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What form of innovation protection are you critically assessing?

Using market, competitor and consumer secondary/primary research relating to the
organisation you have chosen, identify, outline and critically evaluate an opportunity or issue
which may warrant a technology-based innovation.
Technology-based innovation
1. Technology-based innovation = innovation leveraging technology (technologies)
2. Can be any industry sector = though innovation you’re proposing needs to be
technology-based Opportunity or issue
1. Think how technology can be applied to existing ‘suboptimal’ situation
2. Look for areas which are not working;
3. Can technology be applied and act as a solution to improve customer experience or to
add more value to customers.
Getting ideas
1. Use technology reports for disruptive technologies – E&Y, Gartner Hype cycles, other
2. Look into AI and data analytics and how they can be applied to add value direct/indirectly
for consumers
Critically assess the type of innovation they should choose and the process of innovation
they should go through.
Type of innovation: incremental, radical, breakthrough, disruptive, open, closed, jugaad,
reverse, business model (profit, revenue, value chain, value role), customer experience,
service, systems, product, co-creation
.critically assess
Process Rothwell’s – 5 or 6 generations Open innovation – inbound, outbound other Lean
innovation process – MVP Co-creation process Data-driven innovation process NPD and /or
improvides You could be talking about more than one, describe, outline Limitations
Describe the innovation solution in-depth.
What is the solution?\
➢What was the issue and therefore what solution are you proposing to address the issue
[issue – technology shortfall, business model type, lack of integration of supplier or others in
net, lack of integration of customer in process design etc.]
➢Based on issue –now describe solution
➢Describing ➢Describe what it is, how it addresses shortfall How you could illustrate
1. Use business model canvass – if a business model 2. Use flow, diagram – if a process 3.
Use diagram if there are multiple aspects to solution
Critically assess how they should protect the new innovation.
Lecture 10 What form of innovation protection are you critically assessing?
1. Critically e.g. patents 1. Can they use a patent – has this technology been patented
already?
2. Is it possible ‘anyway’ to patent this innovation?
3. Copyright, trademarks have limits in what, how they protect innovation – note! 2. If it can’t
be patented
1. Can parts or other aspects be patented?
2. If it can’t be patented…what other alternatives are there?
3. How to protect – which form 1. How to protect – look at type of innovations, some
innovations may need trademark, some innovations cannot be patented How to apply the
form of protection e.g. patent? 1. Patent each micro step or small part 2. Patent an overall
process 3. Combining patents –license out/in 4. MVP patent 5. Provisional patent license 6.
Patenting throughout stages of the innovation process (or not) 7. Leveraging a patent pool
• A process patent is a form of utility patent that covers methods of changing the functionality
or
characteristics of a material during a particular use. The patent-holder is granted exclusive
protections
and rights to that process for 20 years
• Patent pools can be defined as an agreement between two or more patent owners to
license one or
more of their patents to one another or to third parties. Often,patent pools are associated
with
complex technologies that require complementary patents in order to provide efficient
technical
solutions.
• Patent licensing: Patent licensing is part of how to patent an idea and is a revocable
agreement
between a patent owner and a licensee to transfer interest in a patent to a licensee, who can
benefit
from and enforce the intellectual property rights
• MVP patent An MVP-based patent strategy may begin with filing a provisional patent
application that
describes novel MVP features. Filed subsequently (within one year), a non-provisional
patent
application may claim market-tested, novel MVP features. Absolute patent protection
• Provisional patent application: To protect your MVP, many legal systems throughout the
world provide
a tool called “Provisional Patent Application”, which is provisionally filed with minimum details
to meet
the requirements of Patent laws. Commonly, the legal cost and professional fees involved
are quite low
at this stage. It is important to note that a provisional application is nothing other than saving
the date
for your MVP

Why is this theme particularly significant to Indigenous peoples living in occupied homelands?

English 2520 – Indigenous Women Writers
Dr. Sandra Muse Isaacs
Final Essay Assignment (25%)
Final Essay – Topics & Guidelines
Due Wednesday, November 27, 2019 in class
This final essay is worth 25% of your total grade. Please use at least one scholarly source, and no more than two, and attach a complete Works Cited with your essay. This paper must be at least 1,100 words and no more than 1,300. Use MLA format including double-spacing, page numbering, and Times New Roman 12 font only. Please write in proper language (no contractions, exaggerations or colloquialisms). You’re welcome to print front and back to save paper, but do be sure to staple. There is no need for a separate title page; please put your name only in top left corner, and then the title of paper centered next line down – do not call it simply Research Paper, but create a brief title. Email submissions will not be accepted.
You are also allowed to do a comparative, close-reading essay with or without research. In this case, you are to use two or three works of literature.
You’re encouraged to develop your own research topic connected to our course readings, but you must submit it in writing and meet with me for approval.
DO NOT WRITE ON THE EXACT SAME TOPIC USED IN YOUR SHORT ESSAY.
Try to use works of literature that you did not use in the short essay.
1. The landscape and the natural environment are predominant themes in much of Indigenous literature, and the Women especially are connected to the land. Working with at least three authors, explore the significance of land and its relationship to the cultural survival of Indigenous peoples. How are these relationships described, and to what effect?
2. Each of our three novels (Shell Shaker, The Marrow Thieves, and Rose’s Run) and several of the short stories have one or more strong female protagonists and /or antagonists. Choose at least one and no more than two of these characters, and discuss the way the author has constructed her in terms of either adhering closely to or violating the norms and values of their particular Indigenous culture and community. Discuss how those personal actions and choices either disrupt or reinforce the cultural continuum for their family or community.
3. Indigenous beliefs regarding the Spiritual world come into play in many works of Native literature. Examining any one of our books this term, discuss and analyze how spiritualism and beliefs particular to that Native group play a role within the storyline. Be as specific as possible.
4. Examine how at least two Indigenous women writers use the power of their female voice to address the injustices or cultural damage perpetrated by the colonizer. You may use one novel and one of our Blackboard readings (a short story, poem, essay, or speech), or two readings.
5. Motherhood and raising children are a vital part of Indigenous womanhood. Discuss how these responsibilities are interwoven within any two or three of our works, be it poetry or prose. Consider how the female voice and perspective is necessary in these written works in defining how most Indigenous cultures are not patriarchal and are thus in conflict with Eurowestern values.
6. Many works by Indigenous women are concerned with the theme of alienation and loss of home and/or culture. Examine the issues of identity, isolation, and discrimination in at least two of the writings studied this term. Why is this theme particularly significant to Indigenous peoples living in occupied homelands?
7. Anger and humor often exist side by side in Indigenous literature. What is the significance of both as literary devices in the works we have studied this term, and what is the effect on the reader? Why do writers and artists employ rage and laughter when portraying contemporary Native life? What message(s) is/are being conveyed?

What would you do to sustain or improve productivity, in light of the company’s factors of production?

Productivity Status and Initiatives

Reflect on your current or former company in regard to its productivity levels and initiatives; then address each of the following points:

Has productivity increased, decreased, or remained stagnant at your company?

What would you do to sustain or improve productivity, in light of the company’s factors of production?

Have you observed or participated in any initiatives to turn around a struggling business unit or division?

If Yes:

What worked well in the initiative?

What should be done differently the next time around?

If No:

What could you do to improve your own or your team’s productivity at work?

What area would you focus on first, and why?

Describe how Active Directory can be used to control workstations and give examples?

  • If you get a call from a user that the network is slow – what will you do?
  • You see a ‘fault’ lite on the switch – what will you do to troubleshoot the problem?
  • Describe how Active Directory can be used to control workstations and give examples?
  • Describe why backups are important for network equipment?
  • Describe data center monitoring goals and techniques?
  • Describe any limitations or implementation issues for SDN?
  • Describe any limitations or implementation issues for HCI?
  • Describe what typical problems can wireshark identify?
  • Describe the benefits and configuration of a DMZ?
  • Describe the major strengths and differences between AWS, Azure and GCP?

 

How will you be able to assess whether or not you “understand”?

Module 3 – SLP
COACHING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
Setting Personal Leadership Goals
In Module 1, you began the process of developing a Leadership Growth
Plan (LGP) with a thorough self-assessment. In Module 2, you established
your vision, identified obstacles to achieving that vision, and made plans to
overcome the obstacles. In this module, you will continue to develop your
LGP by setting goals and conducting an assessment of resources you will
need to accomplish your goals. The outcome of this exercise is a 2- to 3-
page plan that specifies 3 to 4 goals you would like to accomplish in the
next year and sets clear objectives for what you will need to do to achieve
them.
Keys to the Assignment
Perhaps the hardest part of setting goals is getting started. Begin by
considering the following:
1. Ask yourself: “What do I need to be doing in order to achieve my
vision?” Think in terms of what you can accomplish by next year. These
are the milestones that describe your goals. They define what you
intend to do.
2. Next, look at each goal separately and ask yourself:
◦ “What do I need to do to reach this goal?”
◦ “What skills do I need to acquire?”
◦ “What new knowledge do I need?”
The answers to these three questions constitute your objectives.
Objectives are shorter term than goals and specify what you need, when
you need it, and how you are going to get it. While goal statements are
helpful in that they set a direction, objectives provide the “roadmap” that
will get you to your vision. Objectives tell you exactly what you need to do,
how you need to do it, and provide a timeline.
Listen
Strong objectives meet the following criteria:
• They are specific. When you write your objectives, use action words
that have a tangible outcome such as identify, demonstrate, perform, or
calculate. You will be able to assess when you have met these types of
objectives. Avoid words like understand, appreciate, know, or learn.
These terms are too vague. How will you be able to assess whether or
not you “understand”?
• They are challenging. Difficult, but attainable objectives will help you
cultivate a greater leadership capacity. If an objective is too easy, you
will not grow. If it is too difficult, you may end up frustrated and the goal
will be unfulfilled.
Your goals and objectives form the outline of your development plan. To
flesh it out, determine what actions are required to meet your objectives.
These actions usually make up the greater part of the leadership
development plan itself.
Putting it all together and writing up the plan
• Fortunately, there are a lot of templates on the internet to help you
create an action plan. Begin by doing some research and select a
template that will allow you to present your goals, objectives, and
timeline. You will also need to identify the resources you will need.
Most of these templates are some type of table, and it is easy to follow
what will need to be done, by when.
• The critical component of this assignment is to be specific about what
actions you will take to gather the resources you will need to meet your
goals. The following list gives a number of specific actions you can
include in your plan, but you should not stop with these. Use your own
initiative and creativity to come up with additional formal, informal,
directed, and self-directed actions you can take to meet your Leadership
Growth Plan.
◦ Reading – This is the basic and most
fundamental way to stay current in your area of
expertise, gain new knowledge, and be inspired.
Your plan should include regular reading of
professional journals, trade publications, books,
and reputable online resources.
◦ Training programs and courses – Formal
courses and training seminars can be effective
and efficient ways of learning new skills and
expanding your leadership capacities. Many
companies offer such training opportunities, but
also check independent or consulting firms in
specific areas such as motivation, performance
appraisal, cross-cultural communication, or
mentoring. Check out the internet, but also local
colleges and Universities. Certificates can offer
cost and time-effective ways to home in on
developing specific skills such as human
resources or project management.
◦ On the job – even if your current position does
not involve leadership responsibilities, you can
look for ways to learn leadership through
practical experience by mentoring a younger or
newer employee, chair a task force, prepare a
presentation, or simply work to develop your
active listening skills on a daily basis.
◦ Volunteering – Join a civic group, charity, board
of a non-profit, political campaign, fundraising
effort, or other community service. Be the first to
offer to take on a new project or supervise other
volunteers. Represent the group on radio, TV, or
press as the spokesperson.
◦ Find a mentor – identify someone who has what
you want and ask if they will show you the ropes.
Let her know that you want to develop specific
skills, such as public speaking or organizing
events and would be interested in being a helping
hand to learn these skills. Ask for feedback from
supervisors and let them know you would
welcome leadership opportunities.
◦ Journaling – often overlooked, a habit of writing
about problems, learnings, obstacles
encountered and overcome, and even hopes and
dreams of the future can help set direction and
increase motivation. A journal can document
what you are learning and how it can apply to
your leadership development.
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SLP Assignment Expectations
• Include a cover page and reference page in addition to the 2-3 pages of
analysis described above.
• Your paper should have an introduction and a conclusion, but the main
part of the assignment may be a well-constructed, professionally
designed table.
• Use headings to indicate major sections of the report.
• Cite and reference any outside sources.
• Use APA formatting.
• Proofread and edit your papers carefully. The expectation is zero errors.

What is the relevance of this experience in terms of your practice? How has this experience developed you as a professional?

Assignment brief

Assessment Criteria:

It will be marked according to the Level 5 University marking grid.

This assignment has been designed to provide you with an opportunity to demonstrate your achievement of the following module learning outcomes:

 

LO1  Demonstrate a contextual understanding of the knowledge and skills required to provide general

care for people and their families in diverse situations.

 

LO 2 Demonstrate a critical understanding of the ways of working that teams and individual

colleagues employ to promote anti-discriminatory practice, the assessment and management of risk or safeguarding individuals and the public.

 

 

LO 3 Provide evaluative evidence of the application of knowledge in an alternative field of practice.

 

This is a 2,000 word reflection.

 

Using Driscoll’s (2007) reflective model, you will demonstrate critical understanding of an area of

practice (Anti-Discriminatory Practice OR Risk OR Safeguarding). This reflection must start by

considering an alternative area of nursing and end by contextualising the discussion into the student’s own field of nursing.

The reflection should include:

  • Title: Develop a title – reflecting the scenario, which alternate area of nursing, the area of practice and your own field of nursing.
  • Briefly rationalise the relevance of reflection within healthcare, then follow the stages of Driscoll’s (2007) model of reflection.
  • Marks will be deducted on Presentation and Knowledge and Understanding if another reflective model other than Driscoll’s (2007) model of reflection is applied in this assignment.
  • The overall structure of this assessment should consist of Introduction, Main Body and Conclusion. NB No sub-headings/ sub-titles within the body of work!

NB Remember you need to apply the lessons learnt to your own field of nursing.

  • You must declare your own field of nursing and select an alternate area of nursing.
Student’s own field Alternate area of nursing
Adult                      Child, Learning Disability, Mental Health or Older Adult.

 

 

How your work will be assessed

Your work will be assessed on the extent to which it demonstrates your achievement of the stated learning outcomes for this assignment (see above) and against other key criteria, as defined in the University’s institutional grading descriptors. If it is appropriate to the format of your assignment and your subject area, a proportion of your marks will also depend upon your use of academic referencing conventions.

This assignment will be marked according to the grading descriptors for Level 5.

 

A

(85-100%)                      (70%-84%)

B

(60-69%)

Criterion

>12.7 12.6-10.5 9-10.4

Presentation

 

15

 

Demonstrates exceptional academic writing style for this level of work Grammar and spelling accurate

Thoughts and ideas clearly expressed

Fluent academic writing style

Within the word limit

Work displays a professional approach

Word count declared

Minimal errors in grammar and spelling accurate

Thoughts and ideas clearly expressed

Fluent academic writing style

Within the word limit

Work displays a professional approach

Word count declared

>12.7 12.6-10.5 9-10.4

Referencing

 

15

Draws predominantly on primary sources of evidence Harvard System used consistently and accurately

Wide range and sizeable amount of reading from a variety of academic sources

Accurate and comprehensive reference list supplied

Harvard System used consistently and accurately

Good range and amount of reading from a reasonable variety of academic sources

Accurate and comprehensive reference list supplied

>21.2 17.5-21.1 15-17.3

Knowledge and understanding

 

25

Demonstrates a full grasp of the contextual nature of knowledge relevant to the topic. Demonstrates extensive and relevant exploration of the topic

Identifies and demonstrates understanding of all key issues and discusses these in depth

Safe practice maintained throughout

 

Demonstrates a fairly extensive and relevant exploration of the topic

Identifies and demonstrates understanding of most of the key issues and discusses these in some depth

Safe practice maintained throughout

 

Version 6: 5.10.10

Level 5

 

A

(85-100%)                        (70%-84%)

B

(60-69%)

Criterion

>17 14-16.9 12-13.9
Integrating academic learning and  practice

 

20

Resourceful and imaginative ability to integrate academic learning into practice. All relevant implications for practice are clearly identified and explained

Demonstrates effective integration of academic learning with issues from  practice

Confidentiality is maintained.

Relevant implications for practice are clearly identified and explained

Demonstrates effective integration of academic learning with issues from  practice

Confidentiality is maintained.

>17 14-16.9 12-13.9

Analysis

 

20

Work shows evidence of a mature and independent analytical approach. Understanding of theory, principles and research evidence is used very effectively to analyse issues and problems

Demonstrates a sustained analytical approach

Understanding of theory, principles and research evidence is used effectively to analyse issues and problems

An analytical approach is reasonably well maintained

 

>4.3 3.5-4.2 3-3.4
Synthesis and evaluation

 

5

Evaluates data to develop a strongly reasoned and articulated argument.

 

Demonstrates some creativity in building a reasoned argument to reach a logical conclusion

 

 

 

 

Demonstrates the ability to build a reasoned argument to reach a logical conclusion

 

Assessment Requirements

In compliance with the principles listed above students must:

  1. Remove names and addresses, identification numbers and any other form of identification from their work that could lead to the identification of an individual in their care. (Do not use labels, TippexTM or black markers, students must recopy if used or cut out any identifying data).

 

  1. Exclude the name of the organisation, except where students must produce a portfolio to evidence practice or a work-based learning contract in which staff and organisation names must be identified. An organisation might be a local authority, NHS trust, statutory or voluntary agency, hospital, clinic, school, day- centre or residential unit. However, in academic assignments, detailed descriptions of the workplace, personal or family backgrounds or any specific data that could lead to the identification of workplace, service-users, carers or staff members must be omitted.
  2. Exclude the name of the organisation on documents or information produced for use by the organisation, unless these are published and available in the public domain.
  3. Replace actual names with pseudonyms when writing about a particular person or place and state as early as possible in the assignment that the name(s) used is/are fictitious.
  4. Please note the following:

Unless a declaration is made within work submitted for assessment that a pseudonym has been used for a patient/client/service-user/learner, markers will assume that confidentiality has been breached and will award a zero percentage mark. Markers will not seek to verify confidentiality on the student’s behalf.

  1. Ensure that personal data, including hospital numbers, case numbers, names and addresses are not stored in electronic files or paper copies of their work.
  2. Ensure that they do NOT remove organisational personal or medical records from the workplace without following organisations’ procedures.
  3. Obtain consent from the patient/client/service-user/learner and a senior member of staff or practice assessor/verifier to copy data from their records (e.g. treatment records or care plans) for use in course assignments, paying due regard to confidentiality by removing names, addresses database numbers and any other form of identification from copies of records.

Students must not submit for publication work that includes confidential information. However, students may submit material for ‘end point’, publication where subjects cannot be recognised.

The content of this module is linked to your practice experiences and the NMC Code (2018):

  • Professional Values
  • Communication and Interpersonal skills (DH, NHS 2012)
  • Nursing practice and decision making
  • Leadership management and team working
  • Practice insight is provided [ through (external) speakers + you] to ensure the students gain experience/insight.
  • This is a reflective piece therefore ‘I’ is expected
  • Using Driscoll’s (2007) reflective model you will demonstrate critical understanding of an area of practice (Anti-Discriminatory Practice OR Risk OR Safeguarding).
  • This reflection must start by considering an alternative area of nursing and include contextualising the discussion into the student’s own field of nursing.
  • Apply Driscoll’s (2007) reflective model, give a brief overview of its structure and a brief justification of the importance of reflection, then follow the stages of the model.
  • You must declare your own field of nursing and select an alternate area of nursing.
  • B. Remember you need to apply the lessons learnt to your own field of nursing!

WHAT (returning to the situation)

(using Driscoll’s model)

WHAT
(returning to the situation)
1. is the purpose of returning to this situation? 2. exactly occurred in your words?
3. did you see? did you do?
4. was your reaction?
5. did other people do? eg. colleague, patient,

visitor?

  1. do you see as key aspects of this situation? What do you need to learn from this experience?

SO WHAT (understanding the context)

What were your feelings about the event?

How did you feel at the time?
Looking back, do you feel the same about it now?

What went well?

What do you think were the strengths of your practice? How might you build on this to improve in the future?

What didn’t go well?

Were there any aspects that you weren’t happy with? Why?
What do you think the consequences of alternative actions would have been?

How does this link to your professional practice?

What is the relevance of this experience in terms of your practice? How has this experience developed you as a professional?

What would you do differently in the future?

Would you behave differently in a similar event in the future? If so, how and why? If not, why not?

NOW WHAT (modifying future outcomes)

Now what are the implications for you, your colleagues, the patient etc.?

Now what might you do differently if faced with a similar situation again?

Now what information do you need to face a similar situation again?

Now what are your best ways of getting further information about the situation should it arise again?

Conclusion

  1. Provide a summary of the issues explored
    2. Remind the reader of the purpose of the essay
  2. Suggest an appropriate course of action in relation to the needs identified in the body of the essay

Key tips

  • Draw on specific instances of the events and describe these in detail.
  • Usually, you’ll be writing about challenges or difficulties that you faced when completing your work. Consider how these came about, how you dealt with them, and what you might do differently next time.
  • Connect the events of this experience with other knowledge you have learnt throughout your courses or your degree. Use academic theories or knowledge to explain, analyse and contextualise the causes and the development of those events.
  • Provide general overviews of your overall experience and describe if it has been a successful or fruitful learning experiences, or if it has been a challenging or demanding one.
  • Suggest ways to improve what you have learnt and how you have enhanced your ability to deal with the situations or issues as a result of the experience

 

What’s going on in there? How the brain and mind develop in the first five years of life.

OPTIONAL FINAL EXAM TOPICS

you will write a short essays. short essay should be at least 400 words, and you should aim for at least 3 citations in each essay.

Short Essay Topics

An “A” paper effectively incorporates the readings/online discussion.  Please note your sources by referring to the article author and page number, or classmate’s name and date if mentioning something from online discussion.  Remember that for all paper topics, you must cite sources.  For all of these topics, it is not necessary to do outside reading for this assignment, but if you refer to anything that is not from class (whether it is a website or something in print), include that reference information in a bibliography.

TOPIC C: GRANT FOR CHILD CARE CENTER

Pretend that a philanthropist has donated $10,000 to the child care center that you own or direct, specifying that the funds must be used to improve children’s cognitive development.  Please be specific about the age(s) that your center serves.  Describe at least 3 ways that you would spend the money.  You can use the money directly on the center and/or to help the families that you serve.

Class texts include:

Eliot, L. (1999). What’s going on in there? How the brain and mind develop in the first five years of life. New York: Bantam. ISBN 0553378252.

 

What is the R-squared for the previous regression? Given this R-squared, would you say the line is a good fit for the data points?

Managerial Economics

Please read the questions carefully.

Description

After coming up with an innovative idea for a new product, you paid $2000 to an industrial designer to draw the blueprints and found a factory in China that agreed to produce the product for you for $3.5 per unit (the price includes the shipping cost from China to you).

Since this is a totally new and unique product, you have no idea how the demand for it would be. Therefore, before you start pricing the product and ordering large amounts from the Chinese factory, you decide to run an experiment (or a pilot study): you talk to Target and they allow you to sell your product at 11 different Target stores for 11 different prices (a different price at each store). These stores are located in areas whose residents have similar average income, so you can be certain that price (and not income) is the only factor varying among these stores.

After 2 weeks, Target sends you the sale numbers for your product. (Find the data at the bottom of this file).

  1. On a graph (scatterplot), display the price-quantity pairs. (Use Excel.) (1pt)  Be careful what variable should be on the vertical axis and which one on the horizontal axis. (1pt)
  2. Using regression, find the demand line that is the best fit for the observed data points. (in other words, add a trend line to the graph you had in part (a)). (1pt)

    Write the demand function in the form of
    Q = a – bP          (1pt)

  3. What is the R-squared for the previous regression? (1pt)
    Given this R-squared, would you say the line is a good fit for the data points? (1pt)
  4. Given the demand equation found in part (b), what is the price elasticity of demand for your product at the price of $7.5? (1pt)

Does that mean your product is elastic or inelastic at that price? (1pt)
To increase your revenue, should you set the price above or below $7.5? (1pt)

  1. Given the information in the description part, how much are the total fixed cost (1pt) and the marginal cost (1pt) of production?
  2. Given the demand equation found in part (b), if you eventually decide to sell your product at $8 per unit for the first year, how many units do you expect to be sold (1pt) and how much will your revenue (1pt) and profits (1pt) be that year?
  3. Assume that your product is so unique that it doesn’t have any close substitutes. Which one best describes the market structure for your good? (competitive, monopoly, competitive fringe, oligopoly, monopolistic competition) (1pt)
  4. Let’s assume the market is a monopoly. Go back to part (b) where you used regression to find the best fit demand (or trend line). Add Marginal Revenue (MR) and Marginal Cost (MC) to the graph (1pt) and see what the profit maximizing quantity (1pt) and price (1pt) are in this scenario? (The numbers don’t need to be precise. Just use the graph and find the approximate price and quantity.)
  5. You forgot to file a patent, so after 2 years, many copycats make products that are somewhat (but not exactly) similar to yours. What kind of market structure would this be? (1pt)
  6. Now imagine another scenario in which your company has only 1 competitor. You and your competitor are both considering running TV ads to promote your own product. You estimate that you and your competitor profits will be as follows if you do or do not run the ads:
    Competitor
    Advertise Do not advertise
Your firm Advertise 1300, 1200 2700, 700
Do not advertise 900, 2000 2400, 1800

What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? (1pt)
If you and your competitor could talk on the phone (imagine it was legal to do so) to coordinate whether to advertise or not, what would the outcome be? (1pt)

 

Total Points: 21

 

 

 

Data:

Price    Quantity Demanded

4          406

5          379

6          355

7          322

8          306

9          283

10        257

11        236

12        205

13        176

14        149

Do the ethical problems of online communication outweigh its undisputed potentials?

Journal of Communication ISSN 0021-9916
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Both Sides of the Story: Communication
Ethics in Mediatized Worlds
Tobias Eberwein1 & Colin Porlezza2
1 Institute for Comparative Media and Communication Studies, Austrian Academy of
Sciences/Aspen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, 1010 Vienna, Austria
2 Institute of Mass Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich, 8050 Zurich, Switzerland
Current transformations in the media landscape are challenging contemporary communication
and media ethics in at least 2 ways. First, digitization of the media creates new
ethical problems that stimulate calls for a redefinition of the norms and values of public
communication. Second, new instruments of web-based media observation introduce
new possibilities for media (self-)regulation and accountability, thus complementing the
initiatives of traditional institutions like press councils. The article retraces those conflicting
developments by reference to 2 comparative studies, representing the diverging traditions
of conventional communication ethics and media accountability research. In bridging over
the conceptual gap between the 2 forms of research, the article develops new perspectives
for ethical reflection in the mediatized worlds of the digital age.
Keywords: Communication Ethics, Media Ethics, Media Self-Regulation, Media
Accountability, Journalism, Online Media, Digitization, Mediatization.
doi:10.1111/jcom.12216
In a world that is mediatized to the core, communication ethics have a key function
in the process of evaluating and assessing human behavior. Everyday life is increasingly
influenced by various forms of media communication (Deuze, 2012), which
implies that ethical reflection is hardly possible without taking into consideration
the insights of contemporary communication ethics (Ess, 2011). However, the ongoing
media transformation also puts many basic ethical concepts to the test. While
a large part of the Internet-related scientific research literature has focused on the
specific potentials of web-based communication, such as its possibilities to pave the
way for new forms of participation (Singer, 2011), more transparency (Eide, 2014),
and a general democratization of professional journalism (Steensen, 2011), more and
more counterexamples suggest that the promising innovations of digitization are all
too frequently reversed. These examples include recurring problems with the quality
Corresponding author: Tobias Eberwein; e-mail: tobias.eberwein@oeaw.ac.at
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T. Eberwein & C. Porlezza Communication Ethics in Mediatized Worlds
of digital contents (lack of accuracy, hate speech, etc.), which—in many cases—are a
direct result of the hypertextuality,multimediality, and interactivity of online communication,
but also with copyright laws and their compensation, issues of data security
and data privacy, the general data explosion and the challenges of information overload,
as well as the uneven distribution of Internet access (Quinn, 2014).
This contradiction provokes numerous questions: Do the ethical problems of
online communication outweigh its undisputed potentials? How do both sides of this
discussion relate to each other?What does this mean for the future of communication
ethics? And what are possible consequences for the (self-)regulation of digitalmedia?
Questions like these are currently being discussed in the light of different analytical
concepts, among which the perspectives of traditional communication and media
ethics and the recent research about media accountability and media governance
stand out.
Traditional communication and media ethics are usually understood as a subdiscipline
of practical philosophy (Rath, 2003). Similar to other subdisciplines, such as
political ethics, business ethics, ethics ofmedicine, or ethics of technology, they focus
on human action as their object of analysis, striving to reflect and legitimize universal
rules of good and responsible behavior in their specific area of application. In the
case of communication and media ethics, this normative approach paves the way for a
definition of ideal values like truth, freedom, and solidarity as well as order and cohesion,
which are regarded as prerequisites for democratic media to fulfill their social
function (McQuail, 2013). In theWestern world, the development of ethical reflection
about the media has been strongly influenced by the tradition of (mostly U.S.-based)
journalism education that narrowly construed media ethics as individual ethics of
professional journalistic actors (Christians, 2000).However, broader concepts of contemporary
communication and media ethics also relate to other actor groups besides
the producers, for example, recipients or communities (Ward & Wasserman, 2010),
which become ever more important in the mediatized realities of today.
Unlike conventional media and communication ethics, research about media
accountability and media governance turns the spotlight from the ideal to the
practical level, thus adding an applied perspective to the tradition of philosophical
reasoning. Through investigating the performance of the different instruments and
institutions of media (self-)regulation (e.g., press councils, ombudspersons, media
journalism, but also media law etc.), the applied perspective evaluates whether and
how the ideals of responsiblemedia communication are realized under the conditions
of everyday life (Puppis, 2007). The inevitable conflicts between ideal norms and
media practice have been documented and discussed in a large scope of studies
(for an overview see Eberwein, Fengler, Lauk, & Leppik-Bork, 2011). The practical
relevance of these conflicts has been exemplified in the recurring attempts by scholars
in this field to act as consultants both for the media industry and media politics.
However, both traditional communication ethics and research about media
accountability and media governance seem to suffer, compared to other research
branches, from a lack of empirical studies, which has to date impeded their
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Communication Ethics in Mediatized Worlds T. Eberwein & C. Porlezza
connectivity to the mainstream of communication studies. Moreover, neither
the links nor the frictions between the two strands of research have been illuminated
and systematized.
Other research fields, such as management, economics, or medicine, have made
further progress in rethinking the dichotomy between research and applied ethics.
Eisenbeiss (2012, p. 791; see also Weaver & Klebe Trevino, 1994, or Donaldson
& Dunfee, 1994), for instance, analyzed business ethics with regard to leadership,
when she addressed “recent calls for more collaboration between normative and
empirical-descriptive inquiry of ethical phenomena by developing an interdisciplinary
integrative approach to ethical leadership.” She concluded that an integrative
approach, which combines normative and empirical ethical considerations, besides
offering new insights with regard to the significance of responsibility for ethical
leadership, represents a starting point for leadership education in terms of how to
deal with ethical dilemmas. Similar efforts can also be observed in bioethics, where
innovative research methodologies are used to shed light on new ethical issues,
which, in turn, leads to a greater understanding of ethics in practice (Frith, 2012,
205ff; see also Borry, Schotsmans, & Dierickx, 2005). The so-called empirical turn
from purely normative ethics to an approach that includes empirical research methods
has thrived in medicine as well (Salloch, Schildmann, & Vollmann, 2012), but
it has not yet occurred in the specific area of journalism and media studies. Even if
some media researchers such asNick Couldry support a neo-Aristotelian approach to
media ethics, which is “guided by the eminently practical insight that right behavior
cannot be identified in advance, abstracted fromthe often competing requirements of
specific contexts” (Couldry, 2012, p. 189; see also Couldry, Madianou, & Pinchevski,
2013), the empirical exploration remains limited.
Thefollowing sections of this essay are supposed to clarify the differences between
normative and empirical ethics as well as the interdependencies between the two with
regard to journalism. By searching for a superordinate concept that would connect
the diverging research traditions, they take the aim of “getting the discipline in communication
with itself” literally, in the hope that it may be useful to demonstrate the
relevance of normative approaches to communication and the media. The starting
point for the line of argument comprises two comparative studies, which were conducted
by the authors.They included qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey
among media practitioners in 12 European countries, as well as a content analysis of
relevant codes of ethics. The implications from these studies are sure to broaden the
comprehension of ethical reflection in communication and media research—which
is more important than ever in the network societies of the digital age.
Ethical challenges in the digital media world
Digitization has not only had a huge impact on the journalistic practice, but was also
a fundamental cultural transformation affecting the media industry (Boczkowski,
2005). Due to the process of convergence that facilitated the emergence of new
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T. Eberwein & C. Porlezza Communication Ethics in Mediatized Worlds
types of multi-, cross-, or transmedia storytelling, journalists had to adapt to the new
characteristics of the web and develop new skills and procedures (Pavlik, 2001).However,
these transformations were not limited to the “techniques” related to everyday
editorial practice, but required a new journalistic mindset. As new concepts, such as
networked journalism, challenge the central qualities of journalists’ role conception
in society, a fusion occurs between traditional news journalism and different forms of
participation by the audience (Beckett, 2010, p. 1).These changes lead to new ethical
challenges that transcend those that strictly refer to the journalistic practice and can
be best described by what Stephen Ward calls the “ethics of how to use new media”
(Ward, 2014, p. 51).
Ethical principles are built to last and journalism is no exception to this rule.
Such principles change slowly and only upon extensiveempirical evidence,which—as
Friend and Singer (2007) argue—leads to an inherent conservativism. This might be
helpful in the everyday practice of the journalistic profession, as these guiding principles
set a framework of rules, but they can become an issue if the whole system
is confronted with structural changes such as the impact of new and social media
on journalism. Moreover, professional journalists are no longer the sole authority to
define good practice, which allowed them to largely ignore calls for greater responsibility
and accountability (Hayes, Singer, & Ceppos, 2007). As virtually everyone
can become an information provider—being at the same time either or both a news
source and part of the public—journalists can no longer be regarded as the only
stronghold of credibility and trust when it comes to news production.
Overall, the digital age has radically changed both journalistic practice and
the journalism profession, and the ethical principles are essentially coupled to the
evolving dynamics within the newsrooms as well as the tools and technologies used
in the news production (Boczkowski, 2005).The dynamics confront news organizations
with new ethical problems, which have been unrecognized—and subsequently
ignored—in analog newsrooms. Hence, the medium—and the technology related
to it—matters, because it changes the way journalists interact and deal with the
public (Singer, 2010).This means that some principles will remain unaltered, others
have to be adapted, and some of the ethical decision-making in journalism has to
be developed from scratch. New principles have to take into account that different
actors, such as the public, now play an increasingly significant role, as audience
interaction becomes paramount in a network society.
A critical scrutiny of the performance of traditional institutions of media
self-regulation such as press councils shows that they have increasingly been forced
to deal with complaints about web issues in recent years. In order to analyze specifically
howtheWeb and newmedia technologies such as linking and online comments,
but also socialmedia like Facebook and Twitter, are affecting professional journalistic
norms, the authors carried out a content analysis of journalistic codes and guidelines
in 12 countries in Eastern and Western Europe (Austria, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom).The aim of the project was to investigate to what extent the ethical
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Communication Ethics in Mediatized Worlds T. Eberwein & C. Porlezza
problems of digital journalism are really accounted for and whether press and media
councils are in a position to act as competent judges responsible for ethical concerns
in a digital media world.
The analysis was systematized along the lines of two major ethical dimensions,
thus providing a coordinate system for contemporary communication ethics that can
also structure future analyses. First, we looked at the shift from gatekeeper ethics
to relationship ethics (Singer, 2010). Gatekeeper ethics largely focus on the journalists’
role to decide what is, or is not, going to be published. In this case, professional
norms such as ethical principles serve as a specificway to both articulate and safeguard
this gatekeeper role. Ethical principles, in this respect, become mainly an instrument
to cultivate an essential role in society—one of fundamental importance to democracy,
allowing citizens to be self-governing thanks to their information: “In short, the
underlying rationale for the ethics of the journalist in a traditional media universe
both stems from and depends upon this traditional role and the traditional view of
that journalist as central to the flow of information” (Singer, 2010, p. 119).
On the other hand, as the Internet changes the way journalists are perceived (more
as individuals) and interact with their publics as well as with one another, relationship
ethics has a variety of implications due to its emphasis on connections to colleagues,
communities, and publics. Being part of a network, the journalist has to develop his
reputation as a trustful information provider first because it allows the publics to participate
farmore actively inevery stage of the journalisticproductionprocess (Beckett,
2010, p. 1). Particularly if you are engaging in interactions—more importantly also for
collaborations—building trust is essential: “The answer lies in the function of the networked
professional journalist to act as a filter and facilitator and the potential power
of the citizen to hold them to account. […] In the end trust is secured by connectivity.
Interactivity leads to accountability through a new conceptualization of trust
based on the networked journalist as a reliable hub of connectivity” (Beckett, 2010,
p. 15). Both journalists working in a traditional news environment and those working
in a network rely on trust. However, in the case of traditional news organizations,
trust is largely based on the reputation the media outlet gained over decades—and
the ethical principles support this performance. “Trust us because we know what we
do,” according to Singer (2010), is a lot to ask, perhaps even too much if we take into
account the dwindling trust in themedia.Anetworkedmedia ecosystem, on the other
hand, requests journalists—be they bloggers or reportersworking in establishednews
firms—to establish a new connection with their publics in order to build trust, which
is, “generally, the ethical thing to do in a relationship” (Singer, 2010, p. 119).The same
applied to the second differentiation between monomedia and multimedia ethics that
have distinctive implications for journalists with regard to ethics for news gathering,
production, content, and relationship with the public (Ess, 2013; Pavlik, 2001).
The study showed that most of the prevalent journalistic codes of ethics in Europe
have not yet reached the Internet era. In themajority of cases, they do not—or only to
a limited extent—contain any references to ethical problems that result from the distinct
features of online communication.1 Exceptions can be found in the guidelines by
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T. Eberwein & C. Porlezza Communication Ethics in Mediatized Worlds
the Dutch Raad voor de Journalistiek (2010) or the Finnish Julkisen Sanan Neuvosto,
which include specific rules relating to the editorial handling of web archives, of corrections
in online media, or to the moderation of discussion forums on the Internet.
Particularly, the FinnishCouncil forMassMedia created a specific Annex to itsGuidelines
for Journalists, which concerns materials generated by the public on a website
(Julkisen SananNeuvosto, 2014).Most of the analyzed codes, however, do not pay any
attention to digitalmedia.
On the other hand, problem-centered interviews with international experts from
the fields of journalism, social media, and media self-regulation enabled us to verify
that transnationally similar amendments of ethical codes are actually being discussed
or prepared in various European countries—even though not in all of the possible
areas of conflict. While some press councils, for example the Swiss or German, still
concentrate their deliberation on areas such as online comments, sourcing, and transparency,
other institutions ofmedia self-regulation, like theDutch or the Finnish press
councils, have progressed to tackling complex issues such as social media and audience
participation.2
However, the issue of journalism ethics cannot be assigned to institutions of
self-regulation such as press councils only. If news organizations want to invest in
quality management, they have to establish forums for debates as well. Audience
members are not alone in wearing many hats. Journalists can be editors, bloggers,
citizens commenting on social media, media critics, etc. Such conflicts can
become even worse if entrepreneurial journalists are launching start-ups, where
there might be additional clashes between commercial and editorial interests. These
overlapping roles demand clear guidelines. However, codifying ethical principles and
transforming them to abstract guidelines may be useful for the purpose of general
considerations. The more specific the guidelines, the more context-dependent they
can be, which makes them hard to apply in specific circumstances. In a networked
journalistic ecosystem, besides clear guidelines, in which news organizations define
general conditions of how they react to ethical issues, it is necessary that media
organizations foster the practices by which journalists connect with their publics.
Such forms of participation—and interaction—would not only embrace the wider
notion of relationship ethics, allowing citizens or the civil society to hold the news
media to account. An enhanced participation would also allow news outlets to get
immediate feedback on their performance and to know whether they are “on the
right track to satisfy the needs of their most important stakeholders, namely the
public who consumes their products” (Meier, 2011, p. 165).
Potentials for media accountability
While traditional communication and media ethics focus on the normative level
of how media actors should behave, research on media accountability and media
governance is related to the practical level. Scholarly research explores what impact
different institutions and practices of media (self-)regulation such as media law,
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Communication Ethics in Mediatized Worlds T. Eberwein & C. Porlezza
ombudspersons, or media journalism, etc., have on the everyday routines of the
journalistic production process and how media organizations can be held to account
for the quality of their media performances (de Haan & Bardoel, 2011).
Claude-Jean Bertrand, who carried out one of the first comparative studies on
media accountability, defines the concept as “any non-State means of making media
responsible towards the public” (Bertrand, 2000, p. 108). A noteworthy aspect of the
concept of media accountability is that it transcends the previously dominant focus
on the media’s general responsibility toward society. Instead, it concentrates on the
media’s obligations toward their stakeholders and, specifically, their publics. According
to the studies of Hodges (1986, cited in McQuail, 2010), the difference between
responsibility and accountability is simple: “responsibility has to do with defining
proper conduct, accountability with compelling it” (for an overview of definitions see
Fengler, Eberwein, Leppik-Bork, Lönnendonker, & Pies, 2014a).
Media governance on the other hand is similar to the concept of media accountability,
but encompasses a stronger focus on governmental action—although it is
often described as “government without politics” or “governing beyond government”
(de Haan & Bardoel, 2011). Contrary to strict media regulation, media governance
involves a networked form of coordination that expresses the intention of a constrained
role of the state in the field of media policy, particularly with regard to press
freedom, journalistic independence, and actors of the private market (Donges, 2007;
Puppis, 2007).
Nevertheless,media accountability and media governance are not concepts based
on rigid structures.They must be seen as a process of different but interrelated practices
in a sequence that range from journalism education to quality management systems
during the production process through to specific practices of interaction with
the audience after the publication of the news.
Recently, the close relationship with the public has become one of themost important
aspects of media accountability, given that the Internet has increased the opportunities
for the public to get in touch with news organizations and journalists. What
is generally called responsiveness denotes the idea of receiving feedback from users
that expect news organizations to react to their concerns and wishes in reference to
the media’s performance (Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004; Domingo & Heikkilä, 2012).
The interactivity and immediacy of theWeb 2.0 has further expanded the opportunities
for members of the audience to critically observe and criticize media content, for
instance, through blogs or citizen journalism. This can be particularly important in
media systems operating under tight political control. Furthermore, the online realm
potentially allows users also to take part in the actual news production by means of
user-generated content, allowing for new and innovative practices of editorial coproduction
such as participatory journalism.
While the online realm enhances the scope ofmedia critique, providing users with
a means to reinforce journalistic norms (Fengler, 2008), it also increases the number
of stakeholders the media have to deal with in terms of media accountability, generating
a complex framework of media accountability practices offline and online.
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This is of vital importance, as traditional institutions of media accountability such as
press councils or ombudsmen suffer fromdistrust and skepticism with regard to their
efficiency.
The failure of the traditional institutions of media accountability and media governance
is confirmed by the second study carried out by the authors (see also Fengler,
Eberwein,Mazzoleni, Porlezza,&Russ-Mohl, 2014b; Fengler et al., 2015), called “Media
Accountability and Transparency in Europe.”3 The quantitative survey of almost
1,800 journalists in 12 European and two Arab countries demonstrated that in the
eyes of professional communicators, traditional institutions of media self-regulation
(such as press councils, ombudspersons, or media journalism) regularly fail when it
comes to addressing the pitfalls of digital communication ethics.
At the same time, large numbers of innovative instruments of media accountability
(e.g.,media watchblogs, cyber-ombudsmen, ormedia criticism on social networks
like Facebook or Twitter) are currently emerging online all around the globe. By hinting
at and discussing minor and major journalistic flaws in public, these instruments
help create a novel kind of participatory media regulation which everymedia user can
contribute to, and which seems to be all the more attentive to the specific features
of digital communication. The survey also showed that the participatory potential
of online communication offers multifaceted new chances for quality management
within the newsrooms. Digital communication must be seen not only as a source
for new ethical problems, but also as a viable strategy to correct them, but only if
media managers are prone to implement such measures. Frequently there is still a
gap between the positive assessment of such practices and the implementation of
accountability practices within the newsrooms, and it thus seems that journalists do
not practice what they preach (Groenhart & Evers, 2014).
Of course, as effective the concept of participatory media regulation might be,
it is not free of controversies. The advent of the Web 2.0 has not only given rise to
an augmented interactivity between journalists and users, it has also brought along
new forms of incivility in communication such as threats, name-calling, hate speech
(Papacharissi, 2004), or trolling (Cho & Acquisti, 2013; Steele, 2013; Turner, 2010).
Incivility and trolling are widespread phenomena on the Internet and are not limited
towebsites of media outlets, but they occurwherever users interact and exchange their
views. Even if trolling may always exist up to a certain degree, news organizations have
different tools at hand to limit the dysfunctional impact of digital misbehavior: gamification,
moderation, or removing the anonymity of the posters can both limit the
impact of trolls and encourage constructive postings (Binns, 2012, p. 559). But even
if these tools bring more civility to the interactions between journalists and users,
they are by no means cure-alls. Such walled gardens may bring “more civil, cohesive,
and diverse discourse; yet, on the other hand, the lingering danger of designing
new systems that perpetuate old problems such as fragmentation, filter bubbles and
homogenization” (Zamith & Lewis, 2014, pp. 569ff).
Nevertheless, for all the problematic side-effects that an increased digital
interactivity entails, hindering participation means precluding accountability and
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Communication Ethics in Mediatized Worlds T. Eberwein & C. Porlezza
responsiveness and shutting out an increasingly assertive public (de Haan & Bardoel,
2012). The potentials of the Web to foster accountability to the public are by no
means fully exploited by news organizations (Eberwein & Porlezza, 2014; Powell &
Jempson, 2014). But the online space is becoming increasingly important particularly
because of its immediacy, versatility, and capacity to reach a lot of users. Under
these circumstances it is very likely that news organizations will have to cope with
increasing pressure from the audience in terms of being held to account for their
performances.
A new notion of media and communication ethics
The empirical studies presented in this article illustrate two conflicting developments
of media and communication ethics in the mediatized worlds of the digital age.
On the one hand, they indicate that the digitization of the media creates new
ethical problems that are a direct result of the hypertextuality, multimediality, and
the increased interactivity of the Internet. Various examples can be seen in the
daily workflow of professional journalistic newsrooms, which still have to find new
quality standards for verifying online sources, providing adequate hyperlinks in their
coverage, handling user comments, or integrating other user-generated contents
such as mobile photos and videos—to name just a few of the fields of action that
are currently being discussed. Although the innovations of the digital age have
stimulated calls for a redefinition of the norms and values of public communication,
there still is considerable uncertainty about what constitutes good and responsible
online journalism—or which traditional norms may remain unaltered. Our analysis
demonstrates that—despite a few exemptions—most of the contemporary codes of
ethics throughout Europe and elsewhere have not yet been adapted to the realities
of a digital media world, hence offering hardly any assistance when it comes to
assessing the potentials and perils of online communication. By uncovering gaps in
the evaluated codes, our researchmay also serve as a practically relevant collection of
recommendations to suggest amendments to the current codes and guidelines—from
which not only journalists but also the audience will benefit.
On the other hand, our empirical studies also gather new impulses for the practice
of media (self-)regulation and accountability. Our comparative journalists survey
clearly demonstrates that the digitization of communication must not only be
regardedasadanger for ethically justifiedbehavior in journalismandthemedia; at the
same time, it can also be a generator for promising innovations in this field. In recent
years, there has been a stunning growth of new instruments of web-based media
observation (such as media watchblogs, cyber-ombudsmen, and media criticism on
or through platforms like Facebook and Twitter), which are not only supported by
the media industry, but also integrate the voice of the audience. This new type of
participatory media regulation seems to be particularly beneficial in the media landscape
of today, sincemany of the traditional institutions ofmedia self-regulation are a
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T. Eberwein & C. Porlezza Communication Ethics in Mediatized Worlds
matter of growing dispute within the profession as they are criticized for being ineffective
and outdated. By contrast, as our survey suggests, participatory media accountability
instruments can unfold a noteworthy sanction potential when they use the
possibilities of attention management offered by theWeb—particularly in those journalism
cultures without a long tradition ofmedia professionalism and self-regulation.
In many instances, social media are the one and only channel that audience members
can use to voice their discontent about the performance of journalistic actors (see
Bichler et al., 2012, for a collection of best practice examples). Therefore, participatory
media accountability instruments constitute a valuable complement to the initiatives
of traditional institutions, like press councils or ombudsmen, and by transforming
and extending journalistic quality management, adapting it to the requirements of
the digital age.
By addressing both sides of the story, we intend to develop a new notion of digital
media and communication ethics, which is no longer limited to traditional concepts
of professional norms and (self-)regulation, but is able to tackle and explain the implications
of digital and convergent communication. On the grounds of the systematic
disruption of journalismand the enormous changes in themedia (eco-)systemcaused
by the digitization of communication, the elaboration of a new digital media ethics
(Ess, 2013) becomes an inevitable necessity in a globalized and increasingly interconnected
world.
However, the strands of research relevant for such an objective seem so far to
have failed to engage in a mutual discourse. Indeed, both traditional communication
ethics and research onmedia accountability andmedia governance focus on the
same objects of analysis, sometimes even posing similar research questions.However,
most of the studies in one field or the other have successfully ignored the findings
and traditions of their respective counterparts for a long time.This lamentable state
occurs, although reciprocal references would be all the more reasonable, since the
practical insights ofmedia accountability research are nothing but a natural follow-up
to the philosophical arguments of traditional communication ethics. The disciplines,
interlinked, would be able to clarify both their theoretical claims and their practical
utilities, which are often overlooked in discussions about the current transformations
of the media. Other than their lack of mutual integration, the reputation of communication
ethics and media accountability within the larger field of communication
studies seems to suffer from their ambivalent relationship to empirical research aswell
as the absence of a larger theoretical concept to explain their role in the mediatized
worlds of today. This is a deplorable condition, since a normative approach becomes
evermore important at present, in order tomake sense of themassive reconfigurations
of the global media landscape that are currently taking place.
The hostility of communication ethics toward empiricism is a problem that seems
to be characteristic of the struggle to clarify the aims and principles of practical
philosophy. Traditionally, ethics are supposed to evaluate decisions about the “ought”
of a certain action, which is usually done on the basis of logical thinking, in such a
way as to clarify which preferences can be normatively legitimized. Under ordinary
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Communication Ethics in Mediatized Worlds T. Eberwein & C. Porlezza
circumstances, there is no need for empirical proof in this context. Nevertheless,
attempts to deduce normative principles from empirical evidence were criticized
as far back historically as the early 18th century (see Treatise of Human Nature by
Hume, 2005), and George Edward Moore described such an attempt to move from
“is” to “ought” as a “naturalistic fallacy” (Moore, 2002). Fromthe perspective of communication
and media ethics, this may suggest that a legitimization of professional
journalistic norms must be based not on the insights of empirical media research,
but rather on plausibility and reason.
Following the argumentation of Rath (2014, pp. 37ff), however, we contend that
contemporary communication and media ethics must not dispense with empirical
research either. Indeed, communication ethics needs empirical data as touchstone,
in order to test the practicability of its normative parameters in the real world. For
example, if communication ethics is expected to help develop rules and guidelines
for digital journalism, it needs reliable information about this field of action and
its protagonists, in order to be relevant for them and adequate to reality. This is
particularly valid if the field of action is in a state of change, as is the contemporary
media landscape. This type of understanding of communication ethics, naturally,
has methodological consequences. Scholars in this area of research cannot solely
rely on philosophical reasoning, but must also develop an appropriate interest
in and knowledge of empirical communication and media studies. Accordingly,
contemporary communication and media ethics metamorphose into an integrative
discipline, which combines its philosophical foundations with the practical orientation
of empirical media research. This combination bridges over the gap between
traditional communication ethics and applied research on media accountability and
media governance.
In order to improve its connectivity, however, this new approach to communication
andmedia ethics also needs a theoretical framework to clarify its place within the
broader system of communication studies. One of the most promising candidates for
sucha theory is offeredby the concept ofmediatization, as specifiedbyFriedrichKrotz
(2007) and others, which reconstructs the dynamics of change in culture and society
and the historically varying influences of (new) media on them. From the perspective
of communication and media ethics, which is struggling to cope with the current
transformations of the media, mediatization theory seems to be a valuable vehicle
which can help to differentiate the determining factors of this process of change, thus
alsooutlining thekeyfieldsofdiscourseof a futuredigitalmedia ethics.Unfortunately,
the normative dimensions of the mediatization approach have not yet been probed
into with due diligence (e.g., Ess, 2014)—and some of its proponents seem to oppose
the idea of paying attention to the subject as a moral agent altogether (e.g. Hjarvard,
2014). Consequently, many of the pressing questions with regard to the relationship
between communication ethics and mediatization theory are still unanswered. For
example, what are the most problematic forms of mediatized communicative actions,
communication technologies, and communication structures from a moral point of
view? How can we discuss responsibility for and resistance against these forms of
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T. Eberwein & C. Porlezza Communication Ethics in Mediatized Worlds
mediatization? Which normative principles can be made plausible in this context?
Evidently, the scholarly debate about communication ethics in the mediatized worlds
of the digital age has only just begun—and, considering the difficulties in assessing
the future direction of the ongoing media transformation, it is high time to move this
debate into the center of our discipline.
Notes
1 For example, the code of ethics (“Ehrenkodex”) of the Austrian Press Council contains no
references to the Internet at all (http://www.presserat.at/show_content.php?hid=2). In
Switzerland, the Directives related to the Declaration of the Duties and Rights of a
Journalist contain some rules with regard to online comments and the right to be forgotten
(http://bit.ly/1OQxQj6), while the German Press council has just recently updated its code
of ethics (“Pressekodex”) with regard to user-generated content (http://bit.ly/1cA7PXP). In
Italy, with the exception of the Charter of Treviso (http://www.odg.it/content/minori),
where the protection of minors is regulated, the Ordine dei Giornalisti does not have any
directives for ethical issues in the case of digital journalism. However, this is no European
phenomenon:The Code of Ethics of the Society of Professional Journalists in the US makes
no references to digital journalism either (http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp).
2 Particularly the Finnish Annex that deals with material generated by the public on a media
website includes a statement about interactivity, since “the public must be given the
opportunity to inform editorial offices of inappropriate content in such a way that the
informant receives due confirmation” (Julkisen Sanan Neuvosto, 2014).
3 Further information about this study can also be found on the project website
(http://www.mediaact.eu).
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What would happen if we all decided that doing X is right instead?

Utilitarianism can be summed up by the following two claims:

  1. The right action in any situation is the one that produces the greatest balance of benefit over harm.
  2. Everybody counts equally.

Each of these components requires some explanation. First, what is meant by “benefit”? Different utilitarian philosophers have interpreted this term differently. Some have held that what is important is happiness. That is, we should maximize the total amount of happiness or pleasure for all concerned. Others have held that what is important is actual welfare or well-being. They argue that we should maximize the extent to which we actually help people (and minimize harm) regardless of whether or not that makes them happy. This distinction will not matter much for us in this course, but it is good to be aware that there are different interpretations of what it means to “benefit” somebody.

One thing that utilitarians generally agree on, however, is that they are concerned with all types of benefits, both short-term and long-term. So, utilitarianism asks us to consider all foreseeable benefits and harms that may result from our actions, not just ones that will result immediately. One final note about the notion of benefit: utilitarians are concerned not just with harms and benefits that are guaranteed, but also with harms and benefits that are possible or likely. When a benefit or harm is possible or likely, utilitarians tell us to include the degree of possibility in our calculations: a potential harm or benefit that is very unlikely counts for less than a potential harm or benefit that is very likely (though they must still be counted to some extent).

Second, what is the significance of the utilitarian’s claim that “everybody counts equally?” For one thing, this means that we are never justified in giving extra weight to our own preferences just because they are our own.  Nor are we justified in giving preferential treatment to the interests of family or friends; as far as moral decision making goes, strangers matter just as much. It also means, for example, that the interests of a poor man ought to count for just as much as the interests of a king.

This does not mean that utilitarianism demands that we all benefit the same amount from every decision. Sometimes, that won’t be possible. What’s important to utilitarians is that in making a decision, everyone’s interests are given equal consideration. Note further that utilitarians do not require that we maximize benefit to each person. What matters for utilitarians is the total amount of benefit or harm, when we “add up” the benefits and harms for each person. So an action that harms a few people in order to benefit a lot of people would likely be endorsed by utilitarians.

At this point it is imperative to point out that utilitarianism is often described as cost-benefit analysis (CBA).  However this is a serious misunderstanding of the theory.  Utilitarianism is not CBA, yet in this course, and many others, students consistently make this mistake.   CBA is an economic theory whereasutilitarianism is a moral theory.  The goal of CBA is cost-effectiveness while the goal for utilitarians is a morally justified outcome that benefits, and reduces harm for the greatest number of people in order to create a better society for all. The notion of utility must be defined, and everyone counts equally.  Confusing this moral theory with CBA is inaccurate and can be quite unfair to those who have developed it.

It is also important to note that there is disagreement among various utilitarian thinkers over the meaning of the term “everybody.” Does “everybody” mean “all humans”? Or, “all creatures capable of feeling pain”? (Peter Singer, author of the book Animal Liberation, is a famous modern-day utilitarian who holds roughly the latter view.) Most utiliarians take the term “everybody” to mean “all persons.”

Strengths & Weaknesses of Utilitarianism

The main intuitive strength of utilitarianism lies in its emphasis on equality. It seems right (to most people) that, when it comes to making moral decisions, all people ought to count equally. For a utilitarian, everybody counts equally: men and women, the young and the old, and people of different races, religions, or sexual orientation.

The primary weakness of utilitarianism lies in its single-minded emphasis on outcomes. This narrow focus, according to critics, neglects important considerations such as justice. For example, imagine a situation in which the police are having trouble catching a killer. Let us imagine that the police have reason to think that the killer has left the country, but that the public is so upset about this murder, and about the police’s failure to solve the crime, that the city is on the brink of civil unrest. If riots break out, there will be much destruction of property, and possibly loss of life. In such a situation, reasoning based solely on outcomes might suggest that the police would be justified in framing an innocent man for this crime. Providing they were sure they could do so successfully, “solving” the crime in this way might well bring peace to the city. But wouldn’t this be grossly unfair – unjust – to the man they framed? Worries such as this have led many moral theorists to the conclusion that while the net benefits of a course of action are important, they cannot be the whole story.

A further criticism of utilitarianism is that it seems to imply very burdensome obligations. For example, you’ve got a choice with what to do with the money in your savings account. You can save it for a rainy day, or you could give it all to a famine relief organization. If you save the money, you will benefit yourself. But if you gave it all to famine relief, you might actually save lives. The utility-maximizing thing to do would be to empty out your bank account and send the money to a charitable organization. And, according to a strict utilitarian, if you fail to do so you will have done something morally wrong. In fact, a strict utilitarian seems forced to say that owning any luxuries at all (television, computer, nice clothes and so on) is unethical, given that you could do more good by giving that money to charity. While most of us would agree that we could all do a little more to help those less fortunate, most people find it implausible that it could be morally obligatory to give away all non-essential goods. To most people, such an act would seem heroic; according to a utilitarian, it is mandatory.

A final worry about utilitarianism lies in its apparent insensitivity to special duties and particular obligations. For example, most people would intuitively think it right that we should pay more attention to the well-being of our family than to the well-being of strangers. Imagine a different version of the example from the previous paragraph. Now, the choice you will have is whether to save money for your children’s education, or instead send that same amount of money to relief organizations overseas. Sending your kids to university will of course benefit them, but not nearly as much as the same money would benefit starving people in another country. For utilitarians, the choice seems clear. Yet most people would say, again, that this asks too much of us.

A Further Complication: “Rule Utilitarianism”

In response to certain criticisms, some utilitarian philosophers have developed a special variety of utilitarianism called “Rule Utilitarianism.” Without going into too much philosophical detail, the basic idea is straightforward. Standard utilitarian thinking says that, in any situation, you should choose whatever action is going to maximize benefit for the group of people affected. Rule utilitarians say, “No way! You shouldn’t choose on a case-by-case basis like that! We should establish rules of thumb that will reliably maximize benefit for the group in the long run; then, in any situation, all you have to do is follow those rules.” In other words, while regular utilitarians ask you to choose actions that maximize utility, Rule Utilitarians ask you to follow RULES that, in the long run, will maximize utility.

A quick example may help. Imagine a situation in which you consider telling a lie to get out of a jam. A utilitarian might advise you to ask yourself, “Will telling a lie in this situation maximize benefit, taking everyone into consideration?” A rule utilitarian, on the other hand, is more likely to advise you to ask yourself, “Would a rule of thumb that advocated lying in situations such as this maximize benefit in the long run?”

Deontology: Theories of Duty

This group of moral theories assumes that right and wrong is a matter of doing one’s duty.  In this course we will look at two theories: the very famous theory provided by Kant and Ross’s theory of prima facie duty.

Kantian Theory

Another group of philosophers has said that in making moral decisions we should focus not on the consequences of our actions, but on whether or not we are doing our duty. The word “deontology” means roughly “a theory of duties.” The two most influential deontologicalmoral theories are those of Immanuel Kant and W.D. Ross.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is one of the most influential philosophers of all time. His theory is considered the primary deontological theory in ethics and is typically the one that leads to the best arguments.  Kant argued that we should make moral decisions based upon what he called the “categorical imperative.” He was particularly opposed to utilitarianism because it did not seem to produce what he would consider ‘moral’ since the intent of the person acting was ignored.  The Categorical Imperative is the one, over-arching super-rule of ethics, for Kant. He gave us two different “versions” of the Categorical Imperative, which he thought were 2 different ways of expressing the same key idea.

The FIRST version of the Categorical Imperative says (roughly) that in any situation, we ought to act according to that principle which we could consistently translate into a moral law for all rational agents. And we should do so, according to Kant, regardless of the consequences of doing so. Kant, for example, thought that we have a duty to tell the truth, since nobody could consistently ask that lying become a universal law. After all, if it was permissible to tell lies all the time, no one could believe anyone. The vast majority of our interactions with each other assume that we are each telling the truth.  This is what makes a lie so noteworthy, and it also provides the liar with an advantage over others…if they can get away with it.  If everyone lied all the time, however, then there would be no advantage to lying,  since no one would believe anyone anyway.  Thus lying is morally wrong because it produces a logical contradiction. (Lying is an advantage and lying is not an advantage).  So, you can’t wish that everyone lied, without tying yourself in logical knots!

Some people interpret the first version of the Categorical Imperative as The Golden Rule where we’re told “Behave only as you would want others to behave, too.” That’s not a good way of understanding Kant, (in fact Kant was quite concerned that he’d be misunderstood this way) because morality is not about focusing on what WE would want.  We cannot put ourselves at the center of every moral issue and decide that whatever we want must be morally right.  That would be moral subjectivism.  What’s important, for Kant, is whether a given way of acting COULD be embraced by all of us, as a shared rule withoutproducing a logical contradiction.

But Kant’s disregard for consequences also means that he thought we should tell the truth regardless of the outcome of doing so. It’s not too difficult to think up examples of situations in which telling the truth could do a great deal of harm. For Kant, such harms are an acceptable consequence of doing one’s duty.

The details of Kant’s moral theory are complicated. We will focus on just a few key elements. Why did Kant say that we should act according to rules that could serve as a moral law for all rational agents? The reason is roughly that Kant wanted to emphasize the equal and inherent moral worth of all people due to their rationality.  Rationality is a capacity that adult humans share and does not have anything to do with intelligence, education etc.  It’s simply the ability to think rationally, if one so chooses.  Since the people around you have moral worth due to their rationality, they deserve to be treated with respect. Further, since you have this moral worth, you should act in a suitable manner – that is you should act like a responsible moral person, someone who is capable of figuring out what the right thing to do is and doing it. This notion of equal, inherent moral worth is one that continues to be influential in moral and political philosophy.

The SECOND version of the Categorical Imperative focuses more directly on this idea of the moral worth of all humans. According to the 2nd version, Kant says that in making ethical choices, you should always act in such a way that you are treating human beings as “ends” (i.e., as inherently valuable and worthy of respect), rather than as “mere means” (i.e., rather than as tools that you can use and manipulate for your own purposes.) The core idea, here, is respect. We should never treat other people as if they were mere instruments, mere tools to be used in getting the things we want.  The second version of Kant’s moral theory tells us that it is wrong to sacrifice one human for another, or to treat that person as less than ourselves.  Their rationality gives them inherent moral worth which is equal to yours, so there is no good reason to suggest that your needs, wants, desires etc count for more than anyone else’s.  Without good reason, then actions are unjustified and thus immoral.

Ross’s Prima Facie rules

The second deontological theory we will look at is presented by W.D. Ross, in his book The Right and the Good (1930). However, this is a challenging theory to apply as it provides no specific guidance and is easily challenged.  It’s good to know that Ross’s theory is another type of deontology, but it’s unlikely to provide convincing arguments in a course like business ethics which addresses very specific issues.

Unlike Mill or Kant, Ross held that there was no one moral principle that could cover every situation. Ross held that various kinds of situations, and various kinds of relationships, produced different kinds of obligations. He thus devised a list of what he called “prima facie obligations” or prima facie duties. The seven kinds of duties which Ross identified are: Fidelity, Reparation, Gratitude or Reciprocity, Beneficence, Nonmaleficence, Justice and Self-improvement. (A moral theory making use of several distinct moral principles like this is called a pluralistic moral theory.) The Latin term “prima facie” means roughly “arising at first sight.” This term is used here to signal Ross’s contention that in any particular situation, we may well be faced with more than one apparentobligation.

For example, imagine you have made a promise to have lunch with a friend. But on the way to lunch, you are the first to arrive at an accident scene, and you may be able to help. If you stop to help, you will have to miss lunch with your friend. In such a situation, according to Ross, you have a prima facie duty (of fidelity) to keep your promise to your friend. You also have a prima facie duty (of beneficence) to stop and help at the accident. In such a situation, Ross says that our actual duty will depend on the circumstances. How bad is the accident? Do you have medical training? How urgently did your friend need to see you? Ross says that there is no formula for balancing our various obligations in situations such as this: we must make what Ross calls an “all-things-considered judgment.”

Ross’s framework is attractive to some since it recognizes that a variety of different kinds of ethical reasons might apply in different situations. Sometimes, for example, it’s most important to create the most benefit, and sometimes it’s more important to focus on treating people with respect. However, the biggest problem for this theory is that Ross does not tell us how to balance these different ethical reasons in real life.  It’s therefore not clear how to put this theory into action, answer specific questions about what our duty is, and is easily refuted since there is no particularly compelling reason to privilege one duty over another.

One sees evidence of the influence of deontological ethics in modern talk of rights. Philosophers often talk in terms of a necessary connection between one person having a duty to do something, and other person having a related right. For example, if I have a right to enjoy my property, then you may be said to have a duty (or obligation) not to interfere with my enjoyment of my property. Similarly, if I have a duty to honour a promise I made to you, then you might be said to have a right to expect that I fulfill my promise.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Duty Theory

The main strength of duty theories is likely to be found in their tendency to prohibit absolutely certain kinds of apparent injustices. Only a duty-based theory can make sense of an absolute prohibition. And it does seem like certain actions (think up your own examples!) ought to be thought of as completely prohibited, as utterly immoral no matter what. (A utilitarian, on the other hand, can never forbid particular types of actions categorically. Whether a given action is right or wrong will, again, depend on the consequences.)

One common criticism of duty theory lies in the lack of a “decision procedure” or formula for resolving conflict between various duties. For example, Kant’s categorical imperative implies a duty not to lie as well as a duty not to hurt others. But sometimes it seems like we must lie in order to avoid harming someone.  Kant attempts to address this concern by elaborating on his concept of contradiction.  However, this is a much more significant problem for Ross since the various duties listed by Ross can easily come into conflict which makes this a very problematic theory to apply in the real world.

Other Types of Theories

Other moral theories do not provide clear answers on what is right or wrong, but rather attempt to offer a way to resolve specific problems, or focus on how we ought to live, rather than telling what we ought to do.  These theories can be useful in helping navigate questions about why we should honour contracts, or what sort of people we should be to live good lives, but they do not provide answers about what actions to take in specific cases.  However, as you become more familiar with ethical reasoning, it will become clearer how to incorporate these considerations into the problems of business ethics, although it’s unlikely they will give us answers to bigger questions on their own.

Social Contract Theory or “Contractarianism”

Contractarianism, or social contract theory, has come in many “flavours” over the past two centuries. Historical contractarians include Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), David Hume (1711–1776) and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778); important modern day contractarians include the late John Rawls and Canada’s own David Gauthier. But the unifying starting point is that morality is, above all, a social phenomenon.

Social contract theorists ask us to consider what moral rules rational people would accept if they were setting up a society from scratch. That is, imagine for a moment that you lived in a world without rules. (Not just without government or law enforcement, but without rules altogether.) Such a world would likely be very nasty. (Or, as Hobbes famously wrote, life would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”) Now ask yourself, in order to escape such a nasty situation, what rules would rational folks agree to be bound by? That is, what would be the terms of the “contract” that people in such a situation would agree to? What should the “rules of the game” be? The social contract argument says roughly that if it would be rational to agree to a particular rule when devising a new society, then we should consider ourselves bound to follow that rule in our moral decision-making.

An important part of (most versions of) contract theory is a focus on reciprocity. That is, social contract theorists strongly believe that all moral obligations have to be reciprocal: they have to go in both directions. For example, if we were devising a new society, it would be reasonable for me to promise not to steal – so long as you promise the same thing. Contractarians ask, “what is a reasonable restriction on my behaviour, given how others are acting?”

Strengths and Weaknesses of Contractarianism

The main attraction of contractarianism lies in its emphasis upon consent. That is, contract theory bases moral obligation on what people can agree to. On such a conception, morality is not imposed upon us, but agreed to. Many have thought this an attractive vision of what ethics is about.

The main criticism of social contract theory is based upon the theory’s reliance on “hypothetical” consent. As real people in real situations, we might reasonably ask, “Why should I care what I would have agreed to in some other situation?”

Virtue Theory

Virtue theory has its historical roots in the work of the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle (384–322 BCE). Modern virtue theorists include Alasdair MacIntyre and Elizabeth Anscombe. Virtue theory is a way of looking at ethics that says that rather than focusing on rules and obligations, we ought instead to focus on the development of good character traits, or virtues. Among the virtues typically mentioned are courage, generosity, temperance, justice and truthfulness. For Aristotle, for example, the virtue of courage was to be found in avoiding being cowardly (a vice) and also avoiding being rash (also a vice).

Given their focus on personal characteristics, instead of asking “What should we do?” virtue theorists ask, “What sorts of people should we be?” For virtue theorists, actions themselves are only significant insofar as they demonstrate certain kinds of personality traits. Virtue theorists tell us that rather than thinking about what rules we should follow, we should think instead about what sort of person sets a good moral example. We should follow good moral examples when we see them, and we should strive to set a good moral example ourselves. In particular, the focus is not on the value of particular actions, but on whether – over the long run – we are displaying the appropriate kinds of character traits.

One reason many people find virtue theory appealing is that it seems to be consistent with how morality is experienced in life. That is, we often think not in terms of doing the right thing in any one circumstance, but of being – and striving to become – a good person. Further, virtue theory seems to accord well with the common intuition that actions sometimes matter less than the character of the people who perform them. When a bad person does something with good consequences, we seem justified in denying him praise.

The main criticism of virtue theory, perhaps, is that it is hard to say much about what kind of person one is without reference to the kinds of actions she performs or the kinds of rules she follows. What is it about an individual that makes her deserve being called “truthful?” One obvious answer is that she is truthful if she always follows the rule, “Tell the truth.” How do we tell whether a person is brave? By checking to see whether she commits brave acts. This casts doubt on the merit of a focus on virtues that is divorced from the notion of good actions.

Module Summary

We have now reviewed the basic details of a number of moral theories, namely deontological or duty ethics, utilitarianism, social contract theory, and virtue theory. In this course, we will not take a position on which of these theories is the most defensible, or the best suited to issues in business ethics. Each of these theories constitutes a sophisticated attempt to arrive at a general account of how we should live our moral lives.

The approach we will take in this course is to think of these various moral theories as tools. These theories provide a set of concepts, and a range of arguments that we can use to discuss issues in business ethics. What we will likely find is that for some kinds of issues, it will seem to make sense to reason like a utilitarian. A corporate executive, for example, might make good use of utilitarian reasoning in deciding which of two factories should be closed. It might be argued that, other things being equal, it makes the most sense for her choose whichever course of action will cause the least suffering – that is, close the factory that employs the fewest people. For other issues, a focus on duties and rights will seem more plausible. For instance, an office manager might consider searching every employee’s desk in hopes of finding out who has been stealing office supplies. This might be the most efficient way to solve the problem – it would maximize benefit – but it would also be a breach of the workers’ right to privacy.

In yet other cases, we may want to focus on the need to develop certain kinds of virtues, as when a corporate executive decides on a course of action based upon the example she knows she will be setting for her employees.Thus for any moral problem we discuss, we now have a toolbox consisting of various kinds of arguments that we can apply. We must exercise caution in using this toolbox, however. Each of these moral theories was conceived of as a stand-alone option that in important ways denies that the others are correct. Kant, for example, explicitly denies that consequences matter, so we can’t be both a Kantian and a utilitarian. There is thus something fishy about being a utilitarian one day and a deontologist the next. We can, however, reasonably claim to use both “utilitarian arguments” and “contractarian arguments” (for example). But we do a disservice to the devoted proponents of those theories if we allow ourselves to think that we are actually following the theories.

A further cautionary note: in taking advantage of the availability of all four of these theories, we may be tempted to choose which theory to use based on what conclusion we want to reach. Think, for example, of the problem faced by a sales manager whose most important customer refuses to deal with female sales reps. He has the choice of keeping his female reps off this account, and thus harming their careers, or allowing female reps an equal chance at this account, and risk losing a key customer. If I already believe that discrimination is inherently morally evil, then I may be tempted to appeal only to rights-based theories, and will be tempted to say that the manager should not cave in regardless of the consequences. (This might be the right course of action, but as students of moral philosophy we should never simply assume so.) We must therefore be careful not to use moral theories, and the sophisticated arguments they provide, simply to back up our existing beliefs.

Moral Relativism

Some people find the idea of a moral theory difficult to understand. A theory is supposed to be something that applies to everyone. But doesn’t each of us have different ideas of wrong and right? Questions like this often lead people to a position called “moral relativism.” Moral relativism is the doctrine that moral truth or value is relative to the beliefs of some individual or group. Effectively, the view is that something is right for me but not be for you and we can just agree to disagree.  That’s a nice sentiment but not very defensible.  If I think stealing your wallet is ok because I need the money, and you disagree with me, surely we want to say more than let’s agree to disagree.  This seems to miss the point about ethics and ethical actions.

Relativism comes in two types. The most common sort is cultural relativism, which is the doctrine that morality is relative to the beliefs or practices of particular cultural groups. The second, more extreme form of relativism is known as “subjectivism.” Subjectivism is the doctrine that morality is relative to the beliefs of the individual.

While an extended examination of moral relativism is beyond the scope of this course, the frequency with which some version or another of this doctrine pops up suggests that it warrants at least a brief mention. First, let us deal very briefly with subjectivism. Very few people, if any, actually believe that right and wrong is relative to the individual. In fact, our everyday moral practices imply that we do all believe in at least some shared values. For example, it is only because we have shared moral beliefs that we bother blaming people when we think they’ve done something wrong. We only blame people for their actions when we think those actions have failed to live up to some shared standard. What about cultural relativism? A thorough examination of the merits of cultural relativism is, again, beyond the scope of this course.

For our purposes, it will be sufficient to point out two things. First, there does seem to be a remarkable degree of agreement, even among members of very different cultures, as to the basic principles of morality. All cultures put restrictions on lying. All cultures see justice as a good thing. Different peoples may differ in how they apply those principles, or in the relative weight assigned to them, but they honour them none the less suggesting that they are not, in fact, relative at all.

Second, from the point of view of moral philosophy, the fact that “my culture believes doing X is morally wrong” is never sufficient reason to believe that doing X is wrong. As philosophers, we always want to ask questions like, “Why do we think doing X wrong?” “How do we know that doing X is wrong?” “What would happen if we all decided that doing X is right instead?”