educators, the Educratic Oath:

(1) do nothing to impair learning and instruction; (2) do what you can to improve learning and instruction; (3) base your actions on evidence that you and others have gathered and analyzed; (4) share the principles of instruction that you have learned with others; and, (5) respect the individual rights of all those with whom you interact. (p. xxxvi).

The Educratic Oath has not been widely embraced, nor has any other such ethical code for educators. As a result, Spector (2015) decided to move from principles, such as those in the Educratic Oath, to a more general concern with values. Figure 1 represents the values that might be associated with a learning environment effort.

One could take each of the values statements in Fig. 1 and develop specific principles that might represent how that value could be articulated. Regardless of agreeing or disagreeing with the values in Fig. 1, that framework is incomplete in many ways. First, it primarily represents an instructional design perspective. Second, it does not take into

Fig. 1 A values hierarchy for learning environments (adapted from Spector, 2015)

account the many activities in which instructional designers engage, nor does it take into account those with whom instructional designers interact nor any of the technologies involved. The next section takes up these shortfalls.

Educational technology practice

Recalling AECT’s definition of educational technology will provide pointers to those involved in educational technology and what they do. Those who facilitate learning and performance are involved (e.g., teachers, tutors, teaching assistants, coaches, etc.). Those who create technology resources and processes are involved (e.g., instructional designers, graphics artists, media specialists, writers, web designers, etc.). Those who manage those resources and processes are involved (e.g., lead instructors, department chairs, deans, technology coordinators, information specialists, etc.). Those who make use of the resources are involved (e.g., students). Those who conduct studies about the design, development, deployment, use and evaluation of the processes and resources are involved (e.g., researchers and evaluators). The educational technology community includes a number of sub-communities, disciplines, and people with different backgrounds, training and interests. Given the complexity of the AECT definition, as elaborated above, there is no such person as a representative educational technologist, just as there is no such person as a representative nurse. There are emergency room nurses, oncology nurses, pediatric nurses, neonatal nurses, and so on. Nurses interact with other nurses, physicians, patients, family members, and others. Educational technology is at least as complex in terms of sub disciplines and specializations as is nursing. The implication is that the ethical principles and kinds of ethical decision making involved are likely to be specific to a particular context.

If one considers the sub-discipline of instructional design and what has been written about instructional design practice, one will not find much with regard to ethics other than AECT’s ethical standards and the one ibstpi competency referred to earlier that also includes adherence to legal standards as well as ethical standards (Koszalka et al., 2013). The importance of values is emphasized in Spector’s (2005, 2015) works and values are mentioned briefly in a few chapters in the Handbook of Research on Educational Communications and Technologies (Spector et al., 2013). However, in major treatments of instructional design practice, there is very little discussion of ethics or values (see, for example, Dijkstra, 2004; Larson & Lockee, 2014; Merrill, 2013; Reigeluth, 1983). In the influential roadmap for education technology (Woolf, 2010), there is no mention of ethics or values. Yet the digital divide remains a reality and is prioritized in the 2016 National Education Technology Plan (see http://tech.ed.gov/files/2015/12/NETP16.pdf). Surely the digital divide involves ethical issues due to the fact that some students (especially those without access to new technologies or with little experience in using advanced learning technologies) are falling further and further behind as new technologies are integrated into teaching and learning. While educational technologists are generally well-intention ed and seek to promote learning and improve instruction, it often happens that the introduction of a new technology will have a negative impact on some students as well as some teachers. Planning to minimize negative impact and properly supporting both students and teachers when introducing a new technology should be a high priority for educational technologist.

As new technologies emerge at an increasing rate, an educational technologist may decide to try something new just because it can be done. The operational outlook should not be ‘‘because we can.’’ The educational technologist’s motto should be ‘‘because we can do better for all involved.’’ Adhering to that creed requires taking an evidence-based approach rather than one based on fads and fancies.

A preliminary educational technology ethics framework

Figure 2 provides a somewhat deeper framework for thinking about ethical issues involving educational technology. This framework is intended to be a starting point for further development and exploration of the usefulness of such a framework for educational technology ethics.

There are three interacting dimensions in this framework: values, principles and people. Two additional dimensions are relevant but not depicted: context (e.g., school, university, workplace, culture, country, regulatory environment, etc.) and technology (e.g., specific technologies and their intended use and purpose). If the simplified framework presented here gets those involved with educational technology to think more seriously about the ethics of practice and research involving educational technology, then this framework is perhaps a step forward.

To encourage the progressive development of this framework, an elaboration of the intersection of these three dimensions is provided: (a) students in the people dimension, (b) evidence in the values dimension, and (c) the ethical principle of being fair and open in assessing and evaluating progress. The intersection of these three dimensions in the framework is one that is commonly encountered and, as a consequence, perhaps useful as a starting point for further elaboration.

Suppose the context is a public high school course that involves history. A major portion of the grade in that course is a student-authored paper analyzing and discussing the causes of World War II. The technologies involved include the internet, media and word processing. Students are required to (a) include links to at least three internet sites that provide different analysis of the causes, (b) include a figure or diagram that represents the resolution of the differences among a variety of perspectives, and (c) submit the final paper as a PDF file to an online learning management system. The instructor has provided

Fig. 2 A preliminary educational technology ethics framework

students with a rubric that indicates how the paper will be graded. The rubric includes requirements such as due date, length, format, required components (e.g., overview, perspectives explored, differences and similarities among those perspectives, etc.), how the quality of each requirement will be determined, and the weight assigned to each of the requirements. Additional notes in the syllabus are provided with regard to plagiarism and other related matters.

The rubric is in the course syllabus and students have been given frequent reminders. Specific drafts of the major components (overview, internet sites found, etc.) have been assigned along the way and feedback on those drafts provided to students. In short, the instructor has created a clear and coherent course plan that includes emphasis on evidence to be used in assessing the final paper.

Student Y has received a failing grade based on making use of another’s work without credit or citation. The student claims it was a simple oversight and is asking the instructor to be given another chance to correct the problem in order to get a passing grade that is required for graduation. What specific ethical issues and principles are involved?

There is the value of making evidence-based decisions, and the evidence of plagiarism in this case is clear. There is the principle of making open and fair assessments. The rubric was well known in advance as was the penalty for plagiarism. Other principles are also involved. The instructor did establish clear and specific goals and expectations. The student failed to recognize the contributions of others. More fundamentally, the instructor has an obligation not to disadvantage others who may want a second chance to improve a grade.

The decision of the instructor to stand by the grade seems to be ethically defensible and perhaps obvious. However, there is a consequence for the student that may be harmful— namely, failure to graduate. Due to the failing grade, the student may be severely punished by a parent or drop out of high school. This instructor happens to know the student’s parents and is aware of some abusive treatment. In addition. The instructor knows with whom the student associates and how well the student has done in other courses. The instructor believes this student could be successful in college and would like to see the student continue education after high school.

Given that knowledge, the instructor now confronts an ethical dilemma—namely, promote benefits and minimize deficits for this student or make fair and open assessments for all students. As Jonassen (2007), ethical dilemmas are challenging. For some, this situation may not seem like a dilemma, but for others it may well be a difficult decision making process. Regardless of how one may perceive this imagined situation, it is clear that the instructor should not decide based on what is easy or convenient for the instructor. What is best for this and other students should be the primary consideration. What might be good for oneself is seldom the primary ethical perspective. Ethical decision making is often other directed rather than being self-directed. There is a self-directed aspect to ethical decision making, however. Basically, that aspect involves reflecting on the kind of person one is becoming on account of the decisions and choices one is making.

Concluding remarks

Some will be inclined to say that this approach to ethics in educational technology is unnecessary or is making something that is quite simple more complex than it needs to be. Ethical decision making in any aspect of life is quite challenging and complex. Ethical decision making should be introduced early and often in the development of a child.

Simply adhering to a law, rule, policy, or guideline involves no ethical decision making. Recognizing the many interacting aspects of a situation is a step toward understanding how different people, values and ethical principles might guide desirable behavior and the responsible conduct of using and studying educational technologies. A suggested earlier in this paper, the attitude that might inform values and ethical principles is the notion that we can do better with regard to supporting learning, improving instruction and understanding how best to make effective use of educational technologies. We can do better.

References

APA. (2010a). Ethical principles of psychologists and code of conduct. Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/jms/ Documents/PDFs/apa-principles.pdf.

APA. (2010b). The publication manual of the American Psychology Association. Washington, DC: American Psychology Association.

Dijkstra, S. (2004). Theoretical foundations of learning and instruction and innovations of instructional design and technology. In N. M. Seel & S. Dijkstra (Eds.), Curriculum, plans and processes of instructional design: International perspectives. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.

ICN. (2012). The ICN code of ethics for nurses. Retrieved from http://www.icn.ch/images/stories/ documents/about/icncode_english.pdf.

Januszewski, A., & Molenda, M. (Eds.). (2007). Educational technology: A definition with commentary (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.

Jonassen, D. H. (2007). Toward a taxonomy of meaningful learning. Educational Technology, 47(5), 30–35. Koszalka, T., Russ-Eft, D., & Reiser, R. (2013). Instructional design competencies: The standards (4th ed.). Charlotte: Information Age Publishing.

Larson, M. B., & Lockee, B. B. (2014). Streamlined ID: A practical guide to instructional design. New York: Routledge.

Merrill, M. D. (2013). First principles of instruction: Identifying and designing effective, efficient and engaging instruction. San Francisco: Wiley.

Reigeluth, C. M. (Ed.). (1983). Instructional-design theories and models: An overview of their current status. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Spector, J. M. (2005). Innovations in instructional technology: An introduction to this volume. In J. M. Spector, C. Ohrazda, A. Van Schaack, & D. A. Wiley (Eds.), Innovations in instructional technology: Essays in honor of M. David Merrill (pp. xxxi-xxxvi). Mahwah: Erlbaum.

Spector, J. M. (2015). Foundations of educational technology: Integrative approaches and interdisciplinary perspectives (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.

Spector, J. M., Merrill, M. D., Elen, J., & Bishop, M. J. (Eds.). (2013). Handbook of research on educational communications and technology (4th ed.). New York: Springer.

Woolf, B. P. (Ed.). (2010). A roadmap for education technology [National Science Foundation Grant#0637190]. Washington, DC: National Science Foundation.

Yeaman, A. R. J. (2016). Competence and circumstance. TechTrends, 60, 195–196.

  1. Michael Spector is a Professor and Former Chair of Learning Technologies at the University of North Texas. He earned a Ph.D. in Philosophy from The University of Texas at Austin. His research focuses on intelligent support for instructional design, assessing learning in complex domains, and technology integration in education. Dr. Spector served on the International Board of Standards for Training, Performance and Instruction (ibstpi) as Executive Vice President; he is a Past President of the Association for Educational and Communications Technology as well as a Past Chair of the Technology, Instruction, Cognition and Learning Special Interest Group of AERA. He is editor of Educational Technology Research & Development and serves on numerous other editorial boards. He edited the third and fourth editions of the Handbook of Research on Educational Communications and Technology, as well as the Encyclopedia of Educational Technology, and has more than 150 publications to his credit.

 

Educational Technology Research & Development is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved.

What is your opinion of the article? Do you agree with the author’s findings?

Read the assigned article by Linstrom (2004), and create an article critique.
After reading the article and briefly summarizing the purpose for the writing, answer the following questions:
What is the author’s main point?
Who is the author’s intended audience?
Do the author’s arguments support the main point?
What evidence supports the main point?
What is your opinion of the article? Do you agree with the author’s findings?
What evidence, either from the textbook or additional sources, supports your opinion?
Your response must be at least 725 words in length. All sources used, including the article, must be referenced. Paraphrased and/or quoted materials must have accompanying in-text citations and references in APA style.

How did the organization develop? What is the story behind the work? How has it changed over time?

EDCO 705

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION IMPACT PAPER INSTRUCTIONS

This is an investigative paper analyzing and assessing the effectiveness and impact of a mental health organization in your community. You will set up an appointment with an executive or director and conduct a face-to-face interview with him/her. Recording the interview is

recommended. While much of your paper will be based on information gleaned from the

interview, the substance should come from critical assessment and evaluation based on

secondary research and best practices articulated in scholarly research. You must incorporate the June & Black and the Scott & Wolfe texts in substantial and meaningful ways and draw on
recent journal articles. A minority of your sources may consist of professional web sources such as local news and the organization’s own materials. This must be a 12-15 page paper in current APA format with 12 sources, not counting the interview. Include the following content, using appropriate headings:

1   Demographic information about the organization: Disclose the name of the

organization; its location(s) and current address, phone number, website URL, etc. Name the person you interviewed, and explain his/her title and function within the organization.

2   History and funding: How did the organization develop? What is the story behind the
work? How has it changed over time?

3   Present status: What is the organization’s purpose/mission statement? Who does it
serve? How is it funded? (Private, public, fundraising, special interest groups, etc.)
Describe the staffing. How many counselors, social workers, psychiatrists, behavioral
specialist, etc. work with the organization?

4   Community collaboration: Who does this organization work with, collaborate with, or
network with to accomplish its goals? (Some organizations began a couple of decades
ago and worked from a “one stop shop” kind of model. Today, many of these same
organizations work with various mental health providers to provide the same services that
once were provided in-house.) Is collaboration a central focus of this organization?

5   Community impact: Describe the organization’s community impact and/or effectiveness
in serving its clients, both from the interviewees own perspective and from secondary
sources. Has public policy been impacted by this organization?

6  Evaluation: From your research and analysis, assess the organization’s strengths and
weaknesses. What does this organization do well and not so well? What do you see as
possible action plans to improve what this organization does and how they carry out its
mission and purpose?

Evaluate the strategies used by international retailers, whilst expanding their business into Germany.

Marketing Project: The Research Proposal

Table of Contents

 

1)    Industry Background and current Market Trends ……………………………………….. 2

 

2)    Research Problem and Aim …………………………………………………………………………… 3

 

 

3)    Objectives ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

 

 

4)    Scope of the Study ………………………………………………………………………………………… 5

 

 

5)    Usefulness of the Topic …………………………………………………………………………………. 5

 

 

6)    Literature Review Topic Areas ……………………………………………………………………… 5 a)    Cross-cultural buying behaviour ……………………………………………………………………. 5 b)    International Retailing …………………………………………………………………………………… 6 c)    Standardisation vs. Adaptation ……………………………………………………………………… 6

7)    Suggested Methodology ……………………………………………………………………………….. 7 a)    Secondary Data ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 7 b)    Primary Data ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 c)    Sampling ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 8

8)    Timeline ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 9

 

 

9)    Indicative Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………… 10

 

1)  Industry Background and current Market Trends

 

The food retail market in Germany, with a value of $277.2 billion, accounts for 14.9% of the European food retail market value. After seeing a decline in 2012 of 0.1%, in 2013 it experienced a growth of 1%. The market is expected to grow with further 7.4% until 2018 and reach a market value of $297.7 billion. In comparison to this are the France and UK markets, which are forecasted to grow towards values of $252.3billion and $203.3 billion respectively (Marketline, 2014). German consumers expenditure on food products has also clearly increased in the period of 2001-2011 by 13.4% to a total of 155.8€ billion. The food and beverages sector also accounts for 38.3% of the total private demand of consumers in

Germany (Metro Retail Compendium, 2013). The German food retail market is saturated and high in price competition amongst the retailers. Included in the food retail market are the

sales of food products along with beverages.

Consumers increasingly demand for organic food products, which experience a growth of

 

10% per year. Another segment that is increasingly requested by German consumers is international good, which is relatable to the current trends in the whole of Europe (Marketline, 2014).

 

Germany counts predominantly as a developed country and a majority of consumer from a country of that nature put significant importance on products with a certain standard of quality rather than the focus on low-priced products (Euromonitor, 2014).

 

Supermarkets and hypermarket are the biggest players in the German food retail industry with a share of 59.4% (Marketline, 2014). Independent and Specialist Retailers follow with

33.7%. Convenience stores have the lowest share with 5.2% (Marketline, 2014). Hypermarkets are not a very common format of retailing in Germany, due to the fact that a majority of consumers find these too complex and prefer the straight-forward layout of supermarkets. This also reflects in the statistics in terms of sales by channels. Over the period of 2008-2013 hypermarkets experienced a slight decline of 0.7%, whereas in comparison to that supermarkets saw an increase of 10.1% (Euromonitor, 2014). Another outstanding increase in the value of sales was experienced by discounters with 8.1%. German consumers increasingly show higher loyalty to the most successful retail format, discounters, as these improved their standards over the last years (Euromonitor, 2014).

 

Discounters are typically characterised by offering very low prices, with low cost margins and a high degree of self-service (Cox, R & Brittain P., 2004, p. 35). Discounters in Germany lately also introduced higher quality products, such as brand-based and fresh foods, which gain more attention by consumers that put great emphasis on regional products, with higher

 

trust in those. International products are also offered, mainly specialised for younger generations, due to higher interest and experimental attitudes amongst the age group (Euromonitor, 2014).

In terms of food retailers brand shares, Edeka (under Edeka Zentrale AG & CO KG) gained

15.6% and is therefore the brand with the highest share in Germany. Lidl and Aldi (under Lidl

Dienstleistung GmbH & Co KG and Aldi Süd) follow with 8.6% and 7.7% share respectively in 2013 (Euromonitor, 2014). Competition is very high in the German food retail market, due to the high price wars and choice criteria of consumers. This results in generally equal shares in the food retail industry, which complicates and raises the entry barriers into the mature and saturated market.

International retailers generally adapt to the German retail market in order to succeed, or even approach the market in a different manner, such as Royal Ahold from the Netherlands, which might attract customers with its uniqueness (Euromonitor, 2014). However, international retailers, specifically in the grocery retail market struggle to enter the market and proceed with standardised strategies. This was the case for the American discounter department store, Walmart, which approached Germany in 1997 and was forced to exit the market in 2006 with an estimated loss of $1 billion (Financial Express, 2006).

 

The purpose of this study is leading from that, to understand the failure of international retailers and to answer the question of why they found it difficult to succeed in the German market.

 

2)  Research Problem and Aim

 

The purpose of this research Project is to analyse the German retail market and determine the reasons that make it difficult for many international retailers to succeed in this market, described on the case of Walmart.

International Retailing has been very popular amongst retailers in the last decades, specifically also in food retailing, where the total revenue of global food and staples reached

$6,56 billion in 2010 (Food and Staples Retail Industry Profile: Global, 2011).

Generally known is that a firm’s global competitiveness is mainly reliant on one aspect, which is a strategic global marketing plan (Hollensen, S., 2013, p. 6).

 

Walmart is the biggest retailer in the world with a share of 3.3% in 2013 (Euromonitor, 2014 [2]). The company saw a great future in the German food retailing market and entered in

1997 by using acquisition. It took over 21 stores of the German Wertkauf chain and in 1998 acquired further 74 hyperstores from Interspar. Walmart’s idea was to operate with its American ethics in Germany, with turned out to be a mistake and forced Walmart to leave the country in 2006 with a loss of approximately $1 billion (dw, 2006). The 85 stores were taken over by the German retail company Metro, in order to open more of its Real hyperstores.

Walmart clearly did not consider the cross-cultural buying behaviour, when entering the German food retail market. Considering different cultures across different countries is of major importance as cultures play a major role in people’s attitudes and behaviour, as stated by Gelfand et al. (2007) cited in Patel, T. (2013). Consumers in Germany did not like the American approach of the retailer and its low price strategy, as this strategy was carried out by almost all the German food retailers. Walmart chose to use standardisation, rather than adaptation in order to succeed in Germany; however, this made Walmart less competitive and not successful in the German market.

Therefore, the aim of this study is to understand the German consumers buying behaviour and evaluate the strategies used by international retailers, such as Walmart, which failed in Germany. Understanding the mistakes will enable to develop recommendable strategies to successfully enter the German market.

3)  Objectives

This study is set out to achieve four specific objectives:

Objective 1:  To provide an overview of the German retail market in terms of size, value, competition and characteristics.

Objective 2:  To analyse the buying behaviour of the German consumers in order to determine whether there are cultural characteristics that differentiate and influence their purchase behaviour.

Objective 3:  To evaluate the strategies used by international retailers, whilst expanding their business into Germany. Also understand and analyse the mistakes that occurred, shown specifically on the example of Walmart.

Objective 4:  To generate recommendations for actions aimed at retailers that contemplate expansion into the German market in the future.

4)  Scope of the Study

The study is reviewing the German retail market, particularly focusing on the food retail industry. It will analyse consumer buying behaviour in Germany, in order to understand the choice criteria and purchase behaviour of the German consumers. The international marketing aspect will play a major role in this research project, as international retailers need to develop a sophisticated marketing strategy in order to be successful in expanding

globally. Cultural aspects play a major role in an individual’s attitudes and behaviour and specifically finding out, which cultural aspects have an impact on individuals, is one of the areas this research project is going to focus on.

Furthermore, the focus will briefly also be put on a fashion retailer that failed to succeed in Germany – Gap. A comparison between the retailers will be given in order to understand the differences and similarities in the strategies of approaching the German market.

5)  Usefulness of the Topic

Being a German citizen, I always have a keen curiosity to understand the extent to which German consumers differ culturally in terms of purchasing behaviour compared to other consumers in developed markets. In addition, I am interested in discovering possible cultural dimension that are underlying these differences.

Furthermore, this research project could benefit international retail firms that are considering entering the German market. It could propose some tactical and managerial implications and provide strategies in order to reduce difficulties, whilst moving into the German market, providing products and services in favour of German consumers buying behaviour.

6)  Literature Review Topic Areas

In the progress of this research project, several marketing theories, such as the cross- cultural behaviour and international marketing theories were found that support the main arguments of this study.

  1. a) Cross-culturalbuying behaviour

The world is full of confrontations between people who think, feel and act differently’

(Hofstede, 2010)

This quote describes the main question of this study in a simplified way, which is to understand if cultural differences, based on the fact that this research is focusing on Germany, have an impact on consumers buying behaviour.

According to Hofstede (1994) as cited in Patel (2013), there are four dimensions in terms of how nations differ in cultural aspects. These are:

  • High versus low power distance
  • Masculinity versus femininity
  • Individualism versus collectivism
  • Uncertainty avoidance versus risk taking

These four aspects play a major role in understanding the German consumers’ cultural motives towards their purchasing behaviour.

  1. b) InternationalRetailing

According to Michael Porter (1980) as cited in Huggins and Izushi (2011) competitive rules and advantages are highly reliant on the industries structure. The main aspects for this are:

  • Threat of new entrants
  • Rivalry amongst existing competitors
  • Threat of substitute products
  • Bargaining power of buyers
  • Bargaining power of suppliers

For this research project the rivalry amongst existing competitors is of high importance, as one of the reasons for Walmart’s failure was the high competition in the mature food retailing market in Germany.

  1. c) Standardisation vs. Adaptation

A fundamental decision that managers have to make regarding their global marketing strategy is the degree to which they should standardize or adapt their global marketing mix.’ (Hollensen, 2013)

Whilst globalising, a company has to wisely choose if it is going to target the new countries with a standardised or adapted approach. In Walmart’s case a standardised approach was chosen which lead to a rejection in the German food retail industry. The theory stated by Hollensen can lead to identifying strategies in order to approach different countries. This will underline  and support the findings of this research project.

7)  Suggested Methodology

The data collection for this report will include secondary data as well as primary data collection in order to meet the stated objectives. The approach will be causal (conclusive research) and explain why the failure of Walmart happened, and what motives are linked to consumers purchasing behaviour in Germany.

  1. a) SecondaryDat

Secondary Data will be gathered in order to evaluate the German food retail market in terms of value, growth etc.. Furthermore, this source will be used in order to identify and analyse the problems experienced by Walmart in trying to approach Germany.

During the research, conducted so far, the database of the LSBU library was used in addition to academic sources from the free web, such as newspaper articles and journals.

Mainly, journal articles, academic literature and e-books have facilitated and supported the key arguments in this research and will also be used in further stages of the study.

The Business resources for Marketing, such as Euromonitor, Marketline and Mintel have been of key use for this study and will base further arguments and findings in the progress of the research.

  1. b) PrimaryData

In order to analyse the buying behaviour of German consumers, primary research will be conducted.

study will collect primary data in form of quantitative research. A total of 100 questionnaires will be given out to German consumers. Quantitative Research has many advantages; one of them is the ability to get beneath the surface of a survey individual.

While not as detailed as in-depth interviews or focus groups, it is common to ask questions about motives, circumstances, sequences of events, or mental deliberations, none of which are available in observation studies’ (Burns and Bush, 2014, p.173).

This is of major importance for the study, as we would like to understand the German consumers’ choice criteria in how they purchase their grocery and which the most important motives are that influence their buying behaviour.

The consumers will be enabled to answer both, open-ended and closed-ended questions

Furthermore, from the results of the surveys, different consumer profiles can be developed, in order to understand diverse types of consumers in Germany.

 

  1. c) Sampling

The sample population that will be used includes consumers in Germany from the age of 16. A key aspect while screening the surveys is, if they are the mainly or partly purchasing body in the household in order to understand their buying behaviour.

The target population for the questionnaires will be approached on the streets and asked a screening question in order to understand, if they belong to the target population, which my focus is on.

This leads to the fact that non-probability sampling will be used in order to find the targeted population, specifically judgement sampling. The research will be conducted in different areas of Germany, in order to collect perceptions and buying behaviour motives from

individuals of different statuses.

8 | P a g e

8)  Timeline

   

Nov

 

Dec

 

Jan

 

Feb

 

Mar

 

April

 

May

 

Proposal

     

X

                                                 
 

Amend Proposal

             

x

 

x

                                       
 

Introduction

                       

x

                               
 

Literature Review

                         

x

 

x

     

x

 

x

 

x

                 
 

Methodology

                             

x

 

x

                       
 

Data Collection: Field Work

                                     

x

 

x

 

x

 

x

           
 

Research Findings and Analysis

                                           

x

 

x

 

x

       
 

Recommendations

                                             

x

 

x

       
 

Conclusion

                                               

x

       
 

Draft

                                           

x

 

x

         
 

Final Version

                                             

x

 

x

       
 

Binding

                                                 

x

     
 

Submission

                                                 

x

     

 

9 | P a g e

9)  Indicative Bibliography

Cox, Roger;Brittain, Paul. 2004., Retailing. [online]. Financial Times/ Prentice Hall. Available from:  http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=60092 [Accessed on 15th November

2014].

 

Euromonitor (2014) Grocery Retailers in Germany. [Online]. Available from: Euromonitor http://0-www.portal.euromonitor.com.lispac.lsbu.ac.uk/portal/magazine/homemain [Accessed on 14th November 2014]

 

Marketline (2014) Germany – Food Retail [Online]. Available from: Marketline  http://0- advantage.marketline.com.lispac.lsbu.ac.uk/ [Accessed on 14th November 2014]

 

Metro Retail Group (2013) Metro Retail Compendium. [Online]. Available from: Metro Retail Group, Bad Oeynhausen  http://www.metro- cc.com/internet/site/mcc/node/308042/Len/index.html [Accessed on 14th November

2014].

 

The Financial Express (2006) Wal-Mart exits Germany with $1bn loss. [Online]. Available from:  http://archive.financialexpress.com/news/walmart-exits-germany-with-1bn-

loss/172670 [Accessed 15th November 2014].

 

Food & Staples Retail Industry Profile: Global (2011), Food & Staples Retail Industry Profile: Global, pp. 1-39, Available from: Business Source Complete [Accessed on 15th November 2014].

 

Hollensen, Svend. 2013., Global Marketing. [online]. Pearson. Available from:

http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=515961 [Accessed on 16th November 2014].

 

Euromonitor (2014) [2] Walmart’s Healthy Food Subsidy Could Revolutionise the Food Industry…but not Anytime Soon [Online]. Available from: Euromonitor  http://0- www.portal.euromonitor.com.lispac.lsbu.ac.uk/portal/magazine/homemain [Accessed on

14th November 2014]

 

DW (2006), World biggest retailer Wal Mart closes up shop in Germany [Online]. Available from:  http://www.dw.de/worlds-biggest-retailer-wal-mart-closes-up-shop-in-

germany/a2112746 [Accessed on 15th November 2014].

 

Patel, Taran. 2013., Cross-Cultural Management: A Transactional Approach : A Transactional Approach. [online]. Routledge. Available from: http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=553015 [Accessed on 16th November 2014].

 

Hofstede, G. (2010), Cultures and Organizations : Software for the Mind, Third Edition. [online]. McGraw-Hill. Available from:  http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=296125 [Accessed on 16th November 2014].

 

 

 

Huggins, Robert;Izushi, Hiro. 2011., Competition, Competitive Advantage, and Clusters: The Ideas of Michael Porter. [online]. Oxford Scholarship Online. Available from:

http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=359478 [Accessed on 15th November 2014].

 

Burns, Alvin C;Bush, Ronald F.. 2013., Marketing Research, International Edition. [online]. Pearson. Available from:  http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=523720 [Accessed on

15th November 2014].

What were their main challenges faced in their role?  What do they enjoy about their work?

Part 3 – Skill Portfolio Activities

Students can select and work on a range of skills that will be needed for their working life.  The following Skill Activities form part of the available portfolio – for assessment purposes students need submit only THREE Activities but are encouraged to do as many as possible to broaden their skills and widen their networks.  Currently we have five Skill Activities on offer:

  1. The construction site visit activity & report
  2. The external exhibition visit & report
  3. The AutoCAD On-line training & drawing activity (Linkedin Learning)
  4. The Excel calculation spreadsheet.
  5. The Mentee report (working with L6 final year students as a Mentor)
  6. Manufacturing visit to Mini factory.

Note that:

  • For students on BEng (hons)/MEng courses the AutoCAD activity is COMPULSORY.
  • For students on all BSc (hons) courses the EXCEL activity is COMPULSORY
  • All Activities are equally weighted.

Student need to plan and manage their time to meet all the required deadline whereby feedback can be provided.  This process of managing your work is a key part of Mental Wealth and needs to be documented in your Reflective Logs and will also be assessed as part of your Self-Reflective Diary.  Students who demonstrate their ability to participate in other activities will receive credit through their Reflective Log and Final Reflective Report parts of the portfolio.

Skill Activity 1- Manufacturing visit to Mini factory Activity & Report

Introduction

This report involves you submitting a written report about Mini car production plant that you personally attended on Friday 22nd November 2019 as part of a UEL organised trip.  . Details of the UEL organised site visits are published on Moodle EG4019 and student’s need book up according to the information given below in this document.  , attend and to bring with them all the necessary PPE.

Brief

The purposes of the visits are to describe the car production plant visited under a range of headings, such as:

  • Types of facilities available for car production? Machinery/laboratory/research/design software?
  • What are the main technologies used in car production?
  • What are the orderly steps of car production?
  • Who did you meet during the visit? What was their role?  Their profession?
  • What were their main challenges faced in their role? What do they enjoy about their work?
  • How is care for workers demonstrated, e.g. health & safety and general tidiness?

 

During the visit Students are strongly recommended to use the site prompt sheets shown in Table to aid note-taking and questioning of site personnel during the visits – See Site Prompt Sheet below for further information.

Resources

, fully prepared with 5-point H&S Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).  They also must have submitted and had approved their Medical Declaration form

 

Booking the Trip

All Engineering Students in groups EG4019 04 & 05 are invited to attend.   The cost of the tour and coach travel to and from the event will be met in part by the University but will require a contribution from each student  of £20 to cover the full cost of the visit. To secure your place you need to book and pay by following the attached link to the UEL eStore:

https://estore.uel.ac.uk/product-catalogue/schools/architecture-computing-and-engineering-ace/ace/ace/level-4-engineering-student-day-visit-to-the-mini-plant-cowley-oxfordshire-221119

Learning Outcomes & Assessment

 

The Learning Outcomes covered in this piece of work are:

EG4019 – Subject-based practical skills

 

  1. Undertake discipline specific codes of practice and industry standards.
  2. Apply appropriate knowledge and skills to communicate effectively with a wide range of audience – construction, technical specialists and laypersons.
  3. Develop self-awareness and awareness of local and global issues; identify their roles within a team and their positive/negative impacts on the environment and society.

 

The marks to be allocated for this piece of work are based around the coverage of the UEL Mental Wealth Competencies as noted below

The UEL Competencies that can to be demonstrated are:

 

Mark Allocation
Digital Proficiency (DP), e.g. 20%
Ability to use MS Word presenting text and images in good professional English; understanding and demonstrating the use of Turnitin for submission works.  
   
   
Industry Connections (IC), e.g. 40%
Understanding the work undertaken in Industry; understanding the roles of industry personnel and their responsibilities; Understanding what industry personnel  like/dislike about their jobs; understanding your need to make connections and network.  
Social Intelligence Development (SID), e.g. 40%
Understanding leadership and entrepreneurship; understanding meeting the needs of the client; understanding the need to work in partnership with other stakeholders.  

 

Submission Format & Feedback

 

By Turnitin link in Word or PDF format located on Moodle Site EG41019 by the DEADLINE ACCORDING TO THE OUTLINE SCHEME OF WORK  at 4pm as stated in Table 1.  The Word count should be @ 500 words   with use of clear labelled photographs to show what was seen.

You are encouraged to make use of the CfSS review of work by submitting to ‘My Feedback’ at least 2 weeks before the deadline.

Work will be marked and returned by your tutor via the Turnitin Grademark within 15 working days

 

Links to Diary & Final Reflective Report.

Note that the you will also be assessed for your individual and group working methods whilst working on this Engineering Challenge and evidenced in your Reflective Log and Report.  Make sure you log what you do as part of your Reflective Log using the Reflective Log Template provide on MS Teams and shown in Table 3.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EG4019 Manufacturing Visit –

Question Prompts & Log

 

Real automobiles do not get manufactured on paper! Seeing productions take place in the realm of dirt, materials, labour, and equipment, is an important part of learning about the making of cars. The ability to knowledgeably observe work in progress is also an important skill for the design, engineering or manufacturing professional.

 

 

Over the course of this semester you will be able to visit several sites to observe work in progress, record your observations, and where necessary, follow up later with analysis of what you have seen. You may record details during a single site visit or span a series of regular visits to a site over the course of the Semester.

The production of this ‘Site Diary Log’ will be a culmination of both the University organised visits and visits that you will arrange by yourself or in groups of two or three.

Take plenty of images and ask questions about what you see and hear.

Observations should be made in the form of notes, and annotated sketches or photographs. In cases where follow-up comments or research are needed, provide concise, clear explanations, and note your sources of information. You may use the form on the following pages as a template for recording your observations and follow-up notes. During each visit, try to answer as many of the following questions as possible:

 

 

  Topics Descriptions / Facts Questions / Notes
1 Types of facilities available for car production? Machinery/laboratory/research/design software.  

 

 

2 What are the main technologies used in car production?  

 

3 What are the orderly steps of car production?  

 

4 What are the main methods of construction seen or equipment used on the visit?  

 

5 Who did you meet during the visit?  What was their role?  Their profession?  

 

 

6 What were their main challenges faced in their role?  What do they enjoy about their work?  

 

 

7 How is care for workers demonstrated, e.g. health & safety and general tidiness?  
8 Other Notes – Remember to take and include at least FOUR interesting photos.  

 

 

 

Our staff identifies itself closely with Bharti. How are they going to take being transferred elsewhere?”

Strategic Outsourcing at Bharti Airtel Limited
Budgeting for capital expenditures was a nightmare. Every time we had a change in the network plan we were forced to go back to the vendor and start over. . . . We would have three or four reviews per year. . . . It showed a real conflict of interest between the operator and the vendor.
— Akhil Gupta, June 2005
Akhil Gupta, joint managing director of Bharti Airtel Limited (the Indian telecommunications firm formerly known as Bharti Tele-Ventures Limited), dropped a newly penned purchase agreement with network suppliers into his inbox, but Gupta did not feel like celebrating. It was early 2004, and the deal had taken three months and a quarter of his time to finalize. Bharti’s customer base was growing 100% per year, and it was a huge challenge to keep pace with network expansion. Very soon Bharti Airtel would be back at the negotiating table for the fourth time in 12 months. “Budgeting and the tendering1 process for network expansion is taking up a tremendous amount of management time and bandwidth—bandwidth that is needed elsewhere,” said Gupta.
Managing the firm’s IT capital expenditures was another challenge. As Gupta explained:
Our CIO would come to me with a budget, reflecting that the equipment we bought in the last couple of years was no longer of much use; the new software wouldn’t run on it. This was painful because we realized that we spent $15 to $20 million and there was already talk of throwing it away because its only use was as a mail server. That’s a heck of an expensive mail server!
In the midst of these wildly unpredictable expenditures, Gupta felt that Bharti badly needed a lean and predictable cost model:
We want to exploit the potential of 300–400 million Indian phone customers. Their purchasing power is relatively low compared to the U.S. and Europe—there is no way our average customer will pay $10 a month for this service. We need a lot of customers with $4 and $5 revenues per month. If we had a reliable, predictable usage-linked cost structure then we could become the lowest-cost producer of minutes not only in India but perhaps in the world.
1 Soliciting vendors’ bids for contracts. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
From the inbox, Gupta’s eye strayed over to the opposite side of his desk. There in the corner was the plan that he and his team hoped, would solve his capital expenditures nightmares. This plan consisted of two outsourcing proposals: one to Bharti’s key telecom network equipment vendors, Ericsson, Nokia, and Siemens; and the other to its IT equipment vendor, IBM. The documents proposed completely handing over the buildup and management of Bharti’s telecom and IT network to these vendors. Gupta explained:
For the first time in telecom history, perhaps anywhere in the world, the network equipment vendor and the operator would be on the same side of the table. Right now, the equipment vendors make more money when they sell more boxes to us, whereas we needed to ensure that we buy fewer boxes but get maximum capacity and coverage to stay competitive. This [caused] an inherent conflict of interest between the two of us. I felt that we needed a completely different equation.
Although Sunil Mittal, the company’s chairman and managing director, had given Gupta free rein to investigate the idea with his colleagues and vendors, thus far he had encountered either stunned
silence or outright resistance. “They reacted as if I had suggested giving the family jewels to outsiders,” said Gupta. The vendors, on the other hand, were worried about taking on additional risk. He wondered whether he would be able to overcome the objections of his colleagues and the vendors and make this idea work.
Bharti History and Background
Mittal founded Bharti in 1995 with $900 in start-up capital.2 Mittal was an entrepreneur who had created and successfully managed several businesses, including a bicycle components business, a portable generator import business, and a venture with Siemens to produce telephone equipment. His goal in creating Bharti Airtel Limited was to take advantage of the liberalization of the Indian telecom market and to bid for a government license to operate the first private mobile telecom service in the Delhi area. Bharti won the government tender and immediately launched its service, known as “Airtel,” using the GSM (Global System for Mobile communications technology).
In the first eight years of its existence, Bharti grew by having what Mittal called “a single-minded devotion to the project and the industry.” As he also put it, ”Our business is telecom and nothing else.”3 Bharti was the first private provider on the market in Delhi and, in 1998, was India’s first private provider to turn a profit.4
As part of its drive for continuous expansion, Bharti aggressively pursued the acquisition of licenses for mobile operations in other geographic regions, or “circles.”5 This strategy required ever- greater capital inflows. In 1999, Bharti sold a 20% equity interest to the private equity firm Warburg Pincus. Soon after, New York Life Insurance Fund, the Asian Infrastructure Group, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and SingTel6 all acquired equity interests in Bharti. In 2002, Bharti went public on the Indian National Stock Exchange, the Mumbai (Bombay) Exchange, and the Delhi Stock
2 IBM website, www.ibm.com/news/us/en/2005/05/Business_Leadership_Forum.html, accessed May 10, 2006.
3 Krishna Palepu, Tarun Khanna, and Ingrid Vargas, “Bharti Tele-Ventures,” HBS No. 704-426 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2003). Original source: Sunil Mittal quoted in Chakravarti, “Tour de Telecom.”
4 Ibid.
5 Telecom service in India was divided into geographical areas, called circles, for the purpose of awarding mobile and fixed- line telephone licenses.
6 SingTel: Singapore Telecommunications Limited, a large Singapore-based telecommunications group.
2
Educational material supplied by The Case Centre Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I Order reference F362298
Exchange, raising $172 million in its initial public offering (IPO). In total, Bharti raised over $1 billion through foreign direct investments by the end of 2002.7
The capital inflow allowed Bharti to finance its next stage of growth. In 2001–2002, it obtained mobile licenses for 15 out of India’s 23 total circles and also obtained fixed-line licenses for six of them. In addition, leveraging its arrangements with SingTel, Bharti subsequently obtained licenses to become
the first private telecommunications service provider in India to launch national and international long-distance service.
By 2003, Bharti was present in all of the major economic and industrial centers—representing 91% of all mobile users in India (see Exhibit 9). It was also targeting growth in the remaining eight circles, even those in the most remote regions. Mittal and his team anticipated achieving full coverage of India by 2005.
From a financial perspective, Bharti’s position had significantly improved. March 2004 year-end results showed revenues of $1,113.4 million, a 100% increase over 2003. Able to take advantage of the economies of scale due to its larger network, Bharti improved its operating margins from negative (–2.25%) in 2003 to 16.9% in 2004. And while it had suffered a net loss in 2003, the next year saw a net income of $117 million. Return on equity in 2004 was nearly 12%. (Highlights of Bharti’s year-end financial statements in March 2004 are shown in Exhibits 1 and 2.)
Bharti Management and Organization
Bharti, like many of the large Indian industrials, was a family- or close to family-run business. Sunil Mittal was chairman and group managing director of Bharti Airtel Limited. His brother Rakesh Mittal was a board director; Rajan Mittal, another brother, was the joint managing director, overseeing the functional directors of marketing, business development, corporate affairs, and corporate development.
Gupta had known the Mittals for many years and was with Bharti Airtel from its inception. A chartered accountant with a degree from Delhi University, he was CFO from 1995 to 2000, becoming joint managing director in 2001. As joint managing director and CFO, Gupta had responsibility for overseeing the functional directors of finance, information technology, special projects, and regulatory and secretarial concerns. (Bharti’s organization chart as of February 2004 is shown in Exhibit 3.)
Indian Market for Telecommunications
Prior to the 1990s, the Indian telecommunications environment showed very little change from the 1950s. It took several months, sometimes years, to install a telephone in a home or business, and mobile phones were a foreign luxury. “Even up to 1995, the biggest favor anyone could do for you in India was to get you a phone,” said Gupta.8
In 1991, India embarked on a policy of economic liberalization, opening up the sector to private competition and foreign investment. Private telecom firms could tender for licenses to operate in each of 23 designated circles. In 1989, before liberalization, there were 4.2 million telephone subscribers; by
7 The equity funds received by Bharti were classified as foreign direct investment and required approval from the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), two of the bodies governing the inflow and outflow of funds in India.
8 Interviews with Ahkil Gupta, June 2005.
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2003, telephone subscriptions numbered 54 million, and India’s telecom network had become the eighth largest in the world.9 Total Indian telecom revenue for 2003 was $8.5 billion and was growing at 17% per annum.10
Wireless services contributed about 18% of the $8.5 billion in telecom revenues (see Exhibit 4 for breakdown).11 Estimates for the wireless market through 2008 showed the market growing from US$1.5 billion to US$10.9 billion.12
Most Indian mobile operators had adopted one of the 2G (2nd generation) technologies—either GSM or CDMA. By 2003, it appeared that India would soon jump to 3G technologies, or at least to 2.5G technologies.13 Value-added services—including data transmission, short message service (SMS), games, ring tones, and ring-back tones (different kinds of music that the caller would hear)— were already being offered in urban areas.
Aside from the growth in 3G, huge potential remained in the development of basic phone services. The number of telephone connections (fixed and mobile) per 100 inhabitants in India in 2003 was fewer than six, whereas among all but four OECD countries it was over 100.14 Customer demand for telecom connections increased daily, and many were bypassing fixed lines and going straight to cell phones. In 2003, over 1.5 million people were signing up for cell phones every month.15
Unlike European and American operators, Indian operators chose to sell mobile phones and mobile telephone services separately. As a result, there was no handset subsidies burden on the operator. Mobile services were sold either on a postpaid or prepaid basis. About 60% of the business was prepaid—cards allowing the customer to recharge his telephone with telephone time were sold in kiosks, drugstores, and small convenience stores. The remaining 40% of the business was postpaid, for businesspeople or business customers who were billed for their telephone use on a monthly basis.16
Market Competition
By 2002–2003, the Indian market had grown highly competitive. Mobile rates were as low as three to four U.S. cents per minute, and ARPU—the average monthly revenue per customer unit—had fallen by 50% in three years as telecom providers fought to capture new subscribers. 17 The top
9 PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Telecommunication,” India Brand Equity Foundation, 2004, www.ibef.org. “Current Issue and Trend in Indian Mobile Market,” Report # 04025.
10 JM Morgan Stanley Equity Research Asia-Pacific, Bharti Tele-Ventures Ltd., June 9, 2005. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.
13 3G mobile technology for mobile telephony is analogous to broadband technology for fixed line in that it provides a similar level of enhanced service—rapid data transfer and the capacity to manage all manner of communication (video, voice, data, multimedia). 2.5G technologies are improvements to 2G technologies that provide many of the same advantages as the 3G technologies.
OECD,
14 http://caliban.sourceoecd.org/vl=4373012/cl=20/nw=1/rpsv/factbook/06-03-02.htm, accessed August 2, 2006.
OECD Factbook 2006—Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. Published by Source
15 “Current Issue and Trend in Indian Mobile Market,” Report # 04025. Research on Asia Group 2003. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid.
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competitors were able to lower their unit costs as their market shares increased through acquisitions or bankruptcy of smaller competitors.
By 2003, there were seven major operators in the Indian telecommunications market: Bharti, BSNL, Hutchinson, Reliance, Tata, Idea Cellular, and MTNL. Bharti and three others had operations in both the fixed and mobile segments. The others operated only in the mobile segment. There were also several strong regional mobile operators, such as Spice and BPL.
With industry consolidation, the focus was switching from having a national footprint to having the ability to provide value-added services. Operators needed 2.5G or 3G technologies to provide those services, and the transition upward from 2G represented a major capital investment challenge for any telecom operator. It was thought by some observers that the strong capital resources of players such as Reliance or Tata might give them a competitive advantage over the other operators.
Exhibit 6 describes each of Bharti’s top competitors. Exhibit 7 breaks down market share by competitor.
Bharti’s Telecommunications Network
By 2003, Bharti had obtained licenses for mobile operations in 15 out of the total 23 circles. It had a 25% market share of the total Indian mobile market and 6 million mobile subscribers. In fixed-line services, it had 1 million customers and licenses for six circles. Upcoming regulatory changes would also allow Bharti to expand wire-line services into any of the circles in which it held a wireless license. Growth in both sectors—wire line and wireless—was expected to be exponential over the coming 18 months as Bharti obtained licenses and built up operations to achieve nationwide coverage.
Operations and Service
Bharti’s operations were structured into three strategic business units (see Exhibit 8 for a detailed breakdown):
• Mobile Services: Providing 64% of Bharti revenues, this unit was where Bharti had achieved the most in terms of market dominance and customer service. In six out of 15 regions, Bharti had over 40% market share. It focused on providing excellent customer service through “error-free” service (low call drop rates, broad coverage, etc.), cost efficiency, and innovation in new products and services. Bharti offered postpaid or prepaid billing options, BlackberryTM service, conferencing, fax and data transmission, and other services such as jokes, games, news, and even astrology via the mobile phone.
• Long-Distance, Group Data, and Enterprise: Providing 30% of revenues, these services allowed Bharti to leverage its recently completed high-speed fiber-optic network. This network spanned 24,000 kilometers (kms) and connected almost all the major cities in the country. Bharti could now provide “end-to-end service,” broadband, long-distance, videoconferencing, and dedicated data and voice line services to business customers.
• Broadband and Telephone Services: Providing 16% of revenues, this unit provided wire-line- based telephone services in six circles and broadband services in all major economic centers. Broadband-related services included DSL to homes and businesses, WiFi, virtual private network (VPN), and video surveillance.
Ten percent of revenues pertained to intersegment eliminations.
5
Technology and Development
By March 2004, Bharti’s mobile network connected 1,400 towns using GSM technology. By the end of 2007, Bharti expected to have GSM service up and running in all the 5,161 census towns. To meet this objective, 100 towns per month on average were to be brought into the system.
Bharti had roughly 5,000 base stations at the end of March 2004. In order to accommodate the required demand for service by March 2007, that number would need to jump to 40,000 and would require the hiring of over 2,000 to 3,000 people to build and maintain them.18
Bharti had also begun deploying EDGE, a 2.5G GSM-compatible technology that allowed it to upgrade its services to 3G performance levels. This was first done in Mumbai and would later be introduced elsewhere in the network. (See Exhibit 9 for Bharti’s mobile footprint as of mid-2003.)
Bharti’s long-distance network used fiber-optic cables around India. It was present in the international carrier business through the group’s participation in the i2i undersea cable system—a joint venture with SingTel. Its international capacity had been further enhanced by a joint venture it had entered into with SingTel and 13 other telecom groups for the construction of SEA-ME-WE4, the Singapore-France submarine cable.
Bharti’s Relationships with Its Vendors
As Bharti’s presence in the Indian market grew, so did the number of relationships Bharti had with network suppliers. Its initial GSM network was set up with the help of Ericsson. By early 2003, Bharti was also working with Nokia and Siemens, among others. Bharti purchased equipment, installation, and maintenance services from each of these suppliers in one or more of the regional circles in which it was present.
Because the GSM technology was a very open standard, Bharti was comfortable working with several suppliers and could change suppliers if the services offered by one proved unsatisfactory. “In today’s telecom world, it’s very easy, because everything is ‘plug and play,’” said Gupta. This also meant that the environment was very competitive between telecom vendors. As Sunil Mittal explained, “Every six months there was a fresh tender for network expansion. There used to be a parade with one vendor playing against another.”19
Along with the operations teams, Gupta managed the process of tendering, negotiating, and working with the vendors to install the expanded capacity, but he was uncomfortable with the results. “Typically in the industry, these vendors will sell you a list of components, ‘boxes’—an MSC [a switching station], a BSC [a base station], etc.,” said Gupta. There was an inherent conflict of interest in this approach since the vendors always tried to sell more equipment, while the operator wanted
maximum coverage and capacity with as little equipment as possible. A typical network used only 60% to 70% of its installed capacity at any point of time. “What we needed was capacity— erlangs,” Gupta said. Erlangs were a measure of telecom traffic. One erlang equaled a circuit that was occupied for 60 minutes in a busy hour.
Industry practice was to purchase about 30% to 40% excess capacity in order to keep one step ahead of customer demand and to compensate for the estimation error of models used to predict capacity of different network configurations. For the telecom operator, that also meant purchasing
18 Shelley Singh and Rajeev Dubey, “The man who gave away his network,” by Business World India, October 4, 2004, www.businessworldindia.com/oct0404/coverstory01.asp., accessed May 12, 2005.
19 Company source.
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more sites, installing electricity in those sites (generators and air conditioners, if necessary), hiring staff to maintain the sites and, of course, installing the telecom equipment required. For Bharti, in terms of capital assets on its balance sheet, the 30% excess capacity through 2007 would represent something in the range of $300 million to $400 million.20 Financial requirements were not Bharti’s only concern; there was also the delay, which the firm could ill afford given its rapid growth, between the time that the need for additional capacity was identified and the time that the additional capacity could be up and running. The process of planning, tendering, financing, purchasing, and installing could take anywhere from six months to a year.
IT Requirements
Bharti needed an IT network that could scale up to match the size of the organization it projected to become in a few years. “There was the problem of scalability in our system. With the very rapid growth, we would soon be making decisions that could not be altered later on and for which we might be sorry,” Dr. Jai Menon, group CIO for Bharti, explained.
Bharti looked increasingly to its vendors to provide expertise in integrated systems design. “Our core competency was in operations, not IT design, and thus we could not do much of the architecture software and hardware design we required,” said Menon.
Generally speaking, Bharti’s IT requirements fell into one of three categories:
1. The telecom network systems and software. These specifically related to the basic functioning of the telecom connection and switching system.
2. Customer management information systems that allowed for the collection of data on customer use, service quality, and network reliability, and programs that gave customers access to value-added services such as ring tones or Java games.
3. Business-support software and hardware architectures, including internal programs such as billing, security, user programs, Internet access, and human resources or financial databases and systems.
Bharti contracted with IBM, Sun Microsystems, HP, and Oracle for business-support software and hardware architectures and customer management systems. Bharti’s IT infrastructure was further complicated by the fact that it had inherited other IT systems—frequently incompatible with existing ones—through acquisitions of telecom operators. The company had also been forced to look outside of its established vendors for certain applications they did not offer, such as fraud management. Unfortunately, many of these arrangements could be described as “fragmented bubbles of outsourcing,” as Menon put it. Many were incompatible and could not be built upon to meet Bharti’s anticipated requirements. As a result, Bharti knew that it was facing huge up-front investments in IT in order to get the right architecture in place and ready to support its growth over the next 10 years.
Human Resources Issue
Related to both IT and network development requirements was the question of human resource scarcity. With constant growth in the market, Bharti was finding it more and more difficult to hire and retain the best and the brightest. In network development alone, Bharti would need to hire 2,000– 3,000 people to accompany network development in 2004. As Gupta put it: “Think of it from the
20 Ibid.
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perspective of a talented IT or telecom guy. Would you rather go work for one of the world’s top multinational firms, large in size and reputation, or for a local upcoming operator like us?”
Bharti’s Proposed Deal
In the folder on the corner of his desk, Gupta had the proposed outlines of a two-pronged outsourcing structure for Bharti with its vendors. Gupta’s strategy included handing over responsibility for the buildup, maintenance, and servicing of the telecom network to equipment vendors. Gupta and his people were talking with Nokia, Siemens, and Ericsson as potential partners. In addition, Gupta was planning to outsource the buildup, maintenance, and servicing of Bharti’s core IT infrastructure to IBM. Other vendors besides IBM had been considered, but discussions had gone the farthest with IBM since few IT vendors had experience handling all of the aspects of the proposed deal.
Below are excerpts from each proposal:
Ericsson, Nokia, and Siemens:
• The vendor will provide Bharti with network capacity—erlangs—in accordance with Bharti’s projected erlang requirements in each of the circles in which Bharti operates and for which they are responsible according to this agreement. In exchange, Bharti agrees to pay the vendor a fee according to the amount of erlang capacity installed. The actual payment for network capacity will be made only when the capacity is up and running and has been used by Bharti customers, thereby excluding payment for unused capacity at any point in time.
• Once erlang capacity is installed, ownership of the assets responsible for producing that capacity belongs to Bharti. The responsibility for maintaining the network in good working
order, however, rests with the equipment supplier under an operations and management (O & M) agreement.
• In order to ensure the quality of Bharti’s service to its end customers, network capacity provided by equipment suppliers will be subject to a number of quality controls specified in service level agreements (SLAs). These are measures of network quality, such as the number of dropped calls and the number of incomplete calls, that will be determined jointly by Bharti and the equipment supplier. [Penalties and rewards linked to quality achieved were provided.]
• This agreement is to be for an initial period of three years, subject to renewal by mutual agreement.
IBM:
 IBM will provide Bharti with complete and comprehensive end-to-end management service for supplying, installing, and managing all of its hardware and software requirements as concerns the basic IT architecture of the company and all of the applications needed to operate it. The outsourcing includes everything from the computer on the desktop all the way up to the mainframe, but excludes all telecom network-specific structures and networks. It includes all internal customer service and all negotiations with external software and hardware suppliers. It also includes the maintenance of all hardware and software, including those provided by other vendors such as security, data warehousing, fraud management, business intelligence, human resource management, financial, and enterprise management systems and software, among various others.
8
• In order to ensure the quality of Bharti’s service to its employees and end customers, IBM services will be subject to a number of quality controls specified in the SLAs, such as hotline customer satisfaction and new application implementation delays. [In the network proposal, a penalty and reward mechanism was provided for.]
• In exchange for these services, Bharti agrees to pay IBM a share of its revenues. This agreement is to last for a period of five years, renewable for another five years, for a total of 10 years. The percentage of revenue shared will progressively decline as overall revenue increases.
In discussing the proposals with his vendors, Gupta made it understood that the Bharti personnel presently carrying out tasks that would be taken over by the vendors would be transferred to the vendor in question. A network manager at Bharti today, for example, would become an Ericsson, Nokia, or Siemens employee tomorrow. Should the proposal be accepted by the vendors, around 270 IT staff and 800 network staff could be transferred out of Bharti.
Reactions at Bharti
Don Price, the CTO of Bharti’s Mobile Services, was one of the first with whom the new idea was discussed. He had been in the mobile telecommunications business from its inception in the U.S. with McCaw Communications and was one of the most experienced CTOs in the world. He had never seen such an arrangement before and had expressed serious reservations about handing over network management and operations to the vendors. “The vendors may have access to the world’s best technology, but we have the operating expertise,” said Price. He grumbled, wondering whether “the financial ‘eggs’ with no network operations experience thought this one up. Operations . . . it’s our bread and butter.”
The IT and marketing departments were concerned that software or hardware applications not supported by IBM would no longer be available. Would IBM be willing to work fairly with other vendors, or would the agreement mean that Bharti would no longer have access to certain creative new applications? They were also concerned about the implications the deal would have on the time to market of new IT-based services for customers. “OK, give the large fundamental innovation to IBM . . . but keep the quick shots in-house!” was what one senior marketing manager had to say.
Meanwhile, the human resources department was wondering how they would manage the transfer of nearly 1,000 staff members. Some staff might not want to be transferred, or perhaps the vendors might not want to take them. One manager worried: “Bharti is a much smaller company, an Indian company. We have a different way of working with people—India is not a hire-and-fire country. The vendors are much bigger, and they’re worldwide companies. The cultures are different. Our staff identifies itself closely with Bharti. How are they going to take being transferred elsewhere?”
Reactions within the company ranks were mild when compared with comments Gupta received after presenting the project to the board of directors. Many were longtime telecom industry practitioners, and to them it was difficult to justify changing from the accepted practices. Gupta had heard one board member comment, “What makes you think that Bharti, an upstart in this industry, could teach the world what to do?” The main concern expressed by all of the board members was the risk of excessive dependence upon the vendors. Gupta recalled the prevailing sentiment of the board: “You will become their slaves.” In response to their concerns, SingTel—which was represented on the board—sent a group of experts in to evaluate the project. “Needless to say, the initial reaction of the board was not highly supportive—in fact, the general feeling was negative,” explained Gupta.
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Vendor Reactions
Initial reactions from vendors were mixed. They liked the opportunity to do more business with a major player—Bharti—but they were concerned with the risks and the need to get ”buy-in” from the top levels in their organization. A major concern was that they might be stuck with important investments in network equipment that they made on behalf of Bharti in the event that Bharti did not use the equipment. If Bharti was transferring the equipment investment risk to the vendors, what was the upside in the deal for them? It was unlikely that they would be able to increase equipment prices to cover all the increased risk.
They were also concerned with absorbing hundreds of Bharti employees. Some of the vendors had very light organizations that would be overwhelmed with such a sudden expansion in the number of employees. Besides the sheer numbers, there was a question of managing the corporate cultural mix. “Our cultures, values, and systems are somewhat different,” they fretted.
Of course, there were dangers in not signing with Bharti. Bharti would be growing very fast over the next few years. If the vendors turned down this business now, making it look as if they were unwilling to take risks in India, they might later be locked out of lucrative deals not only with Bharti, but perhaps with other operators as well. With the impressive growth projected for the market, most vendors were
looking to increase their operations and their market share in India. Nokia, for example, had very little business with Bharti and was behind Ericcson in terms of market share in India. Ericcson, on the other hand, was anxious to lock in its position with Bharti, with which it had been dealing since 1995.
IBM also had concerns about the deal. Although it was keen to develop worldwide partnerships with major clients per its international “on-demand” strategy, it had until now not even envisaged a revenue share arrangement with a client. If IBM were to take a percentage of Bharti’s revenues in exchange for its equipment and services, it would have to forecast Bharti’s revenue growth in order to estimate how much it would get paid over the next five to 10 years. Yet the investments in IT hardware, software, and people on behalf of Bharti would have to be made by IBM today. To them, it represented a major and unfamiliar risk.
Overall, this meant that IBM needed to be fairly sure of Bharti’s future success. Although it knew from experience that there was a strong association between a company’s success and the quality of its IT network, IBM could not be certain that its investment in this project today would improve Bharti’s chances for success in the future. In fact, IBM’s deal with Bharti felt more like betting on a horse in a horse race. IBM was hoping that the signs were right and that Bharti would be a winning horse.

• The mobile phone: The mobile phone consists of two parts, the phone itself and the SIM card. SIM stands for subscriber identity module. The SIM card is inserted into the phone and is basically a memory chip or a ”smart card” with the user’s identity codes and some specific user information such as frequently called numbers or ring tones. The SIM card also allows the user to switch phones without completely reprogramming his handset.
• The base substation: This is the first link in the connection between the mobile set and the telephone network. There are two parts to the base substation. The first, the base transceiver station, is really just a big tower with antennas on top. There are always at least two towers— one for inbound and one for outbound transmission.
The second part to the base substation, the base station controller, manages communication and transmissions between the base transceiver stations and the rest of the network, notably the switching station. One base station can manage up to several hundred base transceiver stations. A base transceiver station can cover an area of 30 to 40 square kms, but if it is located in a congested area, the coverage is much smaller.
Cellular networks get their name for the pattern in which base transceiver stations are distributed around the base controller station and the pattern by which the network is added to as the user requirements increase. Cellular networks take the form of a honeycomb. As can be seen from the diagram below, the transceiver stations are arranged around the controller station with the controller station at three of the points in the honeycomb. If additional coverage is needed, additional antennas are added on the transceiver station. An antenna that
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previously operated on a 120-degree basis would now only operate on 60 degrees; the new antennas would take over the remaining 60 degrees.b
The network substation: Data from the base substation comes into the network substation through the mobile services switching center (MSC). From the switching center information is communicated either to other base substations in the network, to other mobile systems, or to a fixed-line system for connection to the intended party.
The mobile services switching center has several databases at its disposal that provide information and validate identities of the caller before passing the communication on. They include:
• Home location register (HLR)—a database with information about subscribers including their identity and service profile
• Visitor location register (VLR)—a database also containing information about subscribers, but with more specific data concerning their whereabouts. During a call it provides information on where to find a subscriber.
• Authentication center (AC)—acts as an interface between the switching center and the HLR and the VLR, allowing the process of user verification and location to be carried out
• Equipment identity register (EIR)—a database containing the list of all valid mobile equipment in the networkc
Source: Various websites as noted. aCompiled by casewriter based on information from www.coai.in/aboutus-technology.htm, accessed May 20, 2005.
bCompiled by casewriter based on information from www.privateline.com/Cellbasics/Cellbasics02.html., accessed January 5, 2006.
cCompiled by casewriter based on information from www.privateline.com/PCS/GSMNetworkstructure.html, accessed May 20, 2005.
Exhibit 6 Indian Telecom Competitors
Bharti competed with six major operators in the Indian market, as follows:
BSNL:
Former monopoly and still a state-owned business. The oldest telecom operator in the country, its fixed-line operations were omnipresent. In 2003, BSNL still had a subscription base representing 86% of the fixed-line market. It was expected that its market share in fixed-line operations would decline to 58% by 2008 but that its market share in mobiles would rise from 16% in 2003 to 22% by 2008. Overall, it would remain a strong player.a
MTNL:
Set up in 1986 to facilitate the upgrading of telecom services to the metropolitan centers of Delhi and Mumbai (Bombay), this operator was partially state owned (52.25%) and ran a fairly modern network in those cities and the surrounding regions with fixed-line services to 4.4 million subscribers, or 12% of the Indian market, and mobile services to 500,000 customers, or 1.3% of the Indian market. Broadband services were to be introduced in 2003.b
Hutch-Essar:
Hutchinson’s Indian operations represented a joint venture between Hutchinson Whampoa, the Hong Kong-based conglomerate, and the Essar Group, one of India’s largest corporate houses. Hutchinson’s investment in the Indian telecom market began in 1992; its cooperation with Essar dated back to 1999.
Hutch India had limited itself to the mobile sector of the telecom market—it had no fixed- line operations. Its mobile strategy was to target the premium segment. In 2003, it was present in 13 of the 23 circles and had 4.1 million customers, or 12% of the mobile market.
Tata:
Tata Teleservices was the telecom arm of the Tata Group. Partnering with Motorola, Lucent, Ericsson, and ECI Telecom, Tata had 600,000 wireless customers, or just under 2% of the mobile market in 2003. Tata also had a one-third stake in the wireless provider Idea Cellular (see below).
Idea Cellular:
A three-way joint venture between Tata, Birla (another large Indian industrial group), and AT&T, the company adopted the name of Idea Cellular in 2002. It was present in seven circles, four of which represented some of the largest economic and industrial centers. With this concentration, it was able to capture a customer base of 3.7 million customers, or 11% of the entire mobile market in 2003.c
Reliance:
Reliance Infocomm was a subsidiary of the Reliance Group, an Indian, family-run $22.6 billion conglomerate. Reliance entered the market in 2002 with both wireless and wire-line services.
17
Reliance’s key strengths lay in its brand new installed fiberglass network with over 60,000 kms of optical cable stretching throughout India; it was integrated (wireless and wire line) and convergent (voice, data, and video). Reliance had introduced broadband applications including Java applications for the Internet, VPN connections for business clients, and global positioning for vehicle tracking.
In wire line, Reliance had 500,000 customers in 2003 but was expected to increase its customer base to over 8 million by 2008. In wireless, Reliance had a 19.5% market share, representing 6.6 million customers. It was expected to reach 21% market share and 31 million customers by 2008.d
Source: Various websites as noted.
aCompiled by casewriter based on data from JM Morgan Stanley Equity Research Asia-Pacific, Bharti Tele-Ventures Ltd., June 9, 2005.
bData from MTNL website, www.mtnl.net.in/about.htm, accessed January 4, 2006. cCellular Operators Association of India, www.coai.in/archives_statistics_2004_q1.htm, accessed August 3, 2005.
dCompiled by casewriter based on data from JM Morgan Stanley Equity Research Asia-Pacific, Bharti Tele-Ventures Ltd., June 9, 2005.

Has the advent of the digital age had any impact on how political leaders view the ability of weaker antagonists to compete politically with the more powerful side in asymmetrical conflicts?

https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635217727312
Media, War & Conflict
2018, Vol. 11(1) 107–
124
© The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permissions:
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DOI: 10.1177/1750635217727312
journals.sagepub.com/home/mwc
MWC
The role of the media in
violent conflicts in the digital
age: Israeli and Palestinian
leaders’ perceptions
Gadi Wolfsfeld
The Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Israel
Abstract
The role of the news media in violent conflicts is a topic that has received a great deal of scholarly
attention especially in the field of political communication. A major issue that has emerged in
recent years asks about whether the advent of the digital age has led to any significant changes
in the role the media play in such confrontations. In this article, the author focuses on two
research questions that seem especially important. The first asks: Has the advent of the digital
age had any impact on how political leaders view the ability of weaker antagonists to compete
politically with the more powerful side in asymmetrical conflicts? The second asks: To what
extent do political leaders involved in violent conflicts think that the changes associated with
the digital age have led to the media playing a more positive or negative role in attempts at
peace and reconciliation. The author tries to provide some initial answers to these questions
based on 30 interviews with Israeli and Palestinian political leaders. In answer to the first
research question, he did find some convincing evidence that the digital age has improved the
ability of weaker challengers to compete with their more powerful antagonists. The spread of
camera phones and the inability of the authorities to keep secrets help explain this change. The
answer to the second research question is also fairly clear. If the political leaders interviewed
are to be believed, the advent of the digital age represents a tremendous boon for spreading
hatred and intolerance. Revealingly, this is an area where almost total agreement among both
Israeli and Palestinian leaders was found.
Keywords
INFOCORE, media and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, media and peace, new media and conflict,
news and violent conflict, social media and conflict
Corresponding author:
Gadi Wolfsfeld, The Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Tel Aviv 972999, Israel.
Email: msgadi1@gmail.com
727312MWC0010.1177/1750635217727312Media, War & ConflictWolfsfeld
research-article2017
Special Issue Article
108 Media, War & Conflict 11(1)
The role of the news media in violent conflicts has received considerable scholarly attention,
notably in exploring the role of the media in uprisings and revolutions (Cohen and
Wolfsfeld, 1993; Wolfsfeld, 1997; Wolfsfeld, Frosh and Awabdy, 2008), terrorism (Hess
and Kalb, 2003; Norris et al., 2003; Liebes and Kampf, 2007; Papacharissi and De
Fatima Oliveira, 2008; Yarchi et al., 2013) and wars (Bennett et al., 2008; Wolfsfeld,
1997, 2004). Other studies have investigated the role of the media in conflict resolution,
especially the role of the media in peace processes (Hackett, 2006; Lynch and McGoldrick,
2005; Saleem and Hanan, 2014; Sheafer and Dvir-Gvirsman, 2010; Spenser, 2005;
Wolfsfeld, 2004; Wolfsfeld, Alimi and Kailani, 2008).
The vast majority of these studies dealt with the impact of traditional media, but this
article focuses on what has changed in the digital age, which can perhaps be best defined
as changes that have taken place in the collection and dispersion of information since the
invention of the personal computer and the development of the internet.1 Chadwick (2013)
presents perhaps the best description of these changes as a ‘hybrid media system’.
Chadwick’s major point is that it is critical to see the new communication environment as
one in which older and newer media not only feed off and influence each other, but also
have an ongoing impact on the overall flow of information among citizens. Chadwick
notes: ‘Internet-driven norms of networking, flexibility, spontaneity, and ad-hoc organizing
have started to diffuse into our politics and media, and these norms are generating new
expectations about what counts as effective and worthwhile political action’ (p. 210).2 Van
Dijk and Poell (2013: 3) make a similar point by noting: ‘Social media logic is increasingly
becoming entangled with mass media logic.’ Modern political leaders have little
choice but to adapt to this new media environment. This is a broad topic, so the current
study focuses on two research questions that touch on important areas where researchers
dealing with this topic might reasonably expect to find significant change.
The first question concerns the relationship between political power and power over
the news media. When it comes to these two variables, it is generally agreed that ‘the rich
get richer’ and the ‘poor [at the very least] remain poor’ (Wolfsfeld, 1997, 2015). The
advantages the powerful enjoy in the domestic arena also apply in the international
sphere (Golan, 2008; Jones et al., 2011; Kim and Barnett, 1996; Segev, 2014; Wolfsfeld,
1997, 2004). The first research question is: Has the advent of the digital age had any
impact on how political leaders view the ability of weaker antagonists to compete politically
with the more powerful side in asymmetrical conflicts?
The second area of interest concerns the role of the media in the resolution of conflict.
There is widespread agreement that traditional news media usually plays a negative role in
attempts to promote peace and reconciliation between antagonists (Lynch and McGoldrick,
2005; Sheafer and Dvir-Gvirsman, 2010; Wolfsfeld, 2004). One reason for this is that violence
and conflict are more likely to be considered news than any attempts at reconciliation.
Therefore, the second research question is: To what extent do political leaders involved in
violent conflicts think that the changes associated with the digital age have led to the media
playing a more positive or negative role in attempts at peace and reconciliation?
Scientific review of the literature
A basic, theoretical assumption in the literature is that the politically powerful have much
better access than the less powerful to the news media (Bennett, 1990; Bennett et al.,
Wolfsfeld 109
2008; Entman, 2004, 2007; Wolfsfeld, 1997, 2004). When it comes to internal conflicts,
the advantages the powerful enjoy are particularly obvious. The authorities have regular,
almost automatic access to the news media as legitimate sources, while weaker antagonists
must prove their newsworthiness, often through acts of disorder. Wolfsfeld (1997,
2015) referred to this imbalance as the difference between gaining media access through
the front door, while the rear door is intended for deviants who provide sufficient drama
to be admitted. Consequently, more powerful actors are more likely to be covered as
legitimate, while their challengers are more likely to be portrayed as deviants.
This principle can also apply internationally. One of the most obvious indicators concerns
how journalists are assigned to cover international affairs. It is not surprising that the
United States is the most covered country (Wu, 2000), or that the major European countries
host the greatest number of foreign reporters (European Federation of Journalists, 2015).
The richer and more powerful the country, the more likely it is that reporters from other
countries are permanently assigned there. This leads to an ongoing, routine flow of stories
from those countries that include both orderly news (such as elections and decisions about
policy) and disorderly news (such as violence and natural disasters). The mainstream media
in Western countries usually only covers the poorer parts of the world if something terrible
happens. Even then, a terrorist attack in Paris, Brussels, or the United States will receive far
more international coverage than one that happens in Beirut or Tunisia.3 However, the relative
wealth of a country is not the only reason for such editorial decisions about attention.
Other factors can include a country’s strategic interests, amount of perceived threat, and the
cultural proximity between the countries (Hawkins, 2011).
Some people believe that things have changed in the digital era. For example, pundits
point to the power of social media in the 2010 Arab Spring. The conventional wisdom
was that the emergence of social media provided protesters with the necessary tools to
bring down Egypt’s long-ruling Mubarak government. However, Wolfsfeld, Segev and
Sheafer’s (2013) study of 20 Arab countries and the Palestinian authority provided convincing
evidence of a negative correlation between the amount of social media penetration
and the outbreak of violence. The primary reason for this is that the wealthier Arab
countries had no shortage of internet and social media access, but very little political
discontent. In addition, the data showed that people joining social media were much
more likely to follow the outbreak of political unrest than to precede it. In short, the
political situation provided a far better explanation for the outbreak of violence than the
advent of the digital age.4
Nevertheless, it has become clear in recent years that those in power are finding it
increasingly difficult to control the flow of information. The development of the internet
meant that the entire world now has access to information and images that would not
have seen the light of day in the past. Mobile phones play a similar function in poorer
countries (Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 2013). A major reason for this is the massive proliferation
of smartphones, allowing users to record events as they happen and immediately
upload the images to YouTube and similar platforms (Allan, 2013;
Andén-Papadopoulos, 2013; Gregory, 2015). In keeping with Chadwick’s (2013) thesis,
it is critical to emphasize that we are not referring just to information that flows through
newer media. Such events receive their greatest amplification when they are picked up
and publicized by more traditional media.
110 Media, War & Conflict 11(1)
Although there have been many examples of this phenomenon in recent years, perhaps
the best known is the massive increase in videos of police brutality in the United States,
which has led to major public debate about the issue (Antony and Thomas, 2010; Goldsmith,
2010; Gregory, 2015; Robinson, 2011; Wilson and Serisier, 2010). In the field of political
communication, this change is sometimes referred to as the transition from ‘institutionally
driven’ to ‘event-driven’ news (Lawrence, 2000; Livingston and Bennett, 2003).
The difficulties that modern authorities face in the digital age are not limited to the
proliferation of cameras. The fact that activists can now break into the most secure databases
and spread their information worldwide has made it much more difficult for
authorities to keep secrets. The best-known examples of this include Wikileaks
(Chadwick, 2013; Sifry, 2011), the Snowden affair (Gurnow, 2014) and the Panama
Papers.5 This suggests that weaker antagonists now have tools enabling them to compete
with their more powerful adversaries, especially when these stories are picked up by the
mainstream media. Nevertheless, gaining public attention is quite different from bringing
about significant policy or regime changes.
Seeking peace in the digital age
The second research question looks at leaders’ perceptions about possible significant
changes concerning the mostly negative role the media plays in peace processes. It is
noteworthy that there is much more literature on media and violent conflict than on the
role the media can play in resolving conflict. Wolfsfeld (2004) argued that there is an
inherent contradiction between the needs of traditional news and the successful completion
of a peace process. With some exceptions, traditional news media is likely to make
an excellent tool for waging war but a poor one for bringing peace.6
The question is whether or not the advent of the digital age has improved this situation.
Some optimists might assume that the fact that groups working for peace are in a better
position to use social media for mobilization might lead to a more positive outcome. In
addition, the ability to communicate directly with people living on the other side of the
divide might also provide opportunities for reconciliation that were previously
unavailable.
However, initial research findings are far from encouraging. As with traditional
media, the internet and social media appear to primarily be used to spread hatred, intolerance
and violence, rather than peace. Gabi Weinman (2006, 2015) carried out extensive
studies about the ability of terrorist groups to exploit new media, not only for recruitment
but also to pass on information about building more lethal weapons. Social media also
enables other types of hate groups to spread their message (Chau and Xu, 2007; Citron
and Norton, 2011; McNamee et al., 2010). Extremists, who might have felt socially isolated
in the past, now find themselves in virtual communities with thousands of people
who share their views.
The same reasons why traditional media focuses on conflict and violence also explain
the popularity of similar content on the web. Audiences are drawn to drama, and ISIS
videos of prisoners being decapitated are far more likely to go viral than reports about
peace groups meeting to find common ground. The cliché ‘if it bleeds, it leads’ is probably
just as true in the digital world as it is in traditional journalism. This is a good
Wolfsfeld 111
example of where traditional media logic influences how newer media operates
(Chadwick, 2013; Van Dijck and Poell, 2013). While some virtual communities promoting
peace have been created, the initial evidence suggests that hate groups have benefited
far more from the dawn of the digital age than those promoting hope and reconciliation.
Methods
This research was conducted as part of INFOCORE, an international collaborative research
project funded under the 7th European Framework Program of the European Commission.7
The data here is based on one specific interest of a larger research project focused on the
ongoing interactions between political leaders and the media. Fifteen interviews were conducted
with Israeli leaders and another 15 with Palestinian leaders. Not all interviewees
were elected officials. Some were officials involved in diplomacy, while others were leaders
of political organizations. The major criteria for selection were that interviewees must be
somehow involved in promoting a particular political agenda and had ongoing contact with
the media concerning the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. All interviewees were promised anonymity,
so only a general description of their role and status is noted when they are quoted.
The Palestinian–Israeli case is an excellent place to start when asking these research
questions. It is clearly an asymmetrical conflict that often involves violence and has
generated an enormous amount of international political and media attention. In addition,
given that there has been an extensive amount of scholarly work on the role of traditional
media in this conflict, it provides a useful place to see what has changed.8
The interviews were all semi-structured and focused on a core set of questions.
However, the interviews were allowed to go in interesting directions that emerged in the
course of the interview. In this analysis, we specifically focused on four core questions
related to the two research concerns discussed above:
1. Many people have talked about the fact that people walking around with camera
phones have changed the nature of the news, meaning much more stories start
from the field. Do you think this new development has affected the news and the
conflict itself?
2. Can you think of other ways in which news or politics has changed because of the
creation of the internet?
3. Do you think that the internet in general, and social media in particular, have been
more beneficial for the forces of hate or the forces of reconciliation?
4. When it comes to violent conflict, can you think of any positive developments
associated with the dawn of the digital age?
The one-hour interviews were all conducted in person in 2015, in either Hebrew or
Arabic. They were recorded, transcribed, and then translated into English
Findings
The discussion begins by considering the first research question: Has the advent of the
digital age had any impact on how political leaders view the ability of weaker antagonists
112 Media, War & Conflict 11(1)
to compete politically with the more powerful side in asymmetrical conflicts? In general,
the political leaders who were interviewed believed that things had changed and that the
new media environment was more advantageous for weaker antagonists. Although the
technological changes have not eliminated the advantages that the political powerful
enjoy, the new media environment has improved the ability of weaker challengers to compete
with their more powerful adversaries.
One of the most important indicators of an antagonist’s ability to manage the political
environment surrounding any conflict is the extent to which they can control the flow of
information and images. In asymmetrical conflicts, a loss of control by the more powerful
antagonist can provide opportunities for the weaker side to bring third parties into the
conflict as allies and reduce disparity (Wolfsfeld, 1997).
It was apparent from talking to Israeli and Palestinian leaders that the former group
saw recent technological changes as a threat, while the latter saw these changes as an
opportunity. The most obvious, powerful change in this area has been the revolutionary
rise in the number of ordinary Palestinians and human-rights groups using camera phones
to record and upload abuses by Israeli security forces. The Israelis also have their own
cameras, which sometimes worked to their advantage, especially when capturing
Palestinian attacks on Israeli citizens. Nevertheless, the interviews made it abundantly
clear that the Palestinian leaders are far more enthusiastic about these changes than are
their Israeli counterparts.
A perfect example of this phenomenon occurred in March 2016, when an Israeli soldier
shot and killed a Palestinian attacker who was lying, wounded, on the ground.9
Someone connected to the B’Tselem human-rights organization videotaped the incident
and uploaded it to the web. The film led to a major public debate, both inside and outside
Israel, about whether or not the shooting was justified. The solider was arrested and
charged with manslaughter.10
Of course, there are similar examples of powerful videos that embarrassed authorities
long before the digital age. The powerful scenes of the Selma, Alabama, police beating
black protesters during the American civil rights movement (Lee, 2002; Roberts and
Klibanoff, 2008) is one of the best-known examples. The fact that these occurred during
the early days of television may have significantly increased the impact that those horrible
images had on the American public and political leaders. There have also been similar
examples in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Perhaps the best-known of these took
place in September 2000, when a petrified 12-year-old, Mohammad Al-Durrah, was
filmed hiding behind his father during a gun battle between Palestinians and Israelis. The
prevailing assumption was that the boy was killed by Israelis soldiers.
Nevertheless, the dramatic changes that have occurred in recent years cannot be
ignored. In the first intifada (Palestinian uprising), which broke out in late 1987 and
killed hundreds of people, not one incident was captured on film and shown in the news
(Alimi, 2007; Cohen and Wolfsfeld, 1994; Wolfsfeld, 1997).11 In addition, the al-Durrah
incident took place during the first days of the second intifada. Despite hundreds of
Israelis and Palestinians being killed, it would be difficult to find a similar episode
recorded on film.12
However, almost everyone today has a camera and can instantly upload their videos to
the internet. Such videos also originate in thousands of public surveillance cameras.
Wolfsfeld 113
Almost all Palestinian and Israeli leaders who were interviewed noted this change. Most
Palestinians saw this as a tool for revealing Israel abuses. The remarks of a Palestinian
leader, who also served in a senior position at a Palestinian university, were typical. When
asked about whether the proliferation of cameras affected the conflict, he responded:
Yes, it has a big influence. The public has started to practise media-related activities. They
monitor events and capture them with their smartphones. This explains why the Israeli army
assaults Palestinian civilians carrying their cameras more than Palestinian journalists. Media of
the public, so to speak, has a positive impact on spreading the Palestinian cause. But for the
Israelis, of course, it plays a negative role. (Pal 005, 1 December 2015)
A Palestinian director for a major political organization responded in a similar, if
somewhat exaggerated, manner:
Yes, it changed and left an influence. Instead of traditional media outlets becoming the source
of the news, social networks have become the main source of news. Sometimes they even
become more reliable sources when an event is immediately captured on camera and instantly
published on various social network sites. Therefore, social networks have superseded
traditional media outlets in becoming the source of news. (Pal 004, 27 November 2015)
None of these political leaders suggested that the flow of information exclusively runs
through social networks, but rather that newer media becomes an important new source
for all forms of media. A number of the Palestinian interviewees specifically focused on
the power of YouTube to make their case to the world. A head of a major Palestinian
organization said:
YouTube has helped a lot in disseminating news worldwide. It is the most influential and the
easiest method. For instance, some four months ago, Israeli soldiers attacked a young Palestinian
boy, 12-year-old Mohammad Tamimi from the village of Nebi Saleh, north of Ramallah. The
assault was captured on video cameras and immediately posted on YouTube. It reached all
corners of the universe and revealed the volume of Israeli violence in assaulting a little kid. It
also showed how the family tried to protect their kid during the attack. Moreover, Facebook has
a significant effect on disseminating news as information passes through in no time and with
minimal effort. (Pal 009, 28 December 2015)
One Palestinian interviewee, in charge of public relations for one of the ministries,
had a different view, talking about the more negative aspects of the spread of cameras:
Well, sometimes it is useful and has a positive impact on news-gathering as well as on the
conflict itself. But, on the other hand, almost 99 percent of images captured are taken in a
wrong way, leaving a negative impact that helps the Israelis more than the Palestinians. This is
the most serious element in dealing with social networks. Shots and videos should be captured
properly in a way that helps and serves the Palestinian cause and refutes the Israeli version of
the event. (Pal 007, 10 December 2015)
This quote reminds us that the ubiquity of cameras can also work to the disadvantage of
the Palestinian cause. The Israeli police and army employ trained photographers who
114 Media, War & Conflict 11(1)
accompany many units. They sometimes release these videos to reinforce official claims
about Palestinian terrorism. During the 2015–2016 wave of violence, videos of knifewielding
Palestinians attacking Israeli soldiers and civilians, before being shot, were far
more common than more controversial videos, such as those discussed previously.
The question remains as to why the proliferation of cameras is more of a problem for
the Israelis than the Palestinians. The answer brings us back to the international political
environment that opposes the Israeli occupation. The problem for Israeli political leaders
is that, from a strategic perspective, no news is good news. The Israeli government would
prefer that the conflict remain as far under the international radar as possible. Also, while
images of Palestinians attacking Israeli soldiers and civilians work to the government’s
advantage internally, many international audiences may consider such attacks understandable
or even justified.
The advent of the digital age has led to some changes regarding Israeli behaviour on
the ground, especially when war broke out. Again, the presence of cameras recording the
deaths of Palestinian civilians is nothing new. Indeed, an attempt to gauge the impact of
such images on international opinion and policy would more likely point to two historical
events: the 1982 Lebanese war and the first intifada that erupted in December 1987
(Wolfsfeld, 1997).
Nevertheless, concerns about the increasing presence of cameras on the battlefield
and the inability to control the flow of information have a significant impact on how the
Israeli military and political leadership think about military operations. Many Israeli
leaders talked about the bitter lessons they learned about this problem during the second
Lebanese war in 2006. The conventional wisdom was that one reason why the war
against the Hezbollah went so poorly was the continual flow of bad news coming from
the battlefield, especially from soldiers using their cellphones during the fighting.
Rapaport (2010: 52–53) convincingly wrote about the changes the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) made when they again went to war in Gaza in a conflict called Operation
Cast Lead:
Regarding operational discipline, a great improvement has occurred since the 2006 war. A
number of examples illustrate this: (1) The use of cellular phones during operational missions
has been forbidden completely, and this is enforced. (2) Leaks to the media have been reduced
significantly. Checks of telephone conversation emissions that were conducted after the second
Lebanon war revealed that dozens of senior officers had been in contact with journalists. The
scope of this phenomenon began to decline the moment Ashkenazi [the Chief of Staff] decided
to instate heavy penalties for media leaks. It appears that the Chief of Staff’s threats, along with
other factors, have been effective, as a check that was conducted of 550 officers during Cast
Lead found that none of them leaked information or conversed with journalists without the
mediation of the IDF spokesperson.
This conclusion did not mean that the Israelis felt in complete control of the flow of
information during the Gaza War. Many difficult images of the destruction were easily
uploaded to YouTube. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had people working full time to
respond to those images, particularly those it believed were staged or faked. The new
technology also made it easier for journalists and government officials to verify usergenerated
content.
Wolfsfeld 115
The lack of Israeli control over the flow of information is not limited to the proliferation
of cameras. It can also be attributed to the massive number of communication channels
that now enable the general public and leaders around the world to share information
and opinions about the conflict. Here too, it is important to emphasize that the ongoing
interdependence between older and newer media is one of the reasons the changes seem
to have had such an effect on general perceptions of the conflict. While this development
has provided Israel’s defenders with some helpful tools, most Israeli leaders view these
developments more as threats than opportunities. A leading official from the Israeli
Foreign Ministry talked about the difficulties Israel faced in the new media
environment:
Our main problem is facing your opponent, which is much more than the Palestinians, but all
those organizations that are on social networks. There is significance to mathematics. In
traditional media, let’s say, in front of the Washington Post, you and your opponent are going
with the story of the newspaper, and the situation is that either I managed to get the story or not.
In social media, the story is how many people you succeeded to reach and will pass on your
story. For example, in Europe, in France, there are between 500,000 and 600,000 Jews, and at
least 10 times more Muslims. Not all Muslims are automatically active in this anti-Israeli
activity. So, for example, in the Netherlands, Britain and other countries, demographics play a
role. The point is that, within the French-speaking space, there is a large majority of people
whose natural environment is against you. Therefore, this new media presents us with the
challenge of their control in numbers. (IS009, 16 August 2015)
It can be argued that the Israeli interviewees often found themselves constantly
involved in damage control. A useful metaphor would be a ship in which the sailors are
constantly attempting to plug leaks as the water keeps rushing in. The problem facing
the Israelis and other powerful antagonists is that the number of leaks has grown exponentially.
New leaks seem to emerge every day, and plugging them all becomes almost
impossible. The Foreign Ministry professional’s description provides an excellent
example of what happens as political leaders move from the news cycle to the much
less institutional, but more dynamic and fragmented political information cycle
(Chadwick, 2013).
The question remains as to if any of this has any significant long-term effect on the
conflict itself. It is helpful to consider two types of possible effects on the level of
restraint the Israeli military exhibits and the extent to which the international community
makes significant attempts to resolve the conflict.
First, the interviews with Israeli leaders suggest that they are more reluctant to engage
in military operations that involve massive civilian casualties. Some readers may be
skeptical of this conclusion, given the high number of Palestinian civilians killed in the
2014 Israeli–Gaza conflict, which suggests that the Israeli military is willing to pay the
price of international condemnation if it believes the alternatives on the ground are
worse. It is also likely that there are other factors at work, such as changing international
norms about civilian casualties. However, there is little doubt that all Israeli leaders take
the new media environment into account when planning such operations. At the very
least, they agree that the current political and media environments have increasingly
shortened the amount of time they have to carry out such operations.
116 Media, War & Conflict 11(1)
Turning to the second indicator, there is little evidence of significant changes in
the international community’s willingness to intervene in the conflict. While there
have been repeated international condemnations of Israel’s treatment of the
Palestinians, and a growing hostility towards the Jewish state, it would seem that a
good deal of the world has reached the conclusion that this is an intractable conflict.
It is also worth noting that many other recent international conflicts have been far
bloodier than the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Given the constant flow of horror emanating
from places such as Syria and Southern Sudan, the videos from Israel and
Palestine pale in comparison.
This suggests that, although the advent of the digital age has enabled the Palestinians
to compete on a more equal basis with Israel on the international stage, there is scant
evidence that this has led to any significant changes in the nature of the conflict or the
chances of any resolution. This pessimistic conclusion receives further support as the
discussion turns to the second research question.
Peace and hatred in the digital age
The second research question asks: To what extent do political leaders involved in violent
conflicts think that the changes associated with the digital age have led to the media
playing a more positive or negative role in attempts at peace and reconciliation? In
exploring this question, we found significant agreement among Israeli and Palestinian
interviewees. Interviewees perceive that the internet, like traditional media, is far better
at spreading hate and extremism than promoting peace and reconciliation. If accurate,
there is good reason to believe that the internet has made things worse. There are certainly
significant differences in the way Israeli and Palestinian leaders relate to this issue,
but they seem to agree that the internet in general, and social media in particular, have
made the chance for peace even less likely.
The discussion begins by considering the views of Israeli political leaders. One point
that frequently arose in the interviews was the conventional wisdom in Israel that a major
cause for the 2015–2016 wave of Palestinian violence was the incitement that spread
through the social media. This idea resonated within the Israeli populace, particularly
given the extremely young age of many of the perpetrators. The general consensus surrounding
this issue can be demonstrated by the fact that the speaker of the Knesset talked
about it during his annual Independence Day speech in May 2016:
Israel’s enemies incited against us without stop and sowed the seeds of hate and death. Social
media played a major role in spreading the wild incitement against us. It’s ironic that it [social
media], which is meant to join together, to bring countries and people together, has served those
who want to do us evil, to divide, distance, and break [us] up.13
Study of public discourse on this issue in Israel also revealed that claims about incitement
were not only adopted by the right-wing parties in power, but also the parties from
the centre, and even some who would normally be considered part of the peace camp.
One interesting comment on the issue of incitement came from a Knesset member of the
opposition, who surprised us by comparing what was going on among the Palestinians to
Wolfsfeld 117
some of what he learned in school about the more extremist Jewish movements who
fought against the British occupation of Palestine. He started by supporting the government
position on this issue:
It’s true … When you see an ISIS ‘snuff’ film, and they took your parents away and the like,
and it may not be nice to say, but it reminds me of the books I’d read as a child about Etzel and
Lechi, which would fill me with pride. Everyone always says that when God forbids someone
to commit suicide, you shouldn’t publicize it because it could lead to a chain reaction. Here, the
chain reaction works through the internet. On the internet, you learn everything: How to hate,
how to use weapons, everything.
Interviewer: So you think that has an influence on extremist groups?
Absolutely. Those forces become more powerful because to hate is easy, and to love is difficult.
(IS014, 25 November 2015)
A Knesset member who had extensive experience in both the military and Israel’s
attempts at public diplomacy expressed a more nuanced view of this issue. When asked
if he accepted the claim that incitement was a key factor in the recent wave of attacks, he
replied:
I can’t tell exactly which factor has more weight. Obviously, incitement is one factor in
encouraging violence, but it is not the only cause of violence. It encourages violence, but if
there was no infrastructure or political situation that has an effect on people, then incitement
wouldn’t do that. Propaganda can influence only when people have already mentally prepared
to take these actions. That’s how I see it. From all sources of incitement, what I think is most
effective in the Arab society is still television. It is true that this thesis about social media exists,
but in the Arab society it is still the television. I am talking about domestic and international
media, like Al-Jazeera. In the local media, there is an impact of the Palestinian Authority and
we can also influence them, so they are more cautious. But when it comes from Al-Jazeera and
many other similar TV channels and from others that dominate our sky, it does all the work.
(IS012, 1 November 2015)
This particular reply is particularly insightful with regard to two issues. The first is
that those who make claims about Palestinian incitement while ignoring the political
situation are deluding themselves. The idea that politics comes first was the central argument
in the article about the role of social media in the Arab Spring (Wolfsfeld, Segev
and Sheafer, 2013). The second insight is a further reminder to pundits and researchers
who hope to understand the role of the media in conflicts to never ignore the power of
television. This is probably especially true when it comes to the power of Al-Jazeera and
other Arab satellite news stations within Palestinian society (Lynch, 2006; Samuel-
Azran, 2013).
Another Israeli Knesset member was interviewed because of his high level of knowledge
and experience in diplomacy and dealing with the international media. He talked
about the ways in which the internet was also a boon for extremist groups among Israelis
and Palestinians. He specifically mentioned the Israeli right-wing group Lahava. News
118 Media, War & Conflict 11(1)
reports suggested that this Jewish anti-assimilation group was on the verge of being
declared a terrorist organization by the defence minister.14 The Knesset member was
asked about the major changes that had taken place since the dawn of the digital age, and
responded:
It changed in two major ways. The first way is that digitalization has increased the power of
Lahava groups to recruit and to indoctrinate, and to even instruct militarily building bombs.
And rather than advancing the cause of peace, almost invariably, the internet serves as a tool of
excitability and building bombs. It hasn’t brought understanding because usually people tend to
look at sites that confirm their ideas. They’re not looking to challenge their ideas on the internet,
and they get indoctrinated and instructed. We know that lone-wolf terrorists are people that
have been indoctrinated and instructed via the internet. I often say that the ones who benefit the
most from the internet are the people who are opposed to peace, not the ones who are in favor.
Because their message is easy to carry, and they were isolated, and now they’re not isolated. I
think they are much more likely to help hate groups, and terrorist groups, and Nazis, and
Islamic fundamentals. I think they have gotten the most out of the media revolution. And it’s
sad, but I really think that’s the case. (IS010, 20 August 2015)
There is one more Israeli viewpoint on this issue that is worth noting. One of the
Knesset members quoted earlier was a close associate of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
when he was involved in the Oslo peace process. The Knesset member’s thoughts about
what had changed since then are significant:
I’m not sure today that Rabin would have gone for Oslo. I mean he would have been bombarded
with millions of emails and the like, and that is a big deal. (IS014, 25 November 2015)
Assuming there is some truth to this point, it suggests that the digital age may create
similar problems for leaders who hope to either initiate peace negotiations or go to
war. The inability to control the flow of information from either negotiations or the
battlefield represents a serious obstacle to success. Add to that the increasing ability
of protest movements to quickly and massively mobilize against the government, and
one begins to appreciate the difficulties modern governments face in waging either
war or peace.
It was not surprising that the Palestinian leaders we interviewed were less likely to see
a problematic link between social media and the 2015–2016 wave of violence. When
they did talk about the violence, they either said it was invented by the Israelis as an
excuse for killing Palestinians or that it was a justified form of resistance to the Israeli
occupation. However, many interviewees did talk about the ability of more radical
groups to exploit the internet to achieve their goals. Consider the following comments
from a major figure in the Palestinian academic world:
The internet has contributed to spreading chaos, wars, and hatred much more than it has helped
in the educational or cultural spheres. At least this is how I see its influence in the Arab world.
I see no positive developments that serve the Palestinian cause. I read or watch real news in
traditional media outlets. As for social media, I see it as a tool for misleading people, confusing
their beliefs, and spreading lies in all directions. (Pal005, 1 December 2015)
Wolfsfeld 119
A similar sentiment was expressed by another Palestinian leader, a director of a semigovernment
organization that deals with the conflict:
The dissemination of frightening images of murder and killings have contributed a lot to
increasing hatred, while digital media should have been used and guided towards ending wars
and not increasing them. The digital age has allowed the spreading of news on destruction. It
gave all parties the chance to blame each other. It allowed a fast means of action and reaction,
blame and counter-blame. (Pal 004, 27 November 2015)
Some Palestinian interviewees also talked about how the internet had been a boon for
their enemies. Interestingly, Israel was not the only enemy that exploited digital tools
against the Palestinians. A political leader who was also involved in conflict-related
issues referred to both Hamas and Israel:
Unfortunately, the internet has played a major role for the bad more than for the good. Based on
the experience in Gaza, it served as a tool to threaten civilians and suppress their aspirations.
Yet, it all depends on the user. Hamas, for example, thought it could control the public through
social media or digital media, as it allowed it for some and prohibited it for others. At the same
time, the Israeli army used the internet and social media to recruit informers, and to frighten and
intimidate the civilian population. (Pal003, 17 November 2015)
Only one of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders disagreed with this pessimistic view of
the digital age. This exception concerned the attempts of the Israel Foreign Ministry to
reach citizens living in the Arab world. Their not-so-hidden agenda was to promote
Israel’s viewpoints in the Arab world. Many would argue that these attempts had nothing
to do with peace, but should really be seen more as a form of propaganda. They are certainly
seen by the Israeli government as a type of public diplomacy.
Nevertheless, one can also not ignore the number of Arab citizens around the world
who positively responded to these efforts. One official who was heavily involved in these
digital efforts noted:
As soon as we talk about digital media, you have more tools to measure, and have more ability
to keep track of things with hashtags, some kind of search or another. What we see at the microlevel
is that we reach people. We see who is following us because these studies have showed
that we are doing is not bad. It’s not just Israelis, and it is not only non-Israelis. We can see and
identify information that goes away and really comes to other media outlets. Important
examples come from those who are not considered pro-Israel. We have from the Arabic page
that, in terms of ‘likes,’ is our most popular, with 320,000 likes.
Interviewer: How can there be so many Arabs in this group?
Because it is working correctly. When we started, it was around 70,000.
Interviewer: Which Arabs are they?
Very diffuse. A lot from Egypt, Iraq and so on. They are involved and responsive, which is
important to us. The guys who work in Arabic, the message trickled down to them, and they
invest a lot of time in answering, do not leave the page without commenting, stimulate dialogue,
120 Media, War & Conflict 11(1)
and a lot of interesting things come out. It changes the situation very much compared to
traditional media. You have a real dialogue with the Arab population, which is amazing. (IS001,
1 February 2015)
It is noteworthy that this was the only positive comment we heard in all the interviews
we conducted. While there may be more exceptions, whereby some movements working
for peace are able to exploit the new technology for good, the overall impression suggests
that new media has made a bad situation even worse. If the leaders are to be
believed, both newer and older media appear to be far better at spreading hate and violence
than any voices for reconciliation.
Conclusion
The initial evidence presented in this article points to some interesting conclusions about
how the role of the media may have changed since the dawn of the digital age. The
increasing difficulties that powerful antagonists have in maintaining control over the
flow of information works to the advantage of the weaker side. The proliferation of people
with cameras seems particularly significant in this regard.
However, this does not mean that these changes have a significant impact on conflict
outcomes. There was some evidence that Israeli leaders had become increasingly
concerned about how more aggressive military actions would be covered in the
news. Nevertheless, the massive number of civilian casualties being caught on film
from conflicts around the world suggests that many have come to the conclusion that
military benefits of such actions outweigh any short-term costs to their image. We
should be careful about generalizing from this case because the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict receives an unusual amount of international attention. In addition, we need
to bear in mind that the findings in this study reflect leaders’ perceptions. Further
analysis is required before drawing any firm conclusions about the actual role of the
media. In any case, any other effects on asymmetrical conflicts will be gradual and
long-term. It will be up to historians to assess the overall impact that the internet has
on violent conflicts.
With regard to the second research question, results are extremely pessimistic. There
was nearly total agreement among the interviewees that social media is much more likely
to spread violence and hate than aid in any attempts at conflict resolution. It would be
important to look further into this issue using content analysis and the impact of this traffic
on various public groups. As with traditional media, we may find some exceptions to
this general rule, but there is no current good news on that front.
The research path forward is clear. First, we want to look at other violent conflicts and
see if these conclusions also help explain the role of the new media in other contexts.
Second, there is a need to look beyond leaders’ perceptions and attempt to use additional
methodologies to better understand the changing role of different types of media. Finally,
the two research questions asked here have barely scratched the surface in terms of the
issues that need to be addressed. The effects of technological changes will be minimal in
some areas and are likely to be more significant in others. The goal of research in this
area is to learn much more about such differences.
Wolfsfeld 121
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank my research assistants, who did most of the heavy lifting for this project: Yarden
Ben-Ami, Tom Dibon, Linor Tsfroni, and Elias Zananiri.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/
or publication of this article: This research was conducted as part of INFOCORE, an international
collaborative research project funded under the 7th European Framework Program of the European
Commission under Grant Agreement No 613308.
Notes
1. It is clear that the term digital age is a misnomer because all forms of media rely on digital
technology. Nevertheless, the fact that this term has become the most common way of
describing the changes that have taken place in recent years leads to the conclusion that the
advantages of using this term outweigh the disadvantages.
2. Some other important works on this topic include Miskimmon et al. (2014), Bennett and
Segerberg (2012), and Hood and Margetts (2007).
3. See http://usuncut.com/world/beirut-this-terrorist-attack-didnt-get-any-media/
4. These results are not meant to suggest that social media cannot be used as an important tool
for mobilization, especially in places where the mainstream media is controlled. However, the
necessary condition for protest (especially when protesters can be killed) is an intense sense
of political dissatisfaction.
5. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panama_Papers
6. For a better understanding of these exceptions, see Wolfsfeld (2004).
7. For details see: http://www.infocore.eu/
8. Some examples include Bishara (2013), Peterson (2014), Kampf and Liebes (2013);
Tenenboim-Weinblatt et al. (2016), Wolfsfeld, (1997, 2001) Wolfsfeld, Frosh and Awabdy
2008).
9. See: http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.710747
10. It also led to a major dispute between the Prime Minister and his defence minister, which some
believe was one of the reasons for the defence minister being replaced a few months later.
11. There were videos of Palestinians being beaten that led to serious problems for the Israeli
government (Wolfsfeld, 1987).
12. There was no shortage of horrible video images in the aftermath of violence, including terrorist
attacks by suicide bombers. However, the al-Durrah incident seemed to be the only one
where the killing was filmed.
13. See: http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.719228
14. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lehava
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Author biography
Gadi Wolfsfeld is a full professor of Political Communication at the Sammy Ofer School of
Communications at IDC, Herzliya. He is also an emeritus professor of Political Science and
Communication at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His research interests focus on the role of
the media in conflicts and attempts to achieve peace. His most recent book is Making Sense of
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Professor Wolfsfeld was awarded the Murray Edelman lifetime achievement award by the Political
Communication section of the American Political Science Association.

How do direct and indirect forms of participation – separate as well as in combination – affect organizational performance?

UNDERSTANDING WORKER
PARTICIPATION AND
ORGANIZATIONAL
PERFORMANCE AT THE FIRM
LEVEL: IN SEARCH FOR AN
INTEGRATED MODEL
Jan Kees Looise, Nicole Torka and Jan
Ekke Wigboldus
ABSTRACT
Last decades scholars in the field of human resource management
(HRM) have intensely examined the contribution of HRM to organizational
performance. Despite their efforts, at least one major research
shortcoming can be identified. In general, they have devoted far too little
attention to an aspect of HRM potentially beneficial for organizational
performance: worker participation, and especially its indirect or
representative forms. In contrast, for academics embedded in the
industrial relations tradition, worker participation is a prominent theme,
even though less emphasized in its relationship with company objectives.
One might defend traditional scholars’ reservations by arguing that
participation’s main goal concerns workplace democratization and not
Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations, Volume 18, 87–113
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organizational prosperity. However, several writers state that industrial
democracy involving worker participation can channel conflicts of interest
between employees and employers and stimulate desired employee
attitudes and behavior, consequently enhancing organizational performance
(e.g., Gollan, 2006; Ramsay, 1991; Taras & Kaufman, 1999).
And, indeed, several studies have shown positive effects of both direct
participation (e.g., European Foundation for the Improvement of Living
and Working Conditions, 1997) and indirect participation (e.g., Addison
et al., 2000, 2003; Frick & Mo¨ller, 2003) on organizational performance.
Nevertheless, to date, the absence of an integrated model explaining the
connection between worker participation and organizational performance
leads to the following question that still is in need of an answer: how do
direct and indirect forms of participation – separate as well as in
combination – affect organizational performance? This chapter aims to
contribute to the filling of the aforementioned knowledge gaps. In so
doing, we focus on direct and indirect, nonunion participation on the firm
level, using a Western European and especially Dutch frame of reference.
Keywords: Direct participation; indirect participation; firm-level;
performance; the Netherlands
INTRODUCTION
Industrial democracy is still a central theme in industrial relations (IR)
debate and research. Industrial democracy refers to worker participation in
both its direct and indirect or representative forms. Direct participation
refers to employees’ immediate communication, interaction, and co-decision
making with management; indirect participation to one or more employees
who act in a representative function for other employees in dealings
with management. This happens in a vast variety of organizational forms
including committees, councils, and unions (Kaufman & Levine, 2000; Taras &
Kaufman, 2006).
The global economic downturn in the mid-1980s pushed adherents to the
emerging human resource management (HRM) rhetoric to advocate onesided
employer demands, undermining IR’s position in teaching and research
(themes) (Clarke et al., 2009). One of the most influential HRM models (e.g.,
Beer, Spector, Lawrence, Quinn Mills, & Walton, 1984) advocated worker
88 JAN KEES LOOISE ET AL.
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participation as one of the so-called ‘‘high performance management
practices’’ that contribute to organizational effectiveness, and later research
supported this assumption (e.g., Addison et al., 2000, 2003; Frick & Mo¨ ller,
2003). However, compared to other practices such as job design, pay, and
development opportunities, participation – particularly indirect forms – and
its effects have received relatively little interest in HRM studies. Many IR
scholars also remained silent on the relationship between worker participation
and organizational performance. This is not surprising given IR’s
traditional view that worker participation epitomizes industrial democracy.
Yet, an increasing number of IR scholars focused attention on the fact that
worker participation, and mainly nonunion representation on the firm level,
also has a fundamental economic value. These researchers emphasize that from
a managerial point of view employee involvement can be seen as a business
tool: worker participation as a means to reduce transaction costs associated
with the employee-organization relations and, consequently, improving
productivity (e.g., Colling, 2003; Frenkel, Korczynski, Donaghue, & Shire,
1995; Freeman & Lazaer, 1995; Gollan, 2006, 2010; Kaufman & Taras, 2000;
Kaufman & Levine, 2000; Ramsay, 1991; Rogers & Streeck, 1995; Taras &
Kaufman, 1999). Moreover, it can be argued sustainable successful worker
participation on the firm level has to meet employers and employees interests:
in this view enhanced organizational productivity and performance are
aligned with an improvement of the ‘‘social good’’ for workers in terms of
higher wages, improved working conditions, and increased job security. After
all, only companies with sustained productivity and profitability are able to
ensure further enhancement of workers’ conditions.
Against this background, investigating the effects of worker participation for
organizational performance is legitimate. This chapter addresses this issue by
focusing on direct and indirect nonunion forms of worker participation on the
firm level using aWestern European and especially Dutch frame of reference that
we know best. More specifically, the goal here is to explore possible solutions to
the following puzzle: how do direct and indirect forms of participation – separate
as well as in combination – affect organizational performance?
We decided to leave union involvement out of our consideration because in
most Western European countries (like the Netherlands, Germany, Austria,
Belgium, France, and Spain) union interference is restricted to collective,
sector-level bargaining with a strong focus on remuneration packages and
decision making in regard to individual organizations lies outside the unions
mandate. Furthermore, Gollan (2010, p. 212) states that in Anglo countries
the interest in nonunion firm-level participation is increasing because union
density is in decline, and legislative changes more and more ban closed shop or
In Search for an Integrated Model 89
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compulsory union arrangements. For example, in the UK nonunion joint
consultation between management and worker representatives seems to be
growing (Hall, 2009) partly under influence of the recent European Directive
on information and consultation of employees. In contrast, in the Netherlands
(and other European countries) indirect nonunion worker participation
is a rather old phenomenon.We can thus by concentrating on countries with a
long tradition offer arguments for those who want to promote these forms of
participation in countries and firms with a different history.
At the end of this chapter we present an integrative model that can guide
future research on the participation–performance link and policymaking in
this field. We will explore two streams of research which have shaped this
model. The first concerns the connection between direct participation and
employee outcomes like commitment, and consequently organizational
performance. After presenting a brief overview, we proceed to concentrate
on the indirect participation–organizational performance connection, with a
strong focus on the role of Dutch works councils. By combining insights
from the direct and indirect participation–performance links we are able to
present our integrated model in the last paragraph.
DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL
PERFORMANCE
Direct participation can potentially touch all workers directly in relation to
their work tasks, work organization, and working conditions. Such
participation is strongly contingent on a voluntary management decision
and can be seen as an HRM-practice (see Introduction). Despite the vast
amount of research on the performance effects of HRM-practices, very little
work has been done to illuminate the contribution of direct participation to
organizational performance. The EPOC Group’s research (European
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions,
1997) showed it was valuable to investigate this relationship.
The EPOC Research Group studied direct participation in 10 Western
European countries.1 Close to 6,000 general managers participated in this
survey about the coverage, scope, and intensity of different forms of direct
participation (total response rate: 17.8%). They found evidence of direct
participation in 82% of the workplaces in Western European countries, with
group consultation in permanent groups as the leading form (43% of the
workplaces: 29% permanent and 14% temporary), followed by individual
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consultation (33%), group delegation (13%), and individual delegation
(11%). The Netherlands and Sweden had the highest scores in workplaces
with direct forms of participation: 90% and 89% of the workplaces (see also
Gill & Krieger, 1999). This means that in almost all workplaces in these
countries forms of direct participation exist. Positive effects of direct
participation were found for three categories of performance outcomes,
namely:
1. economic performance (cost reduction, reduction of throughput time,
improvement of quality of product or service, increase in output);
2. indirect labor costs (decreases in sickness, absenteeism); and
3. direct labor costs (reduction in number of employees, managers).
Table 1 gives an overview of the performance effects of different forms of
direct participation as perceived by the respondents as reported in the EPOC
survey. In the table only three of the six investigated forms of direct
participation are shown, namely, individual consultation (‘‘face-to-face’’),
group consultation (permanent groups), and group delegation. Not included
are individual consultation (‘‘arms length’’), group consultation (temporary
groups), and individual delegation.
Table 1. The Effects of Different Forms of Direct Participation
(EPOC, 1997).
Effects Individual
Consultation (%)
Group
Consultation (%)
Group
Delegation (%)
Economic performance
Reduction of costs 61 61 56
Reduction of throughput time 64 62 66
Improvement in quality 92 94 94
Increase in total output 52 53 58
Indirect labor costs
Decrease in sickness 39 37 32
Decrease in absenteeism 42 39 37
Direct labor costs
Reduction of number of employees 27 26 30
Reduction in number of managers 26 22 31
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The results show direct participation has the strongest effect on economic
indicators, especially quality improvement, but also on reduction of
throughput time and cost and increase of the total output. The effects on
indirect (i.e., decrease in sickness, decrease in absenteeism) and direct labor
costs (i.e., reduction in number of employees, reduction in number of
managers) seem to be weaker, but are still important.
When we take into account different forms of direct participation, the
EPOC research shows that effect differences between the diverse forms of
direct participation are rather small. This is also the case with reference to
the forms that are missing in the table. Only group delegation seems a little
more effective when it comes to direct labor costs. Another interesting
finding is that temporary group delegation can be as effective as more
permanent forms. It thus seems reasonable to conclude that it is more the
opportunity of direct participation as such less the form of that opportunity
that is decisive for organizational performance.
Although the EPOC study seems to suggest an immediate relationship
between direct participation and organizational performance, based on
HRM rhetoric and research, it is wise to acknowledge that intervening
factors cause this connection. Numerous HRM scholars present models
aiming to illustrate the HRM and performance relationship (e.g., Beer et al.,
1984; Fombrun, Tichy, & Devanna, 1984; Guest, 1997; Paauwe, 2004;
Paauwe & Richardson, 1997) and they all agree there is a relationship
between the organizations’ strategy, the choice for a certain HRM approach
(or system), and specific outcomes or effects. For example, when choosing
for quality as a strategy to foster competitive advantage, this target has to be
aligned within the various HR-practices (e.g., Baird & Meshoulam, 1988).
Concerning the effects, a distinction has been made between employee and
organizational outcomes. Employee outcomes refer to the effects of HRM
on employee attitudes (e.g., satisfaction, commitment) and consequent
behavior (e.g., absenteeism, turnover, organizational citizenship behavior
[OCB]), and these are expected to influence organization outcomes. Thus,
employee attitudes and behavior are the missing link in the direct
participation and organizational performance relationship (see also Cox,
Zagelmeyer, & Marchington, 2006; Purcell & Georgiadis, 2006)
Organizational performance refers to both objective (e.g., profit, return
on investment; productivity, growth) and subjective performance outcomes
(e.g., quality of products and services, client satisfaction, innovativeness).
Several researchers (e.g., Paauwe, 2004; Addison & Teixeira, 2006; Forth &
McNabb, 2008) emphasize the current common research approach to
organizational performance in its sole focus on financial performance is
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too narrow. They urge an alternative use of a multidimensional performance
perspective that includes further objective (e.g., employment growth) and
subjective performance measures (e.g., employee well-being, societal wellbeing).
We fully agree about expanding the parameters in studying
organizational performance, but here limit our discussion to the more
economic effects of (direct) participation.
Building on the general notions we have raised about the connection
between HRM and performance, we can assume the following relationships
between direct participation and organizational performance (see Fig. 1).
As Fig. 1 shows, direct participation appears to have an impact on
organizational performance in three rather basic ways.
First, employees with direct participation opportunities can influence
organizations’ performance directly: they can offer suggestions leading to
more efficient processes or better product quality. In doing so, employees
can contribute to higher labor productivity and process innovation (e.g., De
Leede, 1997).
Second, like other HR policies and practices, direct participation
influences employee attitudes which in turn support employee behavior
that is beneficial for organizational performance (e.g., reduced turnover
and absenteeism, improved productivity and product quality; see also
Doucouliagos, 1995; Dundon, Wilkinson, Marchington, & Ackers, 2004).
Recent findings support the assumed relationships: Torka, Schyns, and
Looise (2010) found direct participation is significantly connected to
affective organizational commitment, and Meyer et al.’s (2002) metaanalysis
shows that this form of commitment strongly influences employee
Organizational
strategy
cost (cost efficiency)
focus (quality)
differentiation
(innovation)
HR policies and
practices
function/job design
hr flow
appraisal and reward
Employee
outcomes
Attitudes:
commitment
motivation
Behaviour:
absenteeism
turnover
collaboration
flexilbility
Organisation
outcomes
growth
labour
productivity
product
quality
product
/process
innovation
direct participation
Fig. 1. The Relationship between Direct Participation and Organizational
Performance.
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health and well-being, turnover, absenteeism as well as task- and extra-role
performance (i.e., OCB). Thus, direct participation can impact organizational
performance indirectly through the just mentioned employee
outcomes.
Third, the model shows that direct participation has a rather prominent
position as part of the HR policies and practices. In other words, managers
should offer employees opportunities to (co-)decide on those HR issues
that clearly affect them. Older research by Beer et al. (1984) supports this
idea with two arguments: (1) ‘‘If ’’, they claim, ‘‘employees are major
stakeholders in the enterprise, then it is critical that managers design and
administer various mechanisms for employee influence’’ and further
(2) ‘‘employee influence in its broadest sense is a central perspective in
the formulation of all human resource management policies.’’ This last
proposition about the critical role of both direct and indirect participation
has been ignored by many scholars and practitioners. Just a sparse handful
of investigators have recognized the point and gone so far as to claim
direct participation should even have a special status within research on
performance: direct participation presumes listening to employee needs and
only when meeting their needs will desired outcomes be gained (e.g.,
Bryson, 2004; Bryson, Charlwood, & Forth, 2006; Gollan, 2003; Torka,
Van Riemsdijk, & Looise, 2007). Given our review of unmistakable
patterns of blind sight in the accumulated evidence, when compared to
other HRM-practices, there can be little doubt that participation deserves
at least equal attention in organizational performance research and
practice.
Finally, Cox et al. (2006) state that more emphasis needs to be placed on
the perception of direct participation. Therefore, it can be argued that
getting insight into the absence or presence of participation opportunities
(see, for example, Forde, Slater, & Spencer, 2006) is less important than the
quality of the given opportunities as perceived by employees. Employees’
satisfaction and justice perceptions can be seen as indicators of the
employee–organization relationship (EOR) quality (e.g., Coyle-Shapiro,
Shore, Taylor, & Tetrick, 2004; Kuvaas, 2008). We know from prior
research that satisfaction with HR-practices is a good predictor of affective
organizational commitment (e.g., Kinnie, Hutchinson, Purcell, Rayton, &
Swart, 2005; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002). Several
studies show that justice perceptions are quite directly correlated with job
satisfaction and organizational commitment (e.g., Colquitt, Conlon,
Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001; see also Colquitt, 2001 for different dimensions
of justice and measurements). Moreover, managerial strategies lacking a
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perception of fairness seem to undermine productivity (Kick, Fraser, &
Davis, 2006). Therefore, we can legitimately assume employees’ satisfaction
with and perceived fairness concerning participation can shed significant
light on the quality of participation. Finally, concerning quality, research
found that participation is often seriously in need of improvement. The role
of managers, the quality of participation policies and practices, and job and
workforce characteristics are still insufficiently taken into account or ever
even considered (e.g., Bryson et al., 2006; Cunningham & Hyman, 1999;
Torka, Van Woerkom, & Looise, 2008).
INDIRECT PARTICIPATION AND
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
There are, as stated earlier, good reasons to focus on indirect nonunion
participation, also known as an integrative form of bargaining, like works
councils and joint consultation committees, and not on union involvement (i.e.,
distributive forms of bargaining). In many Western European countries (the
Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, Spain) both types of
bargaining take place in different institutions, while in others (the Scandinavian
countries and the United Kingdom) both forms of bargaining are executed, but
in a separate mode by union representatives at the company level. According
to the EPOCResearch Group, forms of joint consultation exist in about half of
the organizations in the tenWesternEuropean countries that participated in the
research, with higher levels for Germany and the Netherlands and lower levels
for the United Kingdom and Portugal (see also Gill & Krieger, 1999).
Co-determination via worker representatives in supervisory boards and worker
directors can be found in Germany and the Netherlands.
In the Netherlands, only a few large companies bargain directly with
unions. In large measure the unions’ mandate is restricted to negotiations on
the sector-level, the foremost concern being pay and benefits specified in
collective agreements. The works council is the most important institution
for representative participation on the firm level, and mandatory for all
firms with 50 and more employees. The Dutch Law on works councils (Wet
op de ondernemingsraden, WOR) states that works councils have to be
installed ‘‘in the interest of the good functioning of the company in all its
goals’’ (article 2). According to the WOR, Dutch works councils have
different rights.
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First, the right to give advice about a number of economic and organizational
issues, including the transfer of control over the company, lasting cooperation
with other companies, the closing down of the company or parts of it, major
organizational changes, major investments and loans, and – more recently –
the introduction of new technology.
Second, the right to veto employer proposals regarding changes in social
and personnel policies, including working hours, holidays, remuneration,
job evaluation schemes, working conditions, recruitment, promotion, and
training. These rights are only in effect when such arrangements are not
determined by a collective labor agreement.
Third, the right to appeal – in various courts – when the aforementioned
rights of veto or advice are not respected by the managing director.
Fourth, the right to initiate proposals with respect to all matters related to
the company, to which the employer is obliged to respond.
Finally, the right to assemble at least six times a year during work time
(excluding the presence of the managing director), to follow courses outside
the company (five days a year), and to consult external experts.
The rights of Dutch works councils are comparable to those in other
European countries such as Germany, Austria, and Belgium.
The growing interest in involving representative firm-level participation (e.g.,
unions, partnerships, work councils, and other forms of joint consultation) in
performance research has led to research focused on its consequences for
companies. These investigations seem to be inspired by an economical–political
or managerial point of view: in Western Europe, the popular discussion about
the relative competitive position of European economies.
In Germany, the system of firm-level representative, nonunion participation
has been long debated, questioning if the two institutions within
the firm (the ‘‘betriebliche Mitbestimmung’’ in works councils on company
issues and the ‘‘Aufsichtsrat’’ or supervisory board on concern issues)
hamper or stimulate German competitiveness (‘‘Standort Deutschland’’).
In 2006 the so-called Commission Biedenkopf concluded revision of
the system was unwarranted inasmuch as research failed to detect or
establish any relationship with poor company performance. In point of
fact, the opposite seemed to be the case: extensive research indicated the
German mandatory works councils may well improve firm performance
and certain kinds of productivity (Addison et al., 2000, 2003; Frick &
Mo¨ ller, 2003).
Furthermore, research in other countries shows a positive relationship between
(the presence of) representative participation in firms and performance.
Concerning unions on the firm level, research by Addison (2005), Rose and
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Woolley (1992), and Sengupta (2008) highlights the importance of unions for
high-performance work systems and firm performance. Concerning works
councils, Kleiner and Lee’s (1997) research among large South Korean firms
shows effective works councils can be associated with higher levels of employee
satisfaction and productivity.
The debate on the performance effects of works councils has not achieved
as high a level in the Netherlands as in Germany, due in part to the
unavailability of empirical data on this issue. However, recent initiatives
have been undertaken to address this topic in new research (Karel, Heijink,
Van den Tillaart, Boekhorst, & Van Rijsingen, 2010) and a reassessment of
earlier research (Van den Berg, Grift, & Van Witteloostuin, 2009). This
research when combined with the now growing interest in economic effects
of other legal and institutional arrangements (like the legal arrangements
regarding dismissals and extension of collective agreements, the position and
role of the unions) should fuel the debate on the economic effects of works
councils in the Netherlands.
Up to now scholars have not been generally very explicit in defining the
way(s) representative forms of participation like work councils can
influence performance. However, Dutch research on works councils can
be helpful in developing an understanding about if and how representative
participation can contribute to organizational performance. Based on Van
het Kaar and Looise’s (1999) study on the position and functioning of
Dutch works councils, three ‘‘channels’’ – one direct and two indirect – can
be distinguished regarding the influence of works councils on company
performance.
The researchers sent questionnaires to both the managing directors and
works councils of a representative sample (N¼3,500) of all Dutch
organizations with a works council (about 15,000). Four hundred and
seventy five managing directors (response rate: 14%) and 450 works
council representatives (response rate: 12%) participated in the study.
Although the response rate of this study was rather low, it is in line with
that of other large-scale empirical studies (for example, the EPOC
research). Moreover, more recent Dutch research (Karel, et al., 2010)
seems to corroborate the results. Table 1 shows the answers of both
managing directors and works council members to questions about the
perceived effects of works councils on organizational performance. These
questions were not deliberately developed to understand the contribution
of the works council to organizational performance (i.e., developed to
measure some effects of works councils), but offer a welcome opportunity
to understand the channels by which representative forms of participation
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can influence organizational performance (for more information, see also
Wigboldus, Looise, & Nijhof, 2008).
Table 2 shows both managing directors and works council members
acknowledge performance effects of works councils. However, indirect effects
seem to receive stronger recognition than direct effects, particularly in the case
of managing directors. The fact both parties perceive more indirect than direct
effects of works councils on organization performance is in itself not
surprising inasmuch as influencing organizational performance is a major
responsibility of top management and not Dutch works councils. Against this
background, it is likewise unexceptional that management finds it harder to
‘‘admit’’ the contribution of the works council in this respect. However, the
table also shows that despite managers (average) perception, even they still
perceive a direct contribution of the works council to performance aspects like
efficiency, profitability, and innovation.
Table 2 also shows that both indirect channels receive substantial support
from managing directors and works council members. Regarding the first
indirect channel, managing directors acknowledge especially the effects of
works councils on employee attitudes in terms of acceptance of necessary
decisions with employees, while works council members stress the improved
Table 2. Works Council Effects Based on Perceptions of Managing
Directors and Works Council Members (Based on Van het Kaar &
Looise, 1999).
Effects Management
(%)
Works Council Members
(%)
Direct channel
Enhancing efficiency 9 26
Enhancing profitability 4 10
Enhancing innovation 12 24
Indirect channel 1
Improved acceptance among employees 64 43
Improved representation of employees’ interests 55 78
Reduction of power differences 28 27
Indirect channel 2
Improvement of decision making quality 38 52
More careful decision making 65 67
Faster decision making 3 11
Note: The values are the percentages of managing directors and works council members that
have answered the questions.
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representation of employee interest in decision making. Since we can assume
that both effects are interrelated – a good representation of employee
interests in decision making will enhance the acceptance of the decision by
the employees – the underpinning of this channel seems to be quite
convincing. Also, the reduction of power differences – while less strongly
supported – appears to follow from these circumstances. Finally, the second
indirect channel receives ample support: It was beyond doubt that the effect
of works councils on careful decision making is recognized by a large
majority of both groups of respondents.
Before presenting a deeper exploration of the direct and indirect effects of
representative participation on organizational performance (see also
Wigboldus et al., 2008), we first present a simple explanatory model that
aims to illustrate this interaction and these relationships.
The direct channel contributes to organizational performance through
new information and/or new solutions. Due to their legal rights and/or their
contacts with top-management, representative bodies can directly influence
organizational performance, either by communicating their ideas in their
meetings with top management, or advising and/or negotiating on plans and
policies. By passing on new information, representative participation adds
to the decision making process. This information can potentially improve
management decisions and thereby adds to better performance. The specific
position of works councils or committees as elected representation of all
workers enables the council to acquire information that otherwise would not
come to the attention of senior management without delay and distortion.
This so-called asymmetry approach is supported by Freeman and Lazaer
(1995) who argue works councils’ (and other committees) economic effects
can depend on conveying unknown information from the work floor to
management (see also Lahovary, 2000). Because of the information
asymmetry between management and worker representatives, their interactions
can produce new points of view and new solutions for advantageous
management problem-solving. Addison (2005) found this approach sound
in his study of channeling employee’s preferences to be an important works
council function. Although this does not produce new information to
management, it helps management to deal with the different employee
preferences such as work hours or benefits. Dilger (2002) has shown with his
voice approach that the asymmetry effect goes beyond organization and work
procedure improvement ideas. Representative bodies also may express
complaints and problems that are frustrating circumspect employees, helping
reduce unnecessary employee turnover and so-called mental resignation.
As concluded above, the direct effect of representative participation on
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organizational performance seems to be rather limited when compared to that
of indirect effects. To be sure, this does not mean it should be neglected:
representative participation is able to contribute directly to organizational
outcomes.
The first indirect channel contributes to organizational performance
through an enhanced positive organizational climate. Organizational
climate is the overall meaning derived from the aggregation of individual
perceptions of a work environment (James et al., 2008, p. 15), and research
shows that a positive climate affects employee and organizational outcomes
in a favorable way. Climate is a critical mediating construct for exploring
the relationship between HRM and performance. In a strong positive
climate organizational members display significant congruence concerning
organizational values, and routinely act according to these values by
contributing to organizational performance through, for example, accomplishing
cost effectiveness, quality, and innovativeness. (Bowen & Ostroff,
2004; Ostroff, Shin, & Kinicki, 2005).
Heretofore the possible positive impact of representative participation
on the firm’s climate has been largely neglected. However, research generally
shows that participative organizational climates are perceived as more
effective in terms of trust than authoritarian climates (Farris, Senner, &
Butterfield, 1973), and trust influences labor–management relations (Taylor,
1989), enhanced readiness to change (Lawler, 1992), and negotiation
(Bazerman, 1994). Regarding the latter, the assumption of a reversed effect
of trust seems quite appropriate: trust – an important condition and
consequence of a strong climate – may influence the quality of both direct
and indirect participation.
The activities of representative bodies can contribute to an organizational
climate with fewer power differences, less inequality, and more trust in the
organization. After all, at least in the Netherlands, works councils represent
all employees and their rights; they are restricted to general employee goods,
and do not extend to individual employee interests. Therefore, representative
participation occurs by definition on an aggregated level: next to
organizational interests, representatives embody the shared interests of
(groups of) employees. As such, representative bodies operate on a climate
level, and climate stimulates employee commitment and consequently
performance (see also paragraph on direct participation and organizational
performance and DeCotiis & Summers, 1987; Van den Hooff & De Ridder,
2004). Besides that, a positive organizational climate (co-)created by
representative participation might have a direct positive influence on
organizational performance through improved communication. Lahovary
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(2000, p. 6) supports this idea and concludes works councils intensify the
communication flow between management and employees and communication,
itself is critical for organizational performance (Snyder & Morris, 1984).
Given the evidence of this cascading role of a strong organizational climate,
representative participation can and should be viewed and understood as an
explicit attempt to integrate mutual benefits of managers’ and employees–
organizational and employee well-being. What results is enhanced organizational
performance.
The second indirect channel contributes to organizational performance
through the organization system, and management’s attitudes and behavior.
In many of the (larger) Dutch organizations, the works council has
developed into a player in the corporate governance structure that cannot be
ignored (Van het Kaar & Looise, 1999). Its relatively clear view of what
management does and fails to do, and its communication line with the
supervisory board, are crucial. They have made it possible to get
dysfunctioning CEOs dismissed. Representative bodies’ interventions may
correct and prevent opportunistic management behavior and through this
contribute to better organizational performance.
This assumption is amply supported by empirical evidence. Falkum (2003)
points to the fact that performance is not only positively affected by
management supporting employee participation, but also by employees
resistance: for example, when employees or their representatives are opposed
to bad management strategies and decisions. Van den Berg (2004) is even
more specific, arguing indirect participation can restrict or even prevent
management from placing their own pecuniary interests above company
interests. This is possible by using information and consultation rights, as well
as through interaction with the supervisory board. Van den Berg considers
this mechanism an extension – albeit an unorthodox one – of the principalagent
approach; although it is not meant to foster shareholder interests, it
aims to put the general interest of the company above management’s tendency
to act opportunistically. A similar line of thinking is found in Addison (2005)
who quotes Jirjahn’s (2003) study. He found that works councils can
contribute to company performance by curtailing rent seeking management
behavior, especially when they discuss profit sharing schemes for executives.
A manager working at the large German company Bayer very briefly
expressed the opportunism preventing functioning of the works council: ‘‘The
works council requires of us that we manage well.’’ (in Wever, 1994, p. 475).
Finally, with regards to indirect participation, it is useful to stress that the
quality of participation is decisive. The quality essentially determines the
real power these institutes can have on performance, and this power may
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potentially exceed even minimum rights given by (country-specific) regulations.
Representative participation quality depends on both the managers’
attitudes toward such institutions, as well as the expertise and skills of
representative participation agents. Moreover, it can be argued that the
quality of indirect participation increases when management and worker
representatives share interests. This interest alignment approach is supported
by Vroom (1964), who assumes rational workers’ behavior and claims a
workers’ effort is determined by his dual expectancy of the opportunities that
this effort will lead to a certain performance and by the degree to which this
performance will help to reach a certain desired outcome. Applying this idea
to our subject means that representative bodies will only put effort in
contributing to better profits if (a) it is likely to really have an effect on these
profits, and (b) this contribution will lead to a desired outcome. Grimsrud,
Kvinge, and Gunnes (2003, p. 8) support this overall line of reasoning: ‘‘(y)
to be successful, increased involvement by employees in decision making must
be linked to a gain-sharing mechanism, which offers the opportunity for
workers to gain financially from taking on the extra responsibility.’’
Freeman and Lazaer (1995) suggest works councils will only have positive
economic effects in those situations where there is power equilibrium
between management and works council. When works councils have too
much power they will claim more of the total firm profits for the employees
than they have contributed, but when they have insufficient power they will
not be motivated to contribute to better firm results. Pe´rotin and Robinson
(2002) in their study of performance effects of financial participation by
employees underline that organizational performance depends not only on
the working efforts of employees, but also on management decisions and
external factors. They conclude that employee influence on management
decisions is necessary to prevent that these decisions from harming share
value and profit levels, factors that could undermine employees’ efforts to
earn a fair living.
THE INTERRELATEDNESS OF DIRECT
AND INDIRECT PARTICIPATION
AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
Both direct and indirect participation can be offered by management on a
voluntary basis, but it can also be mandatory for the organization – forced
by laws, collective agreement(s), or union power position. Overall, direct
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forms of participation seem to be more based on voluntary management
decisions, and indirect forms of participation on (legal) regulations. In the
Netherlands, laws on direct participation have not emerged while there is
extensive legislation law on works councils. However, it is interesting to note
that there are other Dutch laws, like the one on working conditions (Arbo
Law) that refer to direct participation of all employees of an organization
concerning this type of issues. Moreover, the Law on works councils is
patently proscriptive, instructing these organizations to stimulate direct
participation in their work. Overall, works councils in the Netherlands are
not very active on this topic: only half of the works councils pay attention to
direct participation (Van het Kaar & Looise, 1999). This is probably due to
the fact that direct participation is already commonplace in the Netherlands
and works councils give priority to other, even more demanding tasks. It may
also be a result of the fact that works councils see direct forms of
participation as a competitor and as a by-pass for management. There is
some empirical evidence of the use of direct participation as a ‘‘unionavoidance
strategy’’ by management (e.g., Kochan, Katz, & McKersie,
1986). However, based on the EPOC research of Fro¨ hlich and Pekruhl
(1996), it is permissible to conclude that ‘‘our data suggest that in countries
with a system of works councils or elected representatives at the establishment
level, employee representatives are generally not by-passed by
management’’ (p. 138).
Surprisingly, the relationships between direct and indirect participation
and their ‘‘combined effect’’ on organizational performance have been
rarely studied. After all, several authors explicitly assume interrelatedness
between both forms of participation. Strauss (1998) stated that institutionalized
indirect participation is inevitable for successful direct participation.
Kleiner and Lee’s (1997) and Poutsma, Ligthart, and Veersma’s (2006)
empirical studies support this generalization. Kleiner and Lee found that
both work councils and unions enhance direct participation in several key
personnel practices, while Poutsma and colleagues’ research reveals
substantial effects of country-specific institutions on direct participation in
European firms.
In the EPOC study some attention has been given to the ‘‘regulation’’ of
direct participation via indirect participation, as well as to the incidence and
effects of both forms of participation. A first conclusion from this study is
that ‘‘the extent of employee information and consultation about the
introduction of direct participation is high.’’ In on average 44% of the
workplaces in the participating ten EU countries, extensive consulting with
employee representative bodies like works councils or joint consultation
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committees has been about the introduction of direct participation in the
work place, and 22% report that they were extensively informed or limited
consulted. Only 34% report no involvement of indirect participation in the
introduction of direct participation. These findings suggest that (according to
a majority) direct participation should not be seen as a purely ‘‘management
instrument’’ aimed at weakening the role of indirect participation, but rather
as an instrument or HR-practice approved by the works council or similar
bodies (see also Gill & Krieger, 1999).
Furthermore, the results also show the (potential) role of indirect
participation in the introduction of HR-practices as discussed above. In the
case of the Netherlands the Law on works councils governs the effect of
the veto-right of works councils on social and personnel matters.However, the
EPOC results do show that in other European countries representative bodies
are also entitled to be informed about or to be consulted over HR-practices
like the introduction of direct participation.
A third fundamental conclusion is that according to managers the extent
of representative bodies involvement affects the actual (assumed) performance
outcomes of direct participation. Table 3 gives an overview of the
effects of direct participation in combination with no involvement (No),
limited consultation (Limited), and extensive consultation (Extensive) with
indirect participation. The table shows that in every case the effects of direct
participation are stronger when representative bodies were consulted on the
Table 3. The Extent of Indirect Participation in the Introduction of
Direct Participation and the Effects of Direct Participation (EPOC,
1997).
Effects No (%) Limited (%) Extensive (%)
Economic effects
Reduction of costs 47 65 61
Reduction of throughput time 61 66 64
Improvement in quality 90 91 96
Increase in total output 13 47 63
Effects on indirect labor costs
Decrease in sickness 15 33 44
Decrease in absenteeism 16 37 48
Effects on direct labor costs
Reduction of number of employees 28 31 34
Reduction in number of managers 23 21 35
104 JAN KEES LOOISE ET AL.
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introduction of direct participation. This seems to be true for economic
effects like cost reduction and increase of total output, and with indirect
labor cost effects like decreasing sickness and absenteeism. With the
exception of cost reduction and reduction of throughput time, the effect is
even stronger when the consultation with employee representatives is more
extensive.
With this background of specific results and our earlier presented models
(anchored in an exploration of prior research and theory) about the way(s)
direct and indirect participation can independently influence organizational
performance, we are now able to offer an integrated model on their
combined effects on organizational performance.
Fig. 3 shows the combination of Figs. 1 and 2, highlighting their mutual
connections. This model illustrates that both direct and indirect participation
have their own roles and functions within organizations, and that there
is no foundation for the fear by either of the other taking over (part of) these
roles or functions. In other words, the role and function of representative
participation cannot be taken over by direct participation, or vice versa.
A second critical point is the role of indirect participation with respect to
HRM and direct participation. Indirect participation is not (only) an HRMpractice:
indirect participation can potentially ‘‘co-design’’ HRM policies
and practices. Representative committees anchored in legal regulations (like
Dutch works councils) have a prescribed agenda to discuss and co-decide on
a list of HRM topics such as benefits, job design, and employee health. In
that sense, indirect participation channels influences on HRM policies and
practices such as those related to direct forms of participation. However,
when indirect participation lacks such protection from legal regulations and
Organization
system
goals/strategy
governance
structure
culture
management
behaviour
Representative
participation
(legal) rights
composition
relationship with
constituency
militancy
Organizational
climate
less power
inequality
more trust
enhanced
readiness to
change
Organization
outcomes
productivity
profit
growth
employment
product quality
innovation
Fig. 2. The Relationship between Indirect Participation and Organizational
Performance.
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thereby legal rights, ‘‘real’’ influence and power concerning issues that affect
employees depend even more on representatives’ quality (e.g., skills,
knowledge).
Members of these indirect bodies should be progressively more aware of
these options, and use them to strengthen direct and indirect participation in
their organizations. A third important point is the combination of social
climate and employee outcomes, especially commitment. While social climate
refers to collective experiences, employee consequences such as commitment
and satisfaction refer to the impact of participation on individuals’
perception. However, research shows that collective and individual experiences
are interrelated (Carr, Schmidt, Ford, & DeShon, 2003) and have a
clear-cut positive impact upon performance (Katz, Kochan, &Weber, 1985).
Representative
participation
(legal) rights
composition
relationship with
constituency
militancy
Organizational
climate
less power inequality
more trust
enhanced readiness
to change
Organization
system
goals/strategy
governance
structure
culture
management
behaviour
Employee
outcomes
Attitudes:
commitment
motivation
Behaviour:
absenteeism
turnover
collaboration
flexilbility
Organization
outcomes
productivity
profit
growth
employment
product quality
innovation
HR policies and
practices
function/job
design
HR flow
appraisal and
reward
direct
participation
Fig. 3. An Integrated Model for HRM, Participation, and Organization
Performance.
106 JAN KEES LOOISE ET AL.
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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Our aim was to contribute to the understanding of the way(s) direct and
indirect worker participation – separate and in combination – can
contribute to organizational performance. After all, knowledge about this
blending and especially indirect participations’ potential contribution is still
limited. Our integrated model adds to the development of this stream of
scholarly (and perhaps also practitioner) attention and should be extended
in further empirical research.
The first step of our approach concerned the relationship between direct
participation and organizational performance. Grounded in prior literature
and research, it can be assumed direct participation is an HR-practice, like
other HRM-practices. As a consequence, direct participation similarly
contributes to employee outcomes and organizational performance like
those other HR-practices. However, we argued there are two basic reasons
that direct participation in comparison with other HR-practices holds a
special position: (1) direct participation can directly contribute to company
performance (in terms of suggestions for improvement of products,
processes, organizational features) and (2) direct participation can influence
the development and implementation of other HR-practices. In our opinion
these possible contributions of direct participation deserve more theoretical
and empirical recognition. Given its extensive diffusion in (European)
organizations – and in fact practitioners seem aware of the possible impact
of this form of participation (EPOC, 1997) – there is an urgent need for
further exploration of this part of the model.
In our second step, we portrayed the relationship between indirect forms
of worker participation and organizational performance. Our focus in the
main was on institutionalized forms of representative participation in
Western European countries – those who practice integrative forms of
bargaining like works councils and joint consultation committees. Relying
on Dutch research we argued representative bodies can influence organizational
performance via three channels, one direct and two indirect. The
direct channel relates to representative participations direct contributions to
organizational performance (e.g., suggestion for improving efficiency,
profitability, and innovativeness).
The first indirect channel operates through indirect participations’
potential strength to enhance an organizational climate that influences
employees and organizational outcomes. The activities of representative
bodies can lead to an organizational climate with less power differences and
inequality, and more trust in the organization. Such an organizational
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climate will in its turn lead to better employee outcomes and consequently
organizational effectiveness. Moreover, a positive organizational climate
can directly influence organizational outcomes. The second indirect channel
works through the organization system and management attitudes and
behavior. Representative bodies’ interventions may correct and prevent
opportunistic management behavior and thus this contributes to better
organizational performance. More comparative international research on
this aspect of the model is badly needed.
In our third step, we blended together the ‘‘separate’’ knowledge from
steps 1 and 2 into an integrated model. Additional empirical evidence leads
us to claim that direct and indirect participation are closely interrelated.
After all, research shows that in a majority of cases consultation of
representative bodies precedes the introduction of direct participation.
Thus, these forms of participation should not be seen as ‘‘competitors,’’ but
rather as ‘‘partners.’’ Moreover, the involvement of indirect participation in
the introduction of direct participation seems to add to the effects of direct
participation (especially economic effects like cost reduction and increase of
total output; and indirect labor cost effects like decrease of sickness and
absenteeism). In our integrated model this has been explained by the
positive effect of indirect participation on the introduction and implementation
of direct participation, organizational climate, and employee outcomes;
these stimulate the effects of direct participation on organizational
outcomes. In follow-up studies we will test this model in an international
context.
We recognize but have not discussed here the special role manager’s
expertise and skills play for successful worker participation (e.g., Bryson,
2004; Bryson et al., 2006). The significance of direct supervisors’ attitudes
and behaviors, as well as top managers’ competence to direct these, cannot
be underestimated. Concerning the ideal of fairness, compared to relevant
others, there is no doubt that both participation as an ‘‘outcome’’
(distributive justice) and the process of participation (procedural justice)
itself are vitally important. The inclusion of both of these relevant variables –
the role of the managers’ and direct supervisor a well as justice – is still
relatively rare in research focused on participation in general or the
‘‘isolated’’ participation–performance link. Regarding the latter, a comparable
conclusion is appropriate for the role of the social climate, employee
outcomes (attitudes and behavior), possible routes in the participation–
performance chain, and broader operationalization of performance.
Theoretical and empirical insights support our idea that research on
indirect participation deserves more sustained interest. Future research
108 JAN KEES LOOISE ET AL.
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should aim for answers on how to improve not only organizational, but also
employee and societal well-being. Our insights, largely based on the work of
colleagues, can enhance the position or increase the implementation
probability of representative, nonunion participation in contexts of choice
where such arrangements are rather new or upcoming. On the organizational
level, this knowledge can be beneficial for managers in their general
design of HRM, as well as in upgrading their capability of coming to terms
with representative participation. HR managers and consultants may profit
from this knowledge when advising top management, and the agents of
representative participation may ‘‘exploit’’ these ideas to improve their use
of intervention strategies.
NOTE
1. These countries were (in alphabetical order) Denmark, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
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Identify and explain the factors that need to be considered when managing performance.

3.1

3.1    Identify and explain the factors that need to be considered when managing performance

 

COURSE NOTES: What AC 3.1 is looking for you to do is to explain some of the factors you would need to take in account when managing both good and poor performance. In terms of managing good performance you need to be thinking about how you use reward and recognition to keep good performers motivated. For example, incentive schemes, promotion, opportunity to mentor other colleagues, chance to work on special projects, represent senior colleagues at meetings etc. In terms of managing poor performance you need to identify what the reasons for poor performance are, for example, is it due to pressures outside work such childcare, illness, caring responsibilities etc. It could be due to a lack of training or knowledge of how to do the job, this would be a capability issue, or it could be an attitude or behaviour problem which would be a conduct issue. How you manage these types of performance will vary depending on the reason. For example, you might agree flexible working or a change in shift patterns if the issue is related to pressure outside of work. If it is a capability issue you might agree additional training and a performance improvement plan and if the issue is around conduct depending on the severity you might agree a performance improvement plan or commence a disciplinary process.

3.2    Describe the data required by individuals involved in performance and reward management processes

 

COURSE NOTES: For AC 3.2 you are looking at one example of internal and one of external data which can be used to support performance and reward management processes. Examples of internal data might be absence records, KPIs or staff satisfaction surveys. External data might be salary benchmarking data or inflation rates.

 

 

 

Total of 3.1 & 3.2 above 500 words

 

COURSE NOTES: What AC 3.1 is looking for you to do is to explain some of the factors you would need to take in account when managing both good and poor performance. In terms of managing good performance you need to be thinking about how you use reward and recognition to keep good performers motivated. For example, incentive schemes, promotion, opportunity to mentor other colleagues, chance to work on special projects, represent senior colleagues at meetings etc. In terms of managing poor performance you need to identify what the reasons for poor performance are, for example, is it due to pressures outside work such childcare, illness, caring responsibilities etc. It could be due to a lack of training or knowledge of how to do the job, this would be a capability issue, or it could be an attitude or behaviour problem which would be a conduct issue. How you manage these types of performance will vary depending on the reason. For example, you might agree flexible working or a change in shift patterns if the issue is related to pressure outside of work. If it is a capability issue you might agree additional training and a performance improvement plan and if the issue is around conduct depending on the severity you might agree a performance improvement plan or commence a disciplinary process.

3.2    Describe the data required by individuals involved in performance and reward management processes

 

COURSE NOTES: For AC 3.2 you are looking at one example of internal and one of external data which can be used to support performance and reward management processes. Examples of internal data might be absence records, KPIs or staff satisfaction surveys. External data might be salary benchmarking data or inflation rates.

 

 

 

Total of 3.1 & 3.2 above 500 words