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What are the conclusions drawn from the articles in relation to your topic?

Please refer to the articles in attachment for this assignment :
In this DB, you will synthesize the four research articles about your topic discussed in Modules 1 & 2. A synthesis includes an analysis of the aggregate of articles, not the individual articles. e.g. clustering and interrelating ideas from the studies to form an overall representation of the conceptual definitions, descriptions, interventions, instruments, and strengths and weaknesses of the body of knowledge represented by the articles. See the examples in Chapter 7 (in particular, Synthesizing Sources and Discussion of Empirical Literature) and Chapter 18 related to Quantitative Research in Gray, Grove, & Sutherland (2017). This is a discussion, not a paper! Be succinct and refer to the questions below.

Use the following questions to synthesize your four articles:

1. What are the conclusions drawn from the articles in relation to your topic?

2. Identify similarities and differences of the studies. These may include a discussion of the samples, research designs, and findings, for example.

3. Are there conflicting findings among the articles?

What are you aware of as you say this? What is happening in your body? What is it like inside right now?

The Therapeutic Relationship in Emotion-Focused Therapy
Leslie Greenberg
York University
Important qualities of the relationship that make it therapeutic are discussed. The relationship is seen
as both therapeutic in and of itself and as providing a facilitative environment from specific change
processes. The role of the relationship in emotion-focused therapy is discussed within this framework.
The relationship in emotion-focused therapy is seen as curative by serving an affect-regulation
function, which is internalized over time by the client. This function is accomplished by offering a
soothing affect-attuned bond characterized by the therapist’s presence and empathic attunement to
affect as well as acceptance and congruence. Second, the relationship is seen as functioning as a
means to an end by offering an optimal environment for facilitating specific modes of emotional
processing. In our view, affect is much more likely to be approached, tolerated, and accepted in the
context of a safe relationship.
Keywords: presence, affect regulation, empathic attunement, acceptance, emotion processing
Emotion-focused therapy (EFT; Greenberg, 2002, 2010; Greenberg
& Watson, 2006) views the relationship, characterized by the
therapist’s presence and the provision of empathy, acceptance, and
congruence, as an affect-regulating bond.1 Over time, this interpersonal
regulation of affect is internalized by the client as selfsoothing
and enhances the capacity to regulate his or her inner
states. In this view, the therapist’s overall attitude, not only his or
her techniques, is seen as influencing the client’s well-being.
Elements such as pacing and facial, tonal, and postural communication
of affect all create a therapeutic emotional climate. An
important goal of EFT is client enhanced self-soothing and emotional
transformation, and EFT sees the relationship as both a
direct predictor of this change and a context in which techniques
can be successfully used to reach this end.
In our view, the relationship thus serves a dual purpose in
psychotherapy (Greenberg & Watson, 2006). First, the relationship
is therapeutic in and of itself by serving an affect-regulation
function, which is internalized over time by the client. This function
is accomplished by offering a soothing affect-attuned bond
characterized by the therapist’s presence and empathic attunement
to affect as well as acceptance and congruence. Second, the relationship
functions as a means to an end. The relationship offers the
optimal environment for facilitating specific modes of emotional
processing. Affect is much more likely to be approached, tolerated,
and accepted in the context of a safe relationship.
In the most general terms, EFT is built on a genuinely positively
regarding, empathic relationship, and on the therapist being highly
present, respectful, and responsive to the client’s experience. Consistent
with this, an abundance of research points to the therapeutic
relationship as being central to client growth and change, given
that differential therapeutic outcomes may only be minimally
attributed to specific techniques (Norcross, 2011). Furthermore,
recent research has identified therapeutic presence as a core therapeutic
stance that contributes to the development of a positive
therapeutic relationship (Geller & Greenberg, 2012; Pos, Geller &
Oghene, 2011). Therapeutic presence is defined as the therapist’s
ability to be fully immersed in the moment, without judgment or
expectation, being with and for the client, which facilitates healing.
EFT therapists also assume that it is useful to use techniques to
guide the client’s emotional processing in different ways at different
times. The relationship thus is seen as curative in and of itself
and as a foundation for specific techniques to work and so is both
directly and indirectly related to outcome (Weerasekera, Linder,
Greenberg, & Watson, 2001)
Treatment Principles
EFT is based on two major treatment principles: The provision
of a therapeutic relationship and the facilitation of therapeutic
work (Greenberg, Rice, & Elliot, 1993). As their ordering implies,
the relationship principles come first and ultimately receive priority
over the task-facilitation principles. In the relationship with the
client, the overall therapeutic style combines what EFT therapists
call following with guiding. In following, the therapist enters
the client’s internal frame of reference, empathically following the
client’s experience and responding to it in an affectively attuned
manner. This is combined with a more guiding process-directive
style to deepen experience. The therapeutic relationship thus, as
well as being curative, also promotes the therapeutic work of
exploration, emotional transformation, and the creation of new
meaning. With safety, exploration deepens and the client is able to
say, “I just feel like I am sinking, sinking into a deep black hole,”
the therapist responds with “just feeling hopeless like I can try and
try but nothing works” (following) and the client responds, “Yes
1 Informed consent for purposes of research, training, and publishing
have been received for case material presented, and number of details of
the client and the situation have been changed to disguise the material for
reasons of confidentiality.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Leslie
Greenberg, Department of Psychology, York University, 510 St. Clements
Avenue, Toronto, Canada M5N1M4. E-mail: lgrnberg@yorku.ca
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This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Psychotherapy © 2014 American Psychological Association
2014, Vol. 51, No. 3, 350–357 0033-3204/14/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037336
350
and I can see the light but just can’t quite reach up it.” Here, we see
facilitated by the therapist’s validation of this painful state, the
client enters a domain of emotional processing of painful feelings
that would never have been reached without the safety and empathy
in the relationship. He allows the client to reach the painful
emotion that needs to be processed to move on. Subsequently, in
response to the therapist’s reflection that the client needs the
support of a mother that she never received (guiding), the client
both grieves the loss and accesses a sense of having deserved more
and begins to reorganize.
Purely following, without a contribution from the therapist and
without the sense of direction emerging from a dialogue, can result
in therapy not progressing efficiently or just going in circles. At the
same time, leading by the therapist without following is ineffective
and may be counterproductive, undermining the client’s efforts to
develop as an empowered, self-organizing person. When disjunction
or disagreement occurs, the client is viewed as the expert on
his or her own experience, and the therapist always defers to the
client’s experience. Thus, therapist interventions are offered in a
nonimposing tentative manner, as conjectures, perspectives, “experiments,”
or offers, rather than as pronouncements, lectures, or
statements of truth.
Relationship Principles
The relationship is built on the following three subprinciples: (a)
Empathic attunement: being fully present, enter the client’s internal
frame of reference and track the client’s immediate and evolving
experiencing; (b) Therapeutic bond: genuinely communicate
empathy, caring, and warmth to the client; and (c) Task collaboration:
facilitate involvement in goals and tasks of therapy.
In EFT, the relationship is seen as being curative in and of itself
in that therapists’ empathy and acceptance promotes breaking of
isolation, validation, strengthening of the self, and self-acceptance.
The relation with the therapist also provides a powerful buffer to
the client’s distress by the coregulation of affect. A relationship
with an attuned, responsive, mirroring therapist is essential in
developing interpersonal soothing and emotion regulation. This
type of relationship helps clients regulate their overwhelming
disorganizing emotions by breaking the sense of isolation and the
unbearable aloneness of emotional pain. Over time, the interpersonal
regulation of affect becomes internalized into self-soothing
and the capacity to regulate inner states (Stern, 1985). When an
empathic connection is made with the therapist, affect-processing
centers in the brain are affected and new possibilities open up for
the client. This type of relationship creates an optimal therapeutic
environment that both contributes to clients’ self-acceptance and to
affect regulation and also helps the client feel safe to fully engage
in the process of self-exploration and new learning. Another important
aspect of a helping relationship is establishing collaboration
on the goals and tasks of therapy. This is essential to developing
the experience that the two of us are working together to
overcome the problem. Getting agreement on goals and tasks is
dependent on understanding the client and what might be helpful
to the client and so it is an enactment of empathy. Goal agreement
in EFT often is achieved by being able to capture the chronically
enduring underlying pain with which the client has been struggling
and establishing an agreement to work on resolving the pain rather
than setting a behavioral change goal.
The Relationship and Affect Regulation
It is important to explore how affect regulation occurs to understand
the important affect-regulating role of the relationship. In
our view, emotion regulation is an integral aspect of the generation
of emotion and coterminates with it (Campos, Frankel, &
Camras, 2004) rather than involving self-control of emotion. The
type of implicit affect regulation that results from a good therapeutic
relationship occurs through right hemispheric processes, is
not verbally mediated, is highly relational, and is most directly
affected by such things as emotional communication, facial expression,
vocal quality, and eye contact (Schore, 2003).
The therapists’ facial, postural, and vocal expression of emotion
clearly set very different emotional climates and are aspects of
their ways of being. Clients’ right hemispheres respond to therapists’
micro affective communication as well as to their explicit
words, and all these influence clients’ processes of dynamic selforganization.
The therapist who conveys genuine interest, acceptance,
caring, compassion, and joy, and little anger, contempt,
disgust, and fear creates the environment for a secure emotional
bond. In the analysis of the classic film, Three Psychotherapies, by
Rogers, Perls, and Ellis with Gloria, Magai and De Haviland
(2002) studied the emotional climate created by the therapists. This
analysis revealed that each of these therapists, in their behavior in
the film, in their theories, and more generally in their personalities
and personal lives, expressed and focused on very different emotions.
Rogers showed interest, joy, and shame. Perls showed contempt
and fear and Ellis anger and fear. Anyone who has seen this
film can see that they created very different therapeutic environments.
Gloria at points becomes defensive with both Ellis and Perls but
not with Rogers whom she sees as a warm father. The categorical
emotions such as interest, anger, sadness, fear, and shame, expressed
by the therapist are important and strongly influence the
relational environment. The vitality aspects of the therapists’ emotional
expression, such as rhythm, cadence, and energy, are also
important in affective attunement.
In clinical work, regulation is thus not easily achieved through
the conscious system alone. A validating relationship is crucial to
affect regulation. People with underregulated affect have been
shown to benefit both from interpersonal validation as much as
from the learning of explicit emotion regulation and distresstolerance
skills (Linehan et al., 2002). Problems in vulnerable
personalities arise most from deficits in the more implicit forms of
regulation of emotion and emotional intensity. Although deliberate
behavioral and cognitive forms of regulation—more left hemispheric
process—are useful for people who feel out of control to
help them cope, over time, it is the building of implicit or automatic
emotion regulation capacities that is important to achieve
transformation for highly fragile, personality disordered, clients
(Schore, 2003). Implicit forms of regulation often cannot be
trained or learned as a volitional skill. Directly experiencing
aroused affect, being soothed by relational or nonverbal means—a
more right hemispheric process (Schore, 2003)—is one of the best
ways to build the implicit capacity for self-soothing. Being able to
soothe the self develops initially by internalization of the soothing
functions of the protective other (Stern, 1985). Soothing then most
centrally comes interpersonally in the form of empathic attunement
and responsiveness to one’s affect and through acceptance
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RELATIONSHIP IN EFT 351
and validation by the therapist. The provision of a safe, validating,
supportive, and empathic environment in therapy helps soothe
automatically generated underregulated distress. Internalizing the
soothing of the therapist is one of the best ways of developing
implicit soothing. Empathy from the other over time is internalized
and becomes empathy for the self and this leads to a strengthening
of the self (Bohart & Greenberg, 1997; Bohart, Elliott, Greenberg,
& Watson, 2002; Elliott, Bohart, Watson, & Greenberg, 2011).
Over time, this interpersonal regulation of affect is internalized
into self-soothing or the capacity to regulate inner states. These
optimal therapeutic relational qualities thus facilitate the dyadic
regulation of emotion through provision of safety, security, and
connection. This breaks the client’s sense of isolation, confirms
self-experience, and promotes both self-empathy and selfexploration.
When an empathic connection is made with the therapist, affectprocessing
centers in the client’s brain are effected and new
possibilities open up for the client (Schore, 2003). This creates an
optimal therapeutic environment that not only contributes to clients’
affect regulation by providing interpersonal soothing but also
helps them to feel safe to fully engage in the process of selfexploration
and new learning. Effective therapeutic work is only
possible when the client feels safe and secure with the therapist.
Developing a sense of safety and security for the client emerges
through therapists’ ability to be fully present and empathically
engaged, in a genuine validating manner (Geller & Greenberg,
2012). When the therapist is fully in the moment with a client, his
or her receptive presence sends a message to the client that he/she
is going to be heard, met, felt and understood, which elicits a
feeling of safety in the client. Current neuroscience research is
beginning to reveal the neurological underpinnings of client safety
through therapists’ presence and affective attunement. Porge’s
(2011) Polyvagal Theory explains that when clients feel met and
felt by the therapist, they not only feel aligned with the therapist,
but the brain likely establishes a state of “neuroception” of safety
(Porges, 2011). This creates a feeling of security in clients, which
allows them to trust the therapist and to open and engage in the
necessary therapeutic work. Neuroception is a novel construct
created to describe how neural circuits discern safety, danger, or
life threat outside the realm of awareness. Neuroception takes
place in the primitive parts of the brain as an unconscious process
that is manifested in our autonomic nervous system as an adaptive
mechanism to prepare us for defensive strategies of fight–flight or
shutdown.
For instance, clients with trauma backgrounds may have autonomic
nervous systems that preclude the down-regulation of defense
strategies and predisposes them to feel unsafe even when
there is no observable risk. Hence, challenges in the social world
of these clients occur, as they respond defensively even when there
is no risk. Hence, in the Polyvagal Theory, the regulators of
emotions and physiology are embedded in relationship. The core
of the social engagement system in mammals is reflected in the
bidirectional neural communication between the face and the heart
(Porges, 2011). From this perspective, arousal can be physiological
arousal or emotional dysregulation and can be stabilized through
social interaction that includes warm facial expression, open body
posture, vocal tone, and prosody (rhythm of speech). The therapist’s
presence and overall safety providing attitude thus influence
the client’s well-being. Therapists’ pacing, facial, tonal, and postural
communication of affect all create a therapeutic emotional
climate that leads to physiological soothing.
The Therapeutic Alliance
Numerous studies have shown that a positive therapeutic alliance
is associated with good outcome (Horvath, Del Re, Fluckiger,
& Symonds, 2011). The alliance reflects three important aspects of
therapeutic work, the bond or the feelings the participants have
toward each other, the level of agreement that exists between them
about the goals of therapy, and the ways in which they will go
about meeting those goals (Bordin, 1979). A recent study that
looked at clients who were being treated for depression in
cognitive– behavioral and emotion-focused psychotherapy found
that clients’ perceptions of the Rogerian relationship conditions
were highly correlated with clients’ ratings of the therapeutic
alliance in both approaches and that presence and empathy were
correlated (Watson & Geller, 2005) and were associated with
changes in clients’ level of self-esteem, and their self-report of
interpersonal difficulties, while therapists’ acceptance of their clients
was predictive of changes in depression.
The development of collaboration also has been established as
an important, empirically supported aspect of the therapeutic relationship
(Horvath & Greenberg, 1994). Thus, as well as creating
the emotional climate that secures a warm trusting bond, it is also
important to foster a collaboration on tasks and goals through the
course of therapy, wherein client and therapist agree to work with
both avoided emotions and underregulated emotions. With research,
we (Horvath & Greenberg, 1989) came to see the client’s
perceived task relevance and task collaboration as more predictive
of outcome than empathy. In fact, perceived task collaboration
emerged from an enactment by the therapist of his or her empathic
understanding of the client. This enactment might occur by making
a suggestion that helped deepen the client’s exploration or experience.
For example, a response like “if your father was here what
would you like to say to him from your anger” enacts an understanding
of what the client needed and would be experienced as
more helpful than a verbal communication of an understanding of
the client’s inner world such as “so that left you feeling so angry
at him.” Proposals thus were enactments of empathy. Collaboration
thus became an important foundational principle of an EFT
approach and a core ingredient of our theory of relationship.
From this, we have identified a number of ways to assist in the
development and maintenance of the task agreement dimension of
the alliance when working with emotions. The first of these involves
conveying that the primary focus of treatment is the client’s
concerns and underlying painful feelings. The therapist conveys
that a central intention of therapy is to help clients to open up and
reveal their inner feelings, meanings, and fears—to risk being
vulnerable with their therapists in the hope that together they can
come to a better understanding of the clients’ inner and outer
worlds and effect meaningful change that will ameliorate clients’
sense of despair. Without this exploratory goal being adequately
negotiated between the parties, the therapy will likely end prematurely
or not progress. From the start, the client is implicitly being
trained, by the therapist’s consistent empathic focuses on the
client’s internal experience, to attend to this internal experience.
Therapists in the early phase of therapy convey understanding,
acknowledge client’s pain, validate his or her struggles, and focus
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352 GREENBERG
on the emotional impact of events in the client’s life. By the
therapist’s attentive listening, presence, and caring and by the
attitude conveyed by the therapist’s face, body, hands, and eyes
that validates the client specialness, the client comes to feel seen,
valued, and respected and is thereby more inclined to trust and be
open. By attending to clients’ core humanness and expressing
unconditional confidence in clients’ strengths and capacities for
growth, the therapist helps reveal clients’ uniqueness and strength.
It is by seeing the possibility of growth in another being that this
possibility is stimulated. This is an important aspect of the relationship
in all approaches. The deeply held therapeutic stance of
presence and the attitude of empathy, positive regard, and a focus
on strengths and resources help create an emotional bond of trust
and respect and help develop the safe environment and a secure
base for the exploration that will take place as the therapy progresses.
This is a relational principle that is universal to all helping
relationships. In addition to creating a bond, a rationale is provided,
right from the start, that the goal of treatment is for the
person to access and become aware of underlying feelings and
needs involved in their difficulties. If, however, their emotions are
underregulated, the goal becomes finding better ways of coping
with feelings that seem overwhelming. People are told that their
feelings provide important information about how they are reacting
to situations and that it is important to get clear on what their
emotions are telling them. There is a strong emphasis from the start
on validating and accepting the pain that people feel. When people
come to therapy they do so because they are suffering and feel
some form of pain—it feels like something in their life or inside of
them is broken. It is with the quickness and sureness with which
the therapist can grasp the nature of the client’s chronic enduring
pain that an emotional bond and collaboration to work on it will be
created. Once the chronic enduring pain has been articulated, the
person’s sense of isolation is broken. There is a sense of relief that
it has been spoken, that someone understands, and that the person
now is not so alone in the struggle. Hope is created and agreeing
to work on resolving the chronic enduring pain creates an alliance,
spurred by this hope. Resolving the articulated enduring pain
becomes the goal of treatment and the basis for the working
alliance.
Therapeutic Presence
Therapeutic presence involves therapists being fully in the moment
on a multitude of levels, physically, emotionally, cognitively,
spiritually, and relationally (Geller & Greenberg, 2002, 2012;
Geller, Greenberg, & Watson, 2010). The experience of therapeutic
presence involves (a) being in contact with one’s integrated and
healthy self, while (b) being open and receptive, to what is poignant
in the moment and immersed in it, (c) with a larger sense of
spaciousness and expansion of awareness and perception. This
grounded, immersed, and expanded awareness occurs with (d) the
intention of being with and for the client, in service of his or her
healing process (Geller & Greenberg, 2002, 2012). A more detailed
description of our empirically validated model of therapeutic
presence can be found in other publications (see Geller & Greenberg,
2002, 2012). Presence is a relational stance that is fundamental
to evoking an experiential and neuro-physiological sense of
safety in the client, which in turn can promote a positive therapeutic
alliance and effective clinical work across different therapeutic
approaches.
To establish a positive alliance, it is important for therapists first
to be present to their clients. A question often asked by trainees is:
What does one need to do to help a constricted client access
feeling? But this implies that it is something one needs to do to the
client. My answer is that the ability to access emotions depends
first and foremost on the type of relationship created. It is the
therapist’s ability to be present that will help the client access
emotion. A qualitative analysis of therapists’ experience of presence
revealed that therapeutic presence involves being receptively
open and sensitive to one’s own moment-by-moment changing
experience, being fully immersed in the moment, feeling a sense of
expansion and spaciousness, and being with and for the client
(Geller & Greenberg, 2002). It is these qualities that will help
create the climate that will lead clients to attend to their momentby-
moment affective experience. It is important that therapists are
able to be receptive and open to their clients’ emotional experiences.
The kind of “presence” that seems to be therapeutic is the
state of mind in which there is an awareness of moment-bymoment
emotional reactions as well as thoughts and perceptions
occurring in the client, in the therapist, and between them in the
therapeutic relationship. This means that therapists need to let go
their own specific concerns, the quarrel with their spouse this
morning, the falling value of the dollar, or an upcoming vacation
and truly show up in the session. To be present for clients is to
empty oneself, to clear a space inside so as to be able to listen
clearly in the moment to the narratives and problems that clients
bring. Therapists need to see their clients’ faces and hear their
voices. It is through the therapist’s undivided and focused attention
that clients feel valued and are able to clearly discern their own
concerns and difficulties. By giving clients their full attention,
therapists are able to more fully resonate with their clients’ feelings
and their experience of events and provide the level of
empathic responding that will be most optimal at different points
during the session.
Dialogue of this type often leads to heightened moments of
meeting or what Buber (1958) referred to as I-Thou contact. In
these moments, people share living through an emotional experience
together. Here an intersubjective experience is lived while it
is occurring: It is a shared experience of attending to and experiencing
the same thing at the same time and knowing that the other
is coexperiencing the same thing. Each person experiences something
of the other’s experience and knows that this is occurring.
This creates a strong bond, a sense of togetherness that breaks any
sense of existential isolation and promotes trust and openness. It
also is a lived moment of experience that remains indelibly
stamped in memory. These moments produce therapeutic change
both in the people’s sense of self and their way of relating.
We see the Rogerian conditions of empathy, positive regard or
acceptance, and congruence (Rogers, 1957) as part of a single
therapeutic way of that of being fully present with the other.
Empathy has been established as one of the three empirically
supported aspects of the relationship, one that correlates moderately
(e.g., r .32) with outcome (Bohart et al., 2003; Elliott,
Bohart, Watson, & Greenberg, 2011). The sense that another is
accepting and can be trusted, to the extent that one perceives the
other as congruent and sincere, is important to the sense that one
is valued and liked by the other. Through sensing the therapist’s
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RELATIONSHIP IN EFT 353
unconditional acceptance of their experience, clients lose their
preoccupation with the therapist and their energy becomes available
to turn inward and contact their own experience. Reduction of
interpersonal anxiety leads to capacity for tolerance of more intrapersonal
anxiety. Clients are able to face and accept more of
their experience with the unconditional acceptance of another.
Genuineness and Congruence
The positive real relationship, composed of what Gelso and
colleagues term congruence and realism, is an important aspect of
the therapeutic relationship that enhances the alliance and client
progress (Gelso, 2011; Gelso & Hayes, 1998; Kolden, Klein,
Wang & Austin, 2011) Congruence or authenticity can be broken
into two separate components (Lietaer, 1993): Awareness of one’s
own internal experience and the willingness to communicate to the
other person what is going on within (transparency). The deeper
level intentions include the intentions to facilitate the others’
development, to be accepting and noncritical of the other, to
confirm the others’ experience, to focus on their strengths, and
above all to do the other no harm. These intentions, and more, are
what determine whether congruence is therapeutic. The case of
transparency or the communication component of congruence is
much more complicated than the self-awareness component. Being
facilitatively transparent involves many interpersonal skills
(Greenberg & Geller, 2001). This component involves not only the
ability to express what one truly feels but to express it in a way that
is facilitative. Transparency thus is a global concept for a complex
set of interpersonal skills embedded within a set of therapeutic
attitudes. These skills appear to depend on three factors: first, on
therapist attitudes, second, on certain processes such as facilitativeness,
discipline, and comprehensiveness, and third, on the
interpersonal stance of the therapist.
The set of skills involved in facilitative congruent communication
is best explicated by looking at congruent interaction in terms
of the interactional stance taken by therapists as described by a
circumplex grid of interpersonal interactions (Benjamin, 1996).
This grid is based on the two major dimensions of autonomy/
control and closeness/affiliation. Consistent with interpersonal theory,
this grid outlines a set of complementary responses that fit
each other and that interactionally “pull” for each other. Thus,
attack pulls defensiveness or withdrawal, and affirmation pulls for
disclosure and revelation. The skill of congruent responding involves
not reacting in a complementary fashion to a negative
interpersonal “pull” of the client, like recoiling when attacked; but
rather, to act in such a way as to “pull” for a more therapeutically
productive response from one’s client, such as clear expression.
This would be achieved by an empathic understanding response to
an attack rather than by recoiling.
What to do when the therapist is not feeling affirming but is
feeling angry, critical, and rejecting and cannot get past this
feeling, to something more affiliative? As we have said, an interactional
response to be facilitatively congruent involves first connecting
with the fundamental attitudes or intentions of trying to be
helpful, understanding, valuing, respecting, and nonintrusive or
nondominant. This will lead to these feelings being expressed as
disclosures. If the interpersonal stance of disclosing the difficult
feeling is adopted, rather than the complementary stances of expressing
it by attacking, or rejecting, or seducing then this congruent
response is more likely to be facilitative. It is not the content
of the disclosure that is the central issue in being facilitative; rather
it is the interpersonal stance of disclosure in a facilitative way that
is important. What is congruent is the feeling of wanting to
disclose in the service of facilitating, and the action of disclosing.
The different ways of being facilitatively congruent in dealing with
different classes of difficult feeling thus are to some degree specifiable.
They all involve adopting a position of disclosing. Expressing
a feeling that could be perceived of as negative, in a stance that
is disclosing, rather than expressing it in the stance that usually
accompanies that feeling, will help make it facilitative because
disclosing is an affiliative and nondominant form of interaction
whereas being angry is clearly nonaffiliative and may be dominant.
Disclosure, implicitly or explicitly, involves willingness to, or an
interest in, exploring with the other what one is disclosing. For
example, when attacked or feeling angry therapists do not attack
the other but rather disclose that they are feeling angry. They do
not use blaming “you” language. Rather they take responsibility
for their feelings and use “I” language that helps disclose what
they are feeling. Above all they do not go into one up, escalatory,
positions in this communication, but rather openly disclose feelings
of fear, anger, or hurt. When the problem is one of the
therapists experiencing nonaffiliative rejecting feelings or loss of
interest in their clients’ experience, the interactional skill involves
being able to disclose this in the context of communicating congruently
that the therapist does not wish to feel this. Or therapists
disclose these feelings as problems getting in the way and that they
are trying to repair so that they will be able to feel more understanding
and closer. The key in communicating what could be
perceived as negative feelings in a congruently facilitative way is
to communicate it in a nondominant affiliative disclosing way with
appropriate nonverbals. Both timing and type of client need to be
considered in deciding whether or not to disclose.
Coaching as an Aspect of the Relationship
In addition to presence and being with the client, EFT therapists
also lead and guide client processing—an activity that we have
termed coaching. In EFT, certain client in-session problem states
are seen as markers of underlying emotional processing difficulties
that offer opportunities for differential interventions best suited to
help facilitate productive work on that problem state. Thus, if a
client enters a self-critical state, this is an opportunity to intervene
with a two-chair dialogue to resolve splits. The therapist is thereby
seen as setting a task for the client to work on. Therapeutic work
thus involves engaging clients in particular tasks suitable to states
that the clients enter into in the session.
We have come to view a therapist who works in this way as
emotion coaches (Greenberg, 2002). Coaches provide guidance on
how to process emotions and emotion-related problems in adaptive
ways. The therapist both promotes and validates awareness and
acceptance of emotional experience and coaches clients to engage
in tasks that promote new ways of processing emotion. Coaching
entails both acceptance and change. The nondirective following
style provides change toward acceptance of what is while the more
leading style provides guidance, introduces novelty and the possibility
of change.
Emotion coaching involves a partnership of coexploration in a
growth-promoting process aimed at helping people achieve goals
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354 GREENBERG
of emotional awareness, regulation, reflection, and transformation
(Greenberg, 2002). It involves facilitating awareness of emotions,
new ways of processing the emotion, and provides guidance in
ways of soothing or regulating the emotion. Awareness in turn
involves helping clients verbally label emotions while they are
being felt, helping them accept the emotion and talking with clients
about what it is like to experience an emotion. In addition, coaching
clients involves facilitating the utilization of adaptive emotions,
usually anger and sadness, to guide action and transform
maladaptive emotions usually fear, shame, or anger. It is important
to note that people often cannot simply be taught new strategies
conceptually for dealing with difficult emotions, but rather have to
be facilitated experientially to engage in the new process and only
later explicitly taught what to do. For example accessing anger or
a getting to an emotionally experienced need or goal may be very
helpful in overcoming a sense of depressive hopelessness or defeat.
However, explicitly teaching people that this is what they
should do is not nearly as helpful as interpersonally facilitating this
by asking them at the right time in the right way what it is they feel
or need.
Some clients, however, are extremely externally focused and
helping them contact their feelings can be challenging. A persistent
gentle pressure to focus on current internal experience is required
by means first, of empathic responding and emotion inquires, and
later, by process directives that focus the client’s attention on
internal experience. The client is encouraged to become aware of
internal experience and to develop mindful awareness (Perls, Hefferline,
& Goodman, 1951). Later process directives like suggesting
the client repeat key phrases that stimulate emotion in the
session can be used to intensify experience and make it more vivid.
A balance needs to be struck between allowing clients to tell their
story and tracking their reactions, and explicitly directing their
attention internally. Questions that are used in this phase and
throughout therapy are: What are you aware of as you say this?
What is happening in your body? What is it like inside right now?
Using empathic exploratory responses and emotion awareness
questions, the therapist therefore coaches clients to approach,
tolerate, regulate, and accept their emotional experience. Acceptance
of emotional experience as opposed to its avoidance is the
first step in emotion awareness work. Having facilitated the acceptance
of emotion rather than its avoidance, the therapist then
helps the client in the utilization of emotion. Here clients are
helped to make sense of what their emotion is telling them and to
identify the goal/need/concern which it is organizing them to
attain. Emotion is used both to inform and to move.
In addition, believing that clients cannot leave a place before
they have arrived at it, the focus in the relational dialogue is on
acceptance and validation of emotion rather than on modification
of cognition or awareness of, or insight into, interpersonal patterns.
It is only after validation of what is being experienced as shown in
the transcript below that transformation via accessing new affect
and creation of new meaning comes into play. The relational
emphasis is more on facilitation of strength than correction of
error.
Case Example
An example of a therapist responding to a client’s sense of
isolation after the loss of her father is given below to exemplify
the type of empathic attunement and exploration characteristic
of the relational style in EFT. A number of details of the client and
the situation have been changed for confidentiality.
T53: Do you think you could put your friend in the chair and
talk to her?
C54: No [pause]
T54: It’s really hard a one for you. [Pause] What are you feeling
right now?
C55: [small voice:] Scared. [ Vulnerability begins to emerge]
T55: [gently: ] Scared. [Pause] Uh-huh. Just so scared about . . .
C56: What will happen to the little [rueful laugh: ] relationship
that we have.
T56: Uh-huh, scared that if you assert yourself here, you could
lose her.
C57: What change will it bring in her, toward me. I don’t think
I could handle it. (T: mhm)
T58: “If I assert my feelings or if I express my true feelings of
anger toward her, will it ruin the shred of a relationship that we do
have? (C: mhm) Will it ruin the little bit of contact I do have.” It
might destroy even those little threads, and it’s so scary to think
about not having that relationship. (C: mhmm mhm)
C59: Yeah. It is such a risk. I don’t know if I can bear the loss.
Without her it’s like I would have nothing.
T59: Just a feeling that, “Without that connection I will be left
totally alone.”
C60: Yes, that’s how I would feel, totally alone, not anything to
anybody.
T 60: Uh-huh, without any value to anyone.
C61: Yes, it’s like feeling that I could die without anyone
knowing.
T62: No one would even know.
C62: Yes. I feel tight in my throat (T: mhm). My stomach hurts.
In the above segment, the therapist responds empathically to the
client’s vulnerability in a prizing and congruent manner. This helps
the client’s vulnerability emerge at C55, when she reports feeling
scared. The therapist validates the scared feelings, and in C59 the
client begins to articulate the unbearable sense of loss. This leads
her toward focusing on a bodily felt sense of pain and the therapist
as shown below guides her to regulate the feeling and to explore it
to access the implicit meanings.
T64: That’s good. [Pause] Good calming breaths [Pause] [Whispers:
] Take a minute, just to relax. Quiet down inside [long pause].
So there’s this feeling inside. What’s it like?
C65: Sometimes it’s just like I want to go crawl in my bed and
just stay in there and nobody bother me [ vulnerability emerges
further]
T65: Mhm, mhm. “I just want to shut my eyes and shut all the
pain shut out (C: Mhm, mhm) And shut all the people out. Yeah
(C: mhm). I just want to make all the pain go away.”
After a deepening to get to core vulnerability, the acceptance
and validation by the therapist helps the client stay with the painful
vulnerable feelings, while the therapist listens for what is worst or
most painful about the whole thing.
T68: What hurts the most right now? I know it’s really hard
(Pause). What part of it is hardest?
C69: It’s like I’m drowning, (T: [whispered:] drowning) and I
keep reaching up, and I’ve been struggling since I was a kid.
T69: [whispering:] Like you’re drowning, and a little piece of
you, one hand, one arm just keeps reaching up.
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RELATIONSHIP IN EFT 355
At the same time as witnessing and receiving the helpless
aspects of her experience and making vivid the depths of the
client’s despair, the therapist is listening for the genuine emergence
of adaptive emotions and for the wants and needs in the
personality. This begins to emerge above in the image of reaching
up and is developed through exploring feelings tied to an episodic
memory of a time in her childhood when she nearly drowned. She
then reorganizes into a more resilient state and begins to access her
need for contact and comfort and safety from others and begins to
reach out for it by saying “I would like to hold onto my relationships
with them (friends and siblings). There are moments when I
know I can make it. It’s just sometimes it feels so overwhelming
and I go to that place.”
Conclusion
People develop from infancy to their demise in relationships.
Relationships are crucial to healthy human development, and therapeutic
relationships are a major vehicle for personal growth and
development. In this article, I have argued that the relationship is
first and foremost an affect-regulating bond, one that is, in and of
itself, facilitative of psychological change and conducive to growth
and well-being. Second, the therapeutic relationship, characterized
by presence, empathy, acceptance, and congruence, helps clients to
feel safe enough to face dreaded feelings and painful memories.
These I have argued are universal principles of all therapeutic
relationships.
Empathic responding by therapists helps clients become aware
of their emotional experience, label it in awareness, and modulate
it so that it is not overwhelming or excessively muted so that its
message is lost. Empathic exploration facilitates the client turning
inward to explore and unpack their inner subjective world views
and feelings about events (Elliott, Watson, Goldman, & Greenberg,
2004). In addition acceptance in the mind of valued person
can have profound effects on physiological processes. Warmth,
compassion, openness, and respect toward the client’s experience,
caring for the client as a separate person, with permission to have
his or her own feelings and experiences, is a crucial aspect of a
therapeutic relationship. Warm, accepting, empathic relationships
with a genuine therapist lead to greater self-acceptance and cure
the pain of isolation.
In EFT, once an alliance, consisting of a warm bond and
collaboration between client and therapist, has been consolidated
and safety established, the therapist guides clients toward new
ways of processing emotion, coaching them to become aware of,
regulate, reflect on, and transform their emotions. It is in the
blending of these various elements of a curative relationship with
the facilitation of specific change processes that successful therapy
emerges.
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Received February 7, 2014
Revision received March 10, 2014
Accepted March 12, 2014
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Explain why the American system of government cannot be described as a majoritarian democracy by exploring constitutional provisions that reflect the nature of the American political system.

Freedom in American Society

Second Exam

Study Guide

Declaration of Independence

  • Not a document that describes a future society. Rather, looks to restore basic rights and liberties that were suspended, taken away, abolished, etc.
  • List of grievances: specific violation of rights and liberties that colonist had enjoyed in the past
  • Men are endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable rights: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Governments are instituted to secure these rights.
  • Reasons why it was necessary to revolt against a despotic government. Revolution carried out not out of momentary passion or anger. A difficult step that was much reflected upon, and that colonists tried to avoid as much as they could.

Constitution of the United States

  • Constitutional form of government: limited government, emphasis on consensus, rule of law, limited expectations
  • Structure:
    • 7 articles + 27 amendments. The first 10 amendments collectively known as the Bill of Rights.
    • Article I: The Legislative (branch of government in charge of creating laws). Bicameral: House of Representatives and Senate
    • Article II: The Executive (branch of government in charge of executing the law). President, Vice-president, cabinet.
    • Article III: The Judiciary (branch of government in charge of interpreting the law). Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
    • Article IV: Relations between the federal government and state/local governments (Federalism: structure of government (three branches) also at the state and local levels)
    • Article V: process to amend (change) the Constitution
  • Limited Government
    • Separation of Powers: three branches with equal power.
    • Checks and Balances (prevent any branch from taking power away from the others).
      • President:
        • Veto Bills
        • Recommend legislation
      • Congress:
        • override a presidential veto with a 2/3 majority.
        • Control appropriations (budget/”power of the purse”)
        • Confirm or Refuse presidential appointments
        • Impeach and remove President from office
        • Propose constitutional amendment to overrule Supreme Court decisions
      • Judicial Branch: Judicial review (Supreme Court can invalidate laws passed by Congress or actions taken by the Executive)
    • Enumerated powers:
      • Article I, section 8 – areas in which Congress can legislate. Some of the enumerated powers of Congress are:
        • Establish an collect taxes
        • To borrow money
        • To regulate foreign and interstate commerce
        • To coin money and regulate its value; punish counterfeit money
        • To establish post offices
        • To grant patents and copyrights
        • To declare war
        • To raise and support armies
        • To make all laws necessary and proper to the execution of any of the other expressed powers.
      • Article 2, a rather short list of functions for the President that include:
        • Take care that the laws be faithfully executed
        • Recommend legislation
        • Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces
        • Grant reprieves and pardons
        • Make treaties
        • Nominate and appoint ambassadors, Federal judges, cabinet members
        • Give Congress information on the State of the Union
      • X Amendment: Powers that are not enumerated, belong to the states or to the people: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution are reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people.
      • Bill of Rights: most articles written in negative language – describes what government cannot do. For example, “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.” Limits the means that government can employ to fulfill its tasks:
        • Amendment 1: Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, and petition
        • Amendment 2: U.S. citizens have the right to keep and bear arms, or own guns
        • Amendment 3: The government may not force U.S. citizens to shelter soldiers in their homes
        • Amendment 4: U.S. citizens are protected from unreasonable searches of a person’s property
        • Amendment 5: The government may not force U.S. citizens to testify against themselves in court
        • Amendment 6: U.S. citizens have the right to a fair and speedy trial
        • Amendment 7: U.S. citizens have the right to a trial by jury
        • Amendment 8: U.S. citizens are protected from cruel and unusual punishment
        • Amendment 9: U.S. citizens may have rights that are not listed in the Constitution
        • Amendment 10: Powers not given to the federal government by the U.S. Constitution belong to the state or to the people.

 

  • Emphasis on consensus/agreement (as opposed to simply following the will of the majority)
    • How a bill becomes law (complex, slow process that fosters deliberation, consensus)
    • Each state represented by two senators (regardless of population)
    • Senate rules: filibuster – one Senator can block a bill. Takes a qualified majority of 3/5 (60%) to stop a filibuster
    • Originally, Vice-president was the first runner-up in the elections. Real power was given to the Vice-president. For instance, Vice-president is first in line. Also, as President of the Senate, gets to cast the deciding vote if Senate is equally divided.
    • Amendment process. Requires almost unanimity: 2/3 of Congress + ¾ states legislatures. Huge amount of agreement is needed to change the Constitution.
    • Elections (avoid passions of the moment, protect minorities against the tyranny of the majority)
      • House of Representatives (it is the only first degree, direct election). By districts, every two years. Representatives serve two-year terms.
      • Originally (before XVII Amendment), second-degree, indirect elections. Senators were chosen by State Legislatures. Staggering method: 1/3 of the Senate is renewed every 2 years. Senators are elected for six-year periods (protects Senators from public opinion pressure). Staggering methods prevents drastic fluctuations in the composition of the Senate as the result of shifts in public opinion.
      • Elected by Electoral College (indirect, second-degree election). Citizens would vote for delegates to the Electoral College and these delegates, in turn, would choose the President. The number of Electoral College delegates for each state = number of representatives in the House + number of senators (which is always 2). It is possible for a candidate to win the popular vote but lose the general election. Candidates cannot concentrate all their efforts in states with large populations.
      • Supreme Court. Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Hence, justices are not elected. Justices have lifelong-tenures.

 

  • Small Government/Rule of Law
    • Judicial Review. Supreme Court can invalidate a law passed by Congress or an action taken by the Executive
    • Lifelong-tenures for federal judges. Justices of the Supreme Court must be protected (shielded) from public pressure so that they can decide in accordance to the law and not pressured by what the people may want at any given moment.
    • Small Government: Enumerated powers + 10th Amendment

 

  • Reasonable Expectations
    • Very short document (only 7 articles without counting amendments)
    • There is nothing in the Constitution about future goals to be accomplished. The Constitution does not describe what a future society should look like. The Constitution only describes the structure of government and the limits of governmental power.
    • Constitution does not make change easy. Rather, it looks to promote stability:
      • Very difficult to change (amend) the Constitution
      • Very slow process for a bill to become a law.

The problem about Foundations

  • For the Founders, Christianity is the indispensable foundation, basis, ground, cornerstone, etc.
  • Argument against: Given how diverse and multicultural American society has become, Classical/Christian foundation is no longer possible. Needs to be replaced by a new foundation that accommodates this new reality.
  • Proposed new foundation: Replace truths about human nature that we find in the Classical/Christian tradition with “attitude” of toleration.
  • Basic idea of this new foundation: No shared truths are necessary as long as people respect each other’s views. American would just need to be open, non-judgmental, accepting, etc.
  • Society, however, still needs to make decisions. Now, however, in the absence of truth, all issues are decided according to the wishes of the majority. Every position is just an opinion. Since there are no shared truths but just individual opinions, there is no need/possibility for deliberation. The only solution is to vote on every decision and allow the majority to dictate public policy. The wishes of the majority must become public policy without delay
  • Every moral position, even those that go against human life (dignity) and freedom, are acceptable if they win the support of the majority. No sense in asking about the intrinsic moral value of a particular position.
  • The power of numbers replaces truth as the criterion of politics. Therefore, the dignity of human beings and freedom as essential condition are no longer foundational truths. Democracy becomes a matter of sheer power.
  • No protection for minorities, no respect for dignity or freedom of human beings. Those that do not belong to the majority must simply accept “the rules of the game” and “are forced to be free” using Rousseau’s phrase.
  • Freedom is redefined as mere choice; relativism becomes “valuable”, “necessary”.
  • For the framers, self-evident truths about human nature (God endowed human beings with certain inalienable rights) are not the result of majority approval. They are prior to government. The democratic process, including elections, allows us to resolve our differences provided that certain core truths remain outside of public debate: E pluribus unum – out of many, one. We can disagree because we share a prior agreement to recognize each other’s dignity as human beings and that freedom is indispensable for human fulfillment. This is what the framers meant when they spoke about Christianity as being the indispensable foundation of the American political system.

 

 

A New Exception Allowing Forcible Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention?

Humanitarian Intervention

Vaughan Lowe, Antonios Tzanakopoulos

Content type:

Encyclopedia entries

Article last updated:

May 2011

Product:

Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law [MPIL]

 

Module:

Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law [MPEPIL]

Subject(s):

Humanitarian intervention — Armed attack — Armed conflict — Conduct of hostilities — Civil and political rights — Gross violations

Published under the auspices of the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law under the direction of Rüdiger Wolfrum.

  1. Concept and Terminology

 Intervention has been characterized as one of the ‘vaguest branches of international law’ and one whose study may leave ‘the impression that intervention may be anything from a speech of Lord Palmerston’s in the House of Commons to the partition of Poland’ (PH Winfield ‘The History of Intervention in International Law’ [1922] 3 BYIL 130). Its limitation to ‘humanitarian intervention’ does little to facilitate greater precision.

 At the outset, one might distinguish between forcible and non-forcible ‘humanitarian’ intervention. There are non-forcible actions, such as the provision of humanitarian aid (food, medicine, and the like), that could constitute ‘humanitarian intervention’. Since, however, intervention in its classical incarnation is generally considered to involve the use of force, these non-forcible actions are better described as ‘humanitarian assistance’ (Humanitarian Assistance in Cases of EmergencyIntervention, Prohibition of). Humanitarian intervention can then be loosely defined as a threat or use of armed force against another State that is motivated by humanitarian considerations. This broad definition is not technical and does not imply any distinct legal justification for the forcible action. Many legal justifications for the use of force may involve a humanitarian component or motivation: for example, authorization by the Security Council, self-defence, the protection of nationals abroad (itself connected to self-defence arguments), and armed action upon invitation or with the consent of the target State (Intervention by Invitation).

‘Humanitarian intervention’ also has a narrower meaning as an autonomous justification for the use of armed force in another State distinct from other legal justifications. Humanitarian intervention in this narrower sense can be defined as the use of force to protect people in another State from gross and systematic human rights violations committed against them, or more generally to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, when the target State is unwilling or unable to act. This is still a broad definition, which could be applied to almost any instance of use of military force that has been claimed to have a humanitarian objective or to have been based on humanitarian considerations. The term is not one of art, however: it does not appear in any international treaties; and it cannot be said that its boundaries are yet clearly delineated.

  1. Historical Antecedents

 Humanitarian intervention as a specifically legal justification for the use of force dates back at least as far as Grotius and his argument that war can be undertaken as punishment of the ‘wicked’ (as long as the punisher’s hands are clean), as well as on behalf of the oppressed. Alberico Gentili had made similar arguments earlier, though his focus was more on moral than on legal duties (Chesterman 14). Later, Emmerich de Vattel accepted an exceptional right to intervene in support of the oppressed when they themselves revolt against their oppressive government, though he rejected any right of intervention or interference in the domestic affairs of another State in other circumstances.

 In the pre-UN Charter era, there was no established State practice of reliance upon a right of humanitarian intervention to justify the use of force—though then, as now, academic commentators wrote in support of the concept. Interventions by the Great Powers in the moribund Ottoman Empire in the 19th century for the protection of that Empire’s Christian and Jewish populations have often been claimed by jurists to be instances of humanitarian intervention. However, even in those cases where armed force was actually used, as in the naval battle of Navarino in 1827 in support of the Greek rebellion or in the French occupation of Lebanon and Syria (at the time, parts of the Ottoman Empire) in 1860–61, the legal justifications relied on by the intervening States, when any were offered, referred to treaty obligations of the Ottoman Empire, to consent to the intervention, and to the protection of trade interests, the prevention of piracy, and so forth. Even the US intervention in Cuba during the latter’s war with Spain in 1898, described sometimes as genuine humanitarian intervention, was justified by the US on the basis of protection of US citizens and property in Cuba, the protection of US commercial interests, and even self-defence, along with a somewhat perfunctory reference in President McKinley’s war message to the ‘large dictates of humanity’.

 History casts a heavy shadow over any intervention claimed to be ‘humanitarian’. In the pre-Charter period, there are strong connections between any type of forcible intervention with a (proclaimed) humanitarian aim and, on the other hand, the colonialist enterprise (see N Krisch ‘Legality, Morality and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo’ [2002] 13 EJIL 330–1 with further references). The US intervention in 1898, for example, led to Cuba becoming a US protectorate (Protectorates and Protected States). In all instances of forcible intervention during this period, humanitarian considerations were, if present at all, commingled with numerous other less laudable considerations, and were never exclusively or explicitly relied on as sufficient legal justifications in themselves.

  1. Modern Concept

 The establishment of a system of collective security under the UN Charter radically changed the framework within which humanitarian intervention could be invoked and discussed. The UN has the power to intervene, including for humanitarian purposes, in any Member State under Chapter VII UN Charter. The reservation of domestic jurisdiction of Art 2 (7) UN Charter does not apply in such a situation. The invocation of Chapter VII powers of the UN Security Council is, to be sure, limited by Art. 39 UN Charter to situations which constitute a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression (Peace, Breach ofPeace, Threat to). UN practice, however, particularly during the 1990s, has established that even internal situations related to widespread violations of human rights or to the existence of a more broadly understood humanitarian crisis, may constitute ‘threats to the peace’. In support of this practice reference is often made to (less and less obvious) transboundary effects such as refugee flows or, more generally, the ‘destabilization of the region’.

 This type of collective humanitarian intervention (on which see further paras 15–22 below), is juxtaposed to unilateral humanitarian intervention, ie intervention by one or more States in another State, acting alone or through an international organization other than the UN, on the basis of humanitarian considerations but on their own authority. Even intervention by a group of States (or an international organization) is unilateral in this sense when it takes place without proper authorization by the UN Security Council, to which the UN Charter gives the monopoly on the right to authorize the use of force (with the exception of the right of self-defence, which is limited ratione materiae and ratione temporis). ‘Unilateral’ here is not the antonym of ‘multilateral’. Intervention by a group of States or an international organization on its own authority is literally multilateral, not unilateral; but the legally significant point is that it is not collective because it does not take place in accordance with the procedure the UN Charter has established for this purpose.

 The main focus of this discussion of humanitarian intervention as a legal concept justifying the use of armed force is on such unilateral (including multilateral but not collective) humanitarian intervention. Collective humanitarian intervention is discussed below only incidentally, while other justifications for the use of armed force that may involve humanitarian motives but have an independent justificatory ambit, are not discussed. Such justifications include the ‘protection of nationals abroad’, a legal category that is sometimes called ‘humanitarian intervention stricto sensu’ but is often considered as a sub-species of self-defence; as well as the concept of intervention in defence of democracy (‘pro-democratic intervention’), a fluid legal category which could perhaps be characterized as humanitarian intervention (to the extent to which it is accepted that the right to democracy is an internationally protected human right, against the violation of which intervention takes place; see also Democracy, Right to, International Protection).

  1. Legality and Status in Customary Law

10  The starting point in considering the legality of any allegedly humanitarian intervention today must be the principles of the UN Charter. The Charter establishes the sovereign equality of States (Art. 2 (1)States, Sovereign Equality); the obligation to settle disputes peacefully (Art. 2 (3)Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes); the prohibition of the use of force (Art. 2 (4)Use of Force, Prohibition of); and the principle of non-intervention by the UN in the domestic jurisdiction of States (Art. 2 (7)). These principles were reiterated and developed in the Friendly Relations Declaration (1970). For any humanitarian intervention to be justified under international law, it must be in accordance with these principles or come within an established exception to their application.

11  Since the use of force against a State, even on humanitarian grounds, prima facie violates the prohibition of the use of force in Art. 2 (4) UN Charter, it must, in principle, either be shown that such use of force is not contrary to the provision, or that it comes within one of the two established exceptions to the prohibition, namely authorization by the Security Council under Chapter VII UN Charter, or self-defence under Art. 51 UN Charter. If this is not the case, then the argument for the legality of humanitarian intervention must rest on a demonstration that a further exception to the prohibition of the use of force has emerged as a matter of customary international law in such a way as to modify the effect of the prohibition in Art. 2 (4) UN Charter.

  1. The Scope of the Prohibition of the Use of Force

12  Art. 2 (4) UN Charter prohibits ‘the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’. Does humanitarian intervention actually fall within the scope of this prohibition? The UK argued in the Corfu Channel Case that only force directed against the territorial integrity and/or political independence of a State is prohibited by Art. 2 (4), and that very limited uses of force for narrow purposes do not have this characteristic (Territorial Integrity and Political Independence). Similarly, an argument has been advanced that a use of force that is consistent with the purposes of the UN (Art. 1 UN Charter), one of which is the promotion of human rights (Arts 1 (3)55 (c) and 56 UN Charter), is ipso facto not prohibited under Art. 2 (4) UN Charter (United Nations, Purposes and Principles). In this narrow reading of Art. 2 (4), humanitarian intervention would not offend the territorial integrity or political independence of the target State, because the intervening State withdraws immediately upon the aversion of the humanitarian catastrophe that provoked the intervention, and does not in any way undermine or attack the government of the target State. Further, the reference to the ‘purposes’ of the UN in Art. 2 (4) UN Charter is read so as to qualify and limit the scope of the prohibition of the use of force, with the result that humanitarian intervention is permissible because, in aiming at the prevention of massive human rights violations, it advances the purposes of the United Nations.

13  The travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter, however, establish clearly that the expressions ‘territorial integrity’, ‘political independence’, and ‘in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations’ were not meant as qualifications of the scope of the prohibition in Art. 2 (4) UN Charter, but rather as reinforcements of the prohibition, aimed at assuring smaller and less powerful States that the use of force, for whatever reason, was absolutely prohibited. This was confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Corfu Channel Case, where a British argument that its actions in forcibly sweeping Albanian waters for mines did not violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Albania was rejected, the UK intervention being declared to be a ‘manifestation of a policy of force’ (at 35). In the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v United States of America), the ICJ reaffirmed the absolute prohibition of forcible intervention, and stated that ‘the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure … respect’ for human rights (at para. 268). The UN-authorized use of force for arguably humanitarian purposes (the protection of civilians) in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 demonstrates that for the humanitarian purpose to be achieved, armed force will usually have to be targeted against a ruling regime (see further paras 15–22 below).

14  Most importantly, the narrow interpretation of Art. 2 (4) UN Charter is inimical to the purpose and structure of an organization intended to maintain international peace and security through the establishment of a collective security system. Oscar Schachter famously wrote that the narrow interpretation of Art. 2 (4) UN Charter requires an ‘Orwellian construction’ (at 649) of the provision’s terms. The better view is that any use of force, irrespective of its—humanitarian or otherwise laudable—motivation, is caught by the prohibition of Art. 2 (4) UN Charter and must be justified on the basis of an accepted exception.

  1. The Traditional Exceptions to the Prohibition of the Use of Force

(a)  Authorization by the Security Council under Chapter VII UN Charter

15  What has been called ‘Security Council-authorized collective humanitarian intervention’ (Franck [2002] 136–7) or simply ‘collective humanitarian intervention’ is nothing but the use of military force authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII UN Charter for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, in circumstances where there is a humanitarian aspect to the Council’s aims. Security Council practice since 1990 has extended the interpretation of ‘threat to the peace’, to the point that it is now accepted that egregious and widespread human rights violations within a single State, along with purely internal armed conflicts, can constitute such a threat. This was a ‘settled practice’ already in 1995, according to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction IT-94-1-AR72 [2 October 1995] para. 30). Such violations or internal armed conflicts may result in a humanitarian crisis, and may create refugee flows, destabilizing the region and risking armed responses by neighbouring States. But even beyond these transboundary effects, the rise of human rights during the last century, and the concomitant shrinking of the domaine réservé of domestic jurisdiction, has led the Security Council to acknowledge that purely internal situations may qualify as threats to the peace, even if the risk of serious transboundary consequences is marginal. In such circumstances, the Security Council may authorize States to take forcible measures to stop the human rights violations and avert or put an end to the humanitarian crisis. The use of force then can be seen as having a ‘humanitarian purpose’; and the intervention of the international community as represented by the States willing to heed the Security Council’s call to arms becomes a ‘humanitarian intervention’, but a collective one.

16  There are numerous examples of UN-authorized armed interventions that have been characterized as ‘humanitarian’ by jurists. They include the UN-authorized interventions in Somalia (UNSC Res 794 [1992] [3 December 1992] SCOR 47th Year 63 Haiti (UNSC Res 940 [1994] [31 July 1994] SCOR 49th Year 51)Rwanda (UNSC Res 929 [1994] [22 June 1994] SCOR 49th Year 10); Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNSC Res 836 [1993] [4 June 1993] SCOR 48th Year 13; Res 1031 [1995] [15 December 1995] SCOR 50th Year 18; Res 1088 [1996] [12 December 1996] SCOR 51st Year 42); Albania (Res 1101 [1997] [28 March 1997] 52nd Year 58); and East Timor (UNSC Res 1264 [1999] [15 September 1999] SCOR 54th Year 128). In each of these cases, the Security Council authorized the use of ‘all necessary means’ to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance (but not—initially at least—to assist any warring parties in an internal conflict), or to monitor the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement.

17  In April 2011, the Secretary-General of the UN instructed the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (‘UNOCI’), and the French forces supporting it, to use force in order to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population in Abidjan by one of the parties to the conflict there. This was pursuant to authorizations by the Security Council to UNOCI and the French forces to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians ‘under imminent threat of physical violence’ in UN Security Council Resolution 1933 of 30 June 2010 (UN Doc S/RES/1933 at paras 16–17)Resolution 1975 of 30 March 2011 (UN Doc S/RES/1975 at para. 6)Resolution 1739 of 10 January 2007 (SCOR [1 August 2006–31 July 2007] 208 at para. 8), and Resolution 1962 of 20 December 2010 (UN Doc S/RES/1962 at para. 17) respectively. The Secretary-General stated that the military operation undertaken by UNOCI was not in support of any party to the conflict, but rather was action in self-defence to protect civilians, in accordance with UNOCI’s mandate (UN Doc SG/SM/13494 of 4 April 2011), even though the attacks were directed primarily against one party to the internal conflict. The authorization to use force in Libya by virtue of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011 (UN Doc S/RES/1973) was meant to ensure the protection of ‘civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’ (at para. 4), but again force was employed against one of the sides to the conflict. While questions may emerge as to the scope of the authorization and the specific measures and targets covered, this is a matter of interpretation of the objective set by the Security Council. The important point for present purposes is that the use of force for arguably humanitarian reasons has been explicitly authorized by the Security Council in all instances described above.

18  There are also a number of cases in which force was argued to have been authorized by the Council, either implicitly or retrospectively, in humanitarian contexts. The US, the UK, and France intervened in Iraq in 1991 to alleviate the suffering of Kurdish (and subsequently also Shia) populations that were being oppressed by Baghdad. They intervened first by the establishment of safe havens and then by the introduction of no-fly zones over the north (and subsequently also the south) of the country (Iraq, Non-Fly Zones). These no-fly zones were kept in place until the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Iraq, Invasion of [2003]), though France withdrew from their enforcement in 1998. The intervening States relied primarily on UN Security Council Resolution 688 of 5 April 1991, ‘in support of’ which action was taken. The authorization of UN Member States to use force in order to implement Security Council Resolutions 660 (1990) et seq and to restore peace and security in the area in UN Security Council Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990 (SCOR 45th Year 27), following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, had already ceased in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 (at paras 1 and 33). The argument in support of the establishment of safe havens and no-fly zones was that Security Council Resolution 688, though it was not adopted under Chapter VII UN Charter and did not include the shibboleth ‘all necessary means’, had implicitly authorized the use of force for the limited purpose of protecting the Kurds and Shi’ites in Iraq.

19  Along similar lines, it was argued with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Kosovo that the NATO bombardments could be justified on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998 (SCOR 53rd Year 13), para. 16 of which provided that the Council would consider additional measures if the ones provided for in UN Security Council Resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998 (SCOR 53rd Year 10) did not lead to the desired results such as the defeat of violence and terrorism. France, among other intervening States, considered that the use of force had been implicitly authorized by Security Council Resolution 1199 and Resolution 1203 of 24 October 1998 (SCOR 53rd Year 15) when further breaches of measures provided for in Security Council Resolutions did occur. Another argument considered that the Security Council implicitly and retrospectively authorized the use of force against the (then) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (‘FRY’) because it did not condemn the threat of force by NATO that led to the conclusion of agreements between the FRY and NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on verification in 1998, but rather endorsed these agreements (UNSC Res 1203). These arguments have caused much controversy in the literature.

20  With respect to potential ex post facto Security Council authorizations (or ‘ratifications’), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone through the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (‘ECOMOG’) between 1990 and 1999, which were said to have essentially humanitarian aims, were ‘commended’ by the Council, while limited authorization to undertake visit and search of ships (Ships, Visit and Search) to enforce embargoes was granted when armed operations were already under way. This, it was argued by some (but disputed by others), amounted to ex post facto authorization of ECOWAS action. Similarly, French action in the Central African Republic in 1997 was approved and further authorized by the Security Council. These instances are perhaps enough to establish the possibility that the Security Council may retroactively authorize, validate, or ratify forcible action, even though significant reservations remain, for example with respect to the right of self-defence of the target State against the use of force that is, at the time, illegal, but is then retroactively authorized by the Security Council.

21  Conversely, no ex post facto authorization can be claimed to have been given through UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 (SCOR 54th Year 32), which established an international civilian and military presence in Kosovo following the NATO bombing campaign. It is one thing to accept the status quo based on a pragmatic attitude towards the situation on the ground, which is what 1244 actually did, and another to endorse an action explicitly, as the Council arguably did with respect to the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone (by ‘commending’ ECOWAS and ECOMOG for their ‘efforts’). Some have argued that the mere absence of condemnation by the Council serves as some form of retrospective authorization. This pushes an already fragile argument on ex post facto authorization to breaking point. It is very difficult to establish the meaning of and motives for an omission with any semblance of certainty. The failure of the draft resolution that would have condemned the NATO action in Kosovo serves as a pertinent example: while some commentators rushed to consider this as an implicit ex post facto authorization of NATO, others pointed to the reasons put forward by States for rejecting the draft resolution, namely their uneasiness at the resolution being unbalanced, favouring the Serbs and seemingly lending support to the admittedly oppressive regime of Milošević.

22  In any event, forcible action authorized (even if ex post facto) by the Security Council under Chapter VII UN Charter, would constitute collective enforcement action that is legal under the UN Charter and international law as a recognized exception to the prohibition of the use of force. It would not constitute justified unilateral humanitarian intervention, or support the right to engage in unilateral humanitarian intervention.

(b)  Use of Force in Self-Defence

23  Humanitarian intervention in order to alleviate the suffering of a local population cannot, without more, be justified as self-defence. Self-defence under Art. 51 UN Charter requires that an armed attack occur against a State. In most cases, widespread violations of human rights will not reach the gravity threshold of an armed attack. Even if the oppression does reach the threshold of an armed attack, however, there will be no armed attack against a State, but at most an armed attack against the population of the State by or with the support or inaction of State authorities. The right to self-defence under international law vests in States and not in sub-State entities such as the local population. Moreover, the oppression will, ex hypothesi, not emanate from another State, but will be by the government upon its own people.

24  There have been proposals within the North Atlantic Assembly to extend the right of self-defence to cover the ‘defence of common interests and values, including when the latter are threatened by humanitarian catastrophes, crimes against humanity, and war crimes’ (North Atlantic Assembly Resolution 283 para. 15 (e)), but international law certainly does not yet extend so far, nor does it seem to be moving in this direction. It has also been argued that the right of (collective) self-defence should perhaps cover not just attacks on States, but attacks on populations as well, since defence of a population is as much warranted as the defence of a political structure (Henkin 833). But these suggestions stretch the interpretation of Art. 51 UN Charter far beyond breaking point and lack any foundation in the practice and opinio iuris of States. Defending its intervention in East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) in 1971, India argued before the UN General Assembly that the influx of millions of East Bengali refugees fleeing Pakistani repression amounted to ‘civil aggression’ comparable to an armed attack, but this—along with all other justifications put forward by India—was overwhelmingly rejected by the General Assembly, which called for the immediate cessation of the hostilities and for the withdrawal of armed forces.

25 ‘Humanitarian’ interventions have been justified on the basis of the right of self-defence under Art. 51 UN Charter. But this has been in cases where the State resorting to force could claim to have suffered an armed attack in the traditional sense by action of the target State. This was the justification of Tanzania for its intervention in Uganda in 1979. That intervention toppled the regime of Idi Amin, which had an atrocious human rights record; but Tanzania’s legal justification of self-defence did not refer to that atrocious record or to the dire humanitarian situation in Uganda, but rather remained within the traditional paradigm. The same is true of the justification put forward by Vietnam for its 1978 intervention in Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia), which brought an end to the violent and abusive Khmer Rouge regime (Cambodia Conflicts [Kampuchea]). In both of these cases, humanitarian concerns were commingled with the official justification of the use of armed force as self-defence. Humanitarian considerations, in the absence of an armed attack against the intervening State or (in the case of collective self-defence) its allies, cannot in itself justify a use of force as an exercise of the right of self-defence. Further, the use of force in self-defence must in any event be limited to countering the armed attack and may not extend to regime change in the target State.

(c)  A New Exception Allowing Forcible Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention?

26  In view of the difficulty of fitting humanitarian intervention undertaken in the absence of Security Council authorization or of an armed attack against a State within the traditional exceptions of the prohibition of the use of force, arguments have been put forward that an additional, new exception may have emerged to the prohibition of the use of force. This would have to be an exception carved out through subsequent practice of UN Member States resulting in a new interpretation of the relevant Charter provisions (cf Art. 31 (3) (b) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [1969]; ‘VCLT’), or possibly through the emergence of a new customary rule (supervening custom). The ‘reinterpretation’ might, for example, require the reference to territorial integrity and political independence in Art. 2 (4) UN Charter to be read as qualifying the prohibition on the threat or use of force, in the manner described above (where it was rejected as a correct reading of the Charter as originally drafted). Such a ‘reinterpretation’, it might be said, is not an ‘amendment’ of the Charter, which would have to follow Arts 108 and 109 UN Charter. The alleged new rule would bring about a qualification of the clear provisions of Art. 2 (4) UN Charter as currently interpreted, and thus would require that the membership of the UN accept this reinterpretation of the Charter, evidenced through the widespread (if not complete) support of the UN Member States.

27  If the argument were not based on a ‘reinterpretation’ of the Charter, it would have to emerge as a new rule of customary international law through the practice and opinio iuris of States. But when cast as an exception to the prohibition of the use of force, which has achieved the status of ius cogens (at least in its core, ie the prohibition of aggression), the new customary law exception to the prohibition would have to achieve the same status, making the requirements for its emergence (assuming it to be logically and legally possible) even more exacting than those for an ordinary rule of customary international law (cf Art. 53 VCLT).

28  A number of instances of practice since 1945 have been invoked by authors—and to a lesser extent by States—as evidence of a general practice of the assertion of a unilateral right to intervene to avert or put an end to a humanitarian crisis or to widespread violations of human rights. The instances commonly cited include, among others, the Indian intervention in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971; the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1978; the Vietnamese intervention in Democratic Kampuchea in 1978; the French intervention in the Central African Empire (later the Central African Republic) in 1979; the US interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989); the ECOWAS/ECOMOG interventions in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997); the US, UK, and French intervention in Iraq to protect Kurdish and Shia populations from 1991 to 2003 (France intervening until 1998); the interventions in Somalia (1992); Rwanda (1994); and East Timor (1999); and of course the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999.

29  In order to support the argument that a new rule of customary international law has emerged, it would be necessary that States made claims that these instances of the use of force were lawful because of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The ICJ asserted in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case that no one has the ‘authority to ascribe to States legal views which they do not themselves advance’ (at para. 207). States may, nonetheless, act in the belief that they are entitled to do so, and only later articulate the precise justification for their action. But such practice is limited. No opinio iuris in favour of a new customary law exception to the Charter prohibition can be deduced from State action authorized by the Security Council, such as the interventions in Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, and arguably the ECOWAS/ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone (which were explicitly condoned, and at least arguably in part explicitly authorized, by the Security Council). Only instances of unauthorized intervention could provide evidence of opinio iuris in favour of a new exception allowing unilateral humanitarian intervention. But again, in none of the instances above did the intervening States argue that their actions were justified by a rule of customary international law that allows intervention on humanitarian grounds. In the interventions of India in East Pakistan, Tanzania in Uganda, and Vietnam in Cambodia, the intervening States claimed to have been acting in self-defence in response to border incursions and other acts or threats of force; and even then the response of the international community was far from unequivocal acceptance of the interventions. It rather ranged from strong condemnation (Vietnam) to mere silence (Tanzania).

30  The use of force in Iraq to establish safe havens and no-fly zones in 1991–92 was argued to have been ‘in support of’ (and thus implicitly authorized by) UN Security Council Resolution 688; while the use of force to enforce the no-fly zones in 1993 was claimed by the US to be based on the right of self-defence against threats of attacking coalition aircraft patrolling the zones. These justifications should be seen as distinct: an argument based on the right of self-defence of Allied aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones cannot itself justify the establishment of the zones. The argument is circular: no-fly zones themselves imply a threat to use force, which must be justified. France combined the argument of implicit authorization with a claim to be responding to violations of UN Security Council Resolution 687; and the UK initially enunciated a free-standing right of humanitarian intervention, but then modified this claim by combining it with the argument that aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones had the right to use force to defend themselves against any attack (which is a distinct matter, as explained earlier).

31  In other cases of use of force, such as those of the US in Grenada and Panama, the justifications ranged from action to rescue nationals abroad, to invitation by the legitimate government, to action for the restoration of democracy. In all these instances there were condemnatory resolutions passed in the UN General Assembly. Even when humanitarian intervention was explicitly claimed as a justification, it was never the sole justification but was always combined with a universally accepted exception to the prohibition on the use of force, such as self-defence or authorization by the Security Council.

32  The question arises whether, irrespective of the legal position prior to 1999, the NATO intervention in the (then) FRY may have provided at least part of the requisite State practice and opinio iuris for the emergence of a customary exception from the prohibition of the use of force along the lines of ‘humanitarian intervention’. This seems unlikely. Some of the States participating in the intervention expressly denied that they considered the Kosovo campaign to be an instance where they had the right to act as they did under international law. Importantly, the German Foreign Minister stated before the Federal Parliament on 16 October 1998 that the NATO decision on air strikes against the FRY ‘must not become a precedent’, while the denial of precedential value to the Kosovo intervention was the major theme in the German parliamentary debate (Simma 13 and 20). Belgium stated in the UN General Assembly on 26 September 1999 that UN Security Council Resolution 1244 had achieved ‘a return to legality’ (Brownlie [2000] 908) and that it hoped that resort to force without Security Council authorization would not become a precedent (White 37). US arguments on the legality of the Kosovo intervention did not espouse any clear doctrine of humanitarian intervention, but rather relied—when referring to such humanitarian intervention—on a mixture of circumstances and principle in order to ‘qualify any universalist theory or wide-ranging rule that might prove less attractive in other hands’ (Henkin 829). This connects well with the German and other denials of the precedential value of the Kosovo intervention, and highlights the lack of any opinio iuris with regard to a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention.

33  The response of other, non-NATO, States to arguments that there was a legal basis for the Kosovo bombing campaign and for a right of humanitarian intervention was overwhelmingly negative. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), numbering well over half of the Member States of the UN, unequivocally condemned the use of force against the (then) FRY, as did many other States, some of which are nuclear powers. In these circumstances, no right of unilateral forcible humanitarian intervention can be said to have emerged as a rule of customary international law.

34  Some authors have argued that in all of the instances mentioned above, humanitarian objectives were the motives for action, and thus irrespective of the legal justifications articulated by the acting States, the instances constitute clear State practice in favour of a right of humanitarian intervention. Such a view, however, runs counter to explicit and clear statements of the ICJ on the formation of custom, which requires both practice and opinio iuris. Motives are not the same as reasons; and the requirement for opinio iuris looks to the latter. And while action by a State coupled with silence on its part as to its legal justification may be presumed to be accompanied by opinio iuris to the effect that its action is lawful on some basis or other, the same cannot be said when the State rebuts the presumption of opinio iuris in a specific case or elects to base its action on some legal bases to the exclusion of others. The latter, excluded, bases cannot carry the opinio iuris of the State. The fact that intervening States have been so reluctant to rely explicitly on a right of humanitarian intervention means that there is great difficulty in finding any opinio iuris that can properly be counted towards the establishment of a right of humanitarian intervention.

35  Post-Kosovo practice does not reveal any reliance on an alleged right of humanitarian intervention. With respect to the 2011 crisis in Libya, it is telling that force was only used to protect civilians after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, in which it authorized the use of ‘all necessary means’ by UN Member States to protect Libyan ‘civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’ (at para. 4) and to enforce a no-fly zone (at para. 8). In the run-up to the Resolution’s adoption, numerous States, including the US, the UK, and NATO Member States collectively, underlined the need for Security Council authorization before any armed force could be used in Libya.

  1. The Issue of ‘Uniting for Peace’

36  The lack of Security Council authorization cannot be the final word on the issue of legality of an intervention on humanitarian grounds, even if no right of unilateral humanitarian intervention has emerged by way of customary international law. As Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory) have confirmed, the Council has primary but not exclusive responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, which may be threatened by humanitarian catastrophes. The UN General Assembly has devised a procedure through which to respond to threats to the peace when the Security Council cannot act because of the use of the veto. This is the procedure established under the Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950). In the event that the Security Council cannot act, States arguing in favour of humanitarian intervention may take the issue to the General Assembly, as in fact they should before even considering unilateral action (White 28–9 and 38–41). Many States have expressed their preference for some form of UN response to a humanitarian crisis as opposed to allowing unilateral action.

37  The position of NATO that it needs to ‘stand ready to act should the UN Security Council be prevented from discharging its purpose of maintaining international peace and security’ (North Atlantic Assembly Resolution 283 para. 15 (d)) is, accordingly, questionable without further qualification. One major reservation relates to whether and when the Security Council is indeed ‘prevented from discharging’ its duties: a decision of the Security Council not to act cannot, without more, be qualified as the Council being ‘unable’ to act; nor can the fact that a resolution in support of action fails to command the necessary majority in a vote within the Council. Even to establish the premise, further evidence is needed that the Security Council cannot act because of the recalcitrant stance of a permanent member, and not merely because there is no agreement as to the use of force in a particular instance. Indeed, the non-authorization of the use of force may be a clear instance of the Council actually discharging its primary responsibility, rather than of it being prevented from doing so. And even if it is considered that the Council is being prevented from acting, UN law allows for an institutional solution: recourse may be had to the General Assembly in an attempt to garner support by two-thirds of its members under the Uniting for Peace procedure. Indeed the language of the NATO resolution itself comes close to that of the Uniting for Peace resolution (Simma 17).

  1. Conditions for Recourse to Humanitarian Intervention

38  Since no right of unilateral humanitarian intervention can be grounded in positive international law, much ink has been spilled in the elaboration of the conditions for recourse to unilateral humanitarian intervention as the basis of a right de lege ferenda. Two issues are intertwined in the concept of a right of humanitarian intervention as lex ferenda: the substantive question regarding the conditions or criteria which allow the use of force without authorization by the Security Council or the consent of the target State; and the procedural question of the manner in which it is to be determined that these conditions or criteria are actually met. Even though the substantive criteria have much more prominence in literature, and even though the two issues have tended to be locked together, these are distinct.

  1. The Substantive Criteria

39  There can be no definitive statement or authoritative decision on the conditions that must be present for the use of force to qualify as an exercise of a putative right of humanitarian intervention; but there are a number of conditions that are commonly asserted in the writings of various publicists and by the few States to have exceptionally explicitly referred to a right (whether legal or moral) of humanitarian intervention. These include: a) the existence of a humanitarian ‘emergency’ or ‘disaster’ or ‘crisis’ or ‘catastrophe’ or ‘necessity’ or ‘tragedy’, usually related to the widespread and gross or egregious violation of human rights of (a part of) the population of a State or to the commission of grave international crimes; b) the inability or unwillingness of the territorial State to act to address the situation; c) the exhaustion of all other realistically possible remedies, including all peaceful remedies and recourse to the UN Security Council (and arguably also the UN General Assembly under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure), which are unwilling or unable to act; d) the acceptance of limitations (both in scope and in time) upon the use of force (as the necessary and sole available course of action), confining it to strictly humanitarian objectives that must be expected to do more harm than good, respecting the principle of proportionality. To these, some add a preference towards multilateral (rather than unilateral, and as second best to collective) action, as well as towards the (relative) disinterestedness of the intervening States and/or organizations.

40  These substantive criteria, however, do not address the most important aspect of recourse to force for humanitarian objectives: namely who is to decide on the fulfilment of the substantive criteria in any given case.

  1. The Procedure for Determination

41  Even proponents of a unilateral ‘last resort’ right to humanitarian intervention accept that ‘the existence of authoritative and impartial acceptance of the existence of [the substantive conditions] is obviously of great importance’ (Brownlie [2000] 931). Reliance has been put by some on objective determinations of an ‘impending humanitarian catastrophe’ made by the Security Council in resolutions adopted under Chapter VII, finding the humanitarian situation on the ground to constitute a ‘threat to international peace and security’ under Art. 39 UN Charter (see eg the statement by the UK Secretary of State for Defence in the House of Commons on 25 March 1999, Hansard HC vol 328, cols 616–617). While this addresses what is most commonly given as the first condition, that of the existence of a humanitarian catastrophe, it does not refer to the determination of any of the other conditions, such as those referring to the exhaustion of all other non-forcible avenues and the necessity for and proportionality of the force used.

42  Even the determination by the Security Council of the fulfilment of the first substantive condition, that of a humanitarian emergency or of a widespread and egregious violation of human rights, appears unlikely to be an easy matter. Clearly, once the threshold for military action is moved from the actual authorization of the use of force to the determination of a threat to the peace (or substantively to the existence of a humanitarian emergency), the member(s) of the Council that would have blocked the authorization of force could block the relevant determination instead. As such, the procedural problem of determination of the existence of substantive conditions may be very difficult to resolve, although the possibility of passing to others the responsibility for engaging in the actual uses of force might induce a measure of increased flexibility in the Council. The only other way out would be to admit the unilateral power of determination by any State, or perhaps by other regional or international organizations, though that step might be thought to encroach too far upon the prohibition on the use of force.

  1. Criteria for Toleration

43  The attempt to use these criteria to guide States in their practice, so as to eventually establish a customary exception to the prohibition of the use of force allowing humanitarian intervention, has not yet borne fruit. All of the instances of humanitarian intervention claimed so far would fail on at least one of these criteria; and States do not seem any less reluctant to assert such a right today than they were when no clear criteria had been set out.

44  The elaboration of the criteria can be useful, however: not in order to establish a right of humanitarian intervention, but rather to guide States in their responses to any violations for purportedly humanitarian reasons of the prohibition on the use of force. The responses of States to such violations have varied considerably, some allegedly ‘humanitarian interventions’ being met with benevolent silence, others with stern condemnation. It has thus been argued that unilateral recourse to force for humanitarian reasons remains unlawful but may be ‘tolerated’, ‘mitigated’, or ‘excused’ by the ‘international community’, in the sense that a great majority of States will elect not to respond to what could be called—and the actors consider to be—an ‘efficient breach’.

  1. Responsibility to Protect

45  In the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis, some commentators and some governments took the position that if no right of unilateral humanitarian intervention existed in positive law, the law should be developed to respond to the terrible dilemma of human suffering amidst inaction on the part of the international community, and to establish such a right. A Canadian initiative led to the establishment of an ‘International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’, which produced a report on the responsibility to protect, with the aim of finding a balance between the wish to respond effectively to humanitarian crises and the maintenance of a robust legal framework for such responses.

46  The report mostly confirmed the non-admissibility of unilateral humanitarian intervention under current international law, even if it sometimes employed language that appears equivocal. When the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (or ‘R2P’ as it is irritatingly known) was put before States during the 60th anniversary of the United Nations in 2005, the General Assembly confirmed the traditional approach to the use of force for humanitarian purposes, subjecting it to Chapter VII powers of the Security Council and making no reference to a unilateral right of humanitarian intervention (2005 World Summit Outcome para. 139). This confirms the continued reluctance of States to accept a right of humanitarian intervention outside the confines of the UN Charter and of the procedures for collective response established therein.

  1. Evaluation

47  There is no denying that widespread and egregious violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law are no longer within the ‘exclusive’ domestic jurisdiction of States but constitute a matter of concern of the international community as a whole. They require corrective action by that community, through the procedures it has established to this end. The question of what can be done when the primary vehicle for such action, the UN Security Council, appears unwilling or unable to act, poses itself with great force in the face of human suffering. It appears, however, that it is the unwillingness of States to commit the material and financial resources required for intervention, as well as their politically-motivated reluctance to meddle in certain situations, rather than the problematic constitutional structure of the UN, which prevents intervention in most cases. What has also become evident through the responses to the instances of alleged humanitarian intervention that have occurred since the establishment of the UN, is that States are not willing to discard the prohibition of the use of force and the collective machinery of the UN in favour of a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention. In the rare event where there is a humanitarian emergency, and where most States agree that intervention is needed but the UN is unable to act (due to recalcitrant vetoes or narrowly failing the two-thirds majority required for General Assembly action), States may be willing to accept humanitarian considerations in mitigation of the occasional violation of the prohibition of the use of force and limit their response accordingly.

Select Bibliography

Select Documents

 

Determine crucial questions to be addressed. Isolate the major factors that hold consequences for the future of that region.

Create a podcast script about Syria and ISIS, synthesizing facts into an informative narrative using appropriate scholarly resources and reasoning in the development of your case study of pivotal events. Explain challenges in light of concerns for political solvency and/or public policy. Identify the distinctive attributes associated with the political actors and organizational entities involved. Look at these challenges through the lens of your subfield. Determine crucial questions to be addressed. Isolate the major factors that hold consequences for the future of that region. Explain why. Include an overview of discussion, main body, a sidebar, and then summary.

Develop a better understanding of the entire process of strategic HR planning, and the ability to tie HR to business strategy and evaluate HR effectiveness.

Project: Actual Case Study on a Chosen Organization (total 26 marks)

The actual case study project is due Week 13, Sunday at midnight. There are no extensions, late work will not be graded.

Objectives

  • Apply the concepts and techniques learned in this course by conducting strategic HR planning for an organization of your choice.
  • Develop a better understanding of the entire process of strategic HR planning, and the ability to tie HR to business strategy and evaluate HR effectiveness.
  • Apply the techniques related to forecasting supply and demand in a business change initiative.

Project Report Format and Submission

The main body of report should not exceed twenty 1.5 spaced pages in 12 font and 1 inch margins (excludes title page, executive summary table of contents, references and appendices). Number pages and use appropriate headings. Refer to evaluation criteria. Your submission will follow the components of a formal report. You submit your report via Moodle in the appropriate assignment drop (under the heading ‘Project: Actual Case Study’).

  • Title page
  • Executive Summary (1page)
  • Table of Contents
  • Text Section
  • References
  • Appendices ( worksheets, tables and figures)

 

Content (minimum requirement to be included in your project)

 

Note: Use textbook tables (or other online sources) as appropriate to your organization (include in appendices). Real data from your contact (although it must be public data) or secondary sources is best. If not possible, you can make up some numbers, make/state assumptions, and use other students as expert roles to include the content required (described below).

 

To begin your actual case study you will want to gather information about your chosen organization (through information gathering interviews and secondary data). Analyze the company’s current environmental context and strategy. The purpose of this discussion is to emphasize the idea of strategic HR management (i.e., aligning HR strategy with corporate and business strategy). Does the HR strategy support the business strategy? Is the business strategy aligned with corporate strategy? (Chapters 1 and 2).

  • Discuss the organizations corporate strategy (e.g., restructuring, growth, stability).
  • Discuss the organizations business strategy (can use Porter’s model).
  • Discuss the organizations HR philosophy (e.g., high commitment, low cost)

Recommend a change initiative. You will want to consider HR planning problems, opportunities, causes and alternatives. The purpose of this discussion is to ensure that HR planners are responsive to business trends. What are some of the recent business needs? What are the implications for HR planning? (Chapters 3 and 9)

  • Conduct a SWOT analysis, factors including, but are not limited to, business environment, external competitors, and internal issues. Focus on one or several that are most salient at the moment.
  • When discussing the SWOT results, forecast the impact of these issues on the organization.
  • Suggest a change initiative (major initiatives can include, but are not limited to, downsizing, restructuring, merger, etc.; minor initiatives can include, but are not limited to, implementing training, recruiting talent etc.).
  • Discuss your approach to your change effort.

Forecast a workforce that can implement the initiative. The purpose of this discussion is to align HR demand with the strategies and change initiatives identified previously (i.e. reducing cost may require streamlining management processes, which in turn may require a different composition of human capital and a different way of how they work together.

  • Use human capital and behaviours to identify a desired workforce (Chapter 2).
  • Use demand forecasting techniques on a particular unit, or on the organization if it is manageable to do so (Chapter 4 and 5).
    • Use Delphi or nominal group technique to forecast demand and supply below. This is intended for you to experience how these approaches can help solicit contributions from experts (you may need to use other students). Document the procedures and the final result.
    • Produce a trend analysis table of the unit or organization.
    • Produce an HR budget and staffing table for the focal unit or organization.
    • Use envelop/scenario forecasting for the above (optional).

Suggest plans/procedures through which the HR demand can be satisfied.

  • Identify source and markets for candidates (Chapter 4) (i.e. internal market, external market.
  • Analyze internal movement within the unit (Chapter 6).
    • Analyze three key positions (data collection is not required; can rely on public data such as NOC http://www5.hrsdc.gc.ca/NOC/English/NOC/2011/Welcome.aspx and/or other career profiles such as the Albert Career Profiles http://occinfo.alis.alberta.ca/occinfopreview ).
    • Produce a succession/replacement chart for the three key positions identified. Real data is preferred. If not possible, you can make up some names.
    • Conduct a Markov analysis of the unit or organization, based on your estimates of outbound probabilities. If real data is not possible, you can make up some numbers.
    • Produce a table estimating the number of positions to be filled, based on certain assumptions of annual increase and loss.
    • Produce a movement table based on the information above.
    • Use the vacancy model (optional).
  • Design an HR system (selection, training, performance management, compensation etc.) that will develop, motivate, and retain the desired workforce (in terms of the desired human capital, motivation, and empowerment you discussed earlier). This is to reinforce the idea of strategic HR management (Chapter 2). You can talk in general about your strategies in selection, training, compensation etc. that will create the desired workforce or you can outline a more detailed implementation plan for one particular HR process.
  • Identify information technology applications for your HR planning. Explain one software application that might help your organization better manage some of its elements of strategic HR planning (Chapter 8).
  • Explain how you would assess the success of your initiative. This is to demonstrate the impact of HR management on bottom-line performance (can use balanced score cards in Chapter 14 or other measure of effectiveness). It is important to use metrics to demonstrate the links between HR practices – desired workforce – improved bottom-line performance, so that the HR managers can claim the credit for enhanced performance.

 

 

 

elect a product, service, or corporate initiative that has successfully expanded internationally. Analyse their global business strategy and assess how their strategy aligns with at least one of the strategic frameworks discussed in this module.

Module 8 has explored the considerations that need to be made before a firm decides to enter the international market. Not only will firms need to consider liabilities of foreignness, ownership advantages, and location advantages, they will also need to consider the advantages of internalization. By making use of the OLI and the CAGE frameworks, firms will be in a better position to consider these factors and assess their comparative advantage in the international market.
Having established whether it is beneficial to go global, firms will then need to determine which business strategy to use. As a result, this module has unpacked three global business strategies, namely global integration, local responsiveness, and Ghemawat’s AAA global strategy framework.
For this assignment answer the following question: Using Apple or FedEx Corporation
1) Select a product, service, or corporate initiative that has successfully expanded internationally. Analyse their global business strategy and assess how their strategy aligns with at least one of the strategic frameworks discussed in this module.

Would you be more willing to find out if the genetic condition was Yes  curable or early diagnosis improved the outcome?

Attitudes to Publicly Available Genetic Information

Please fill out this questionnaire prior to reading the leaflet provided.

2) What is your role at the university? Student

Student (Course):

Medicine

Other (Please Specify):

3) Have you heard of any genetic testing companies, such as 23andMe or Ancestry.com? Yes
4) Do you have any reservations about using these products?

 

Yes
5) Have you ever used 23andMe or Ancestry.com or any other genetic testing company?

i.      Are you aware of any of the services provided by these companies?

 

No

 

Yes

6) If you answered yes to question 5:

i.              Which company did you use?

 

ii.            Were you aware of other gene testing services other than the one you used?

 

 

Ancestry.com/ 23andMe/

Other (please specify):

 

 

Yes  /  No

7) If you answered no to question 5:

i.     Have you ever heard of these genetic testing companies?

ii. Have you ever considered/ thought about using them?

 

▫ Would you ever use them?

▫ If yes, what you would use these tests for?

 

Yes

 

No

 

 

8) Do you believe this form of testing should be available on the NHS for everyone to have access to? No
  • Would you want to find out if you were at increased risk of developing No certain genetic conditions? (e.g. T2DM, Huntington’s Disease, Breast

Cancer)

  1. Would you be more willing to find out if the genetic condition was Yes  curable or early diagnosis improved the outcome?

 

  • To what extent do you think it is important that you are presented with information about your genetic risk? (1 = unimportant, 10 = vitally important)

 

1      2      3     4     (5)     6     7     8     9     10

11) If you found out you were at increased risk of a genetic condition, would you go to a medical professional to have your results explained?

 

Yes
12) Are you aware of any of the implications genetic testing can have on your family?

 

Yes
13) Would you discuss the potential implications of undergoing such testing with your family prior to taking part?

i.      If you have undergone DTC testing already which provided you with medical information relevant to other family members, did you discuss this with them?

 

Yes

 

 

14) Are you aware of how these companies use your Personal Information/ data (i.e. name, email, street address, genetic information)?

 

To some extent
15) Are you aware that these companies use your data for research purposes?

 

Yes
16) Would you be happy for your genetic information to be used for research purposes?

 

No

 

17) Are you aware that once your data has been used for research, you may not be able to withdraw your genetic information?

 

Yes
18) Were you aware that your genetic information can be used by the police?

 

No
19) Would you be happy for your genetic information to be used to aid police investigations?

 

No
20) Are you aware of other ways in which these companies use your data? Please add additional information regarding the ways in which these companies may use your data that you are aware of.

 

 

No

21) How well do you think you would be able to understand your results? (1 = not at all, 10 = fully)

 

1      2      3     (4)     5     6     7     8     9     10

 

 

 What contributes to the success you have when it comes to family engagement?

Hi, please make sure all my comments in red. You can use some of the information that you used  for the data analysis paper.  Happy holidays.

Thank you.

 a10-page paper using the Evidence Informed Process (EIP) Model,to include:

Introduction: Describe district (location, demographics, populations served, size of school, vision, mission, district goals, etc.)  Hi, the district that I want you to describe is Sunnyvale School District (please this teacher is very familiar with this district and knows very well, so please make sure you are as accurate as you can be.)

Design Context:  Choose a problem of practice that is already identified in your school/district’s LCAP.  Recall that the EIP Model is based on identification of a problem that the client system wants to resolve.  I am focusing on goal number 4th specifically parents’ engagement.  ( Goal 4 Increase and deepen opportunities for family education. )   page 151 LCAP goal 2018-2019. Page 151-161_

 State and/or Local Priorities addressed by this goal:

State Priorities:

Priority 2: State Standards (Conditions of Learning)      

 Priority 3: Parental Involvement (Engagement)     ( I am focusing parental involvement)    

 Priority 4: Pupil Achievement (Pupil Outcomes)       

 Priority 5: Pupil Engagement (Engagement)       

 Priority 8: Other Pupil Outcomes (Pupil Outcomes)       

https://www.sesd.org/site/handlers/filedownload.ashx?moduleinstanceid=2396&dataid=7117&FileName=Local%20Control%20Accountability%20Plan%20LCAP%20FY%202018-2019.pdf

Question: Create of an answerable question related to the problem and engage the interest of the system (if possible, interview principal, cabinet, etc. to further explore the problem and possible solutions).

What contributes to the success you have when it comes to family engagement?

What did you do to promote the high levels of parent involvement you currently have in your school?  What challenges do you face as the principle in attempting to increase parent involvement?

What resources, supports, expertise did you used to get the success you have with family/parents engagement? ( those are the questions that I want to ask the principle )

Assessment: How do you know it’s a problem?  What data exists (surveys, interviews, reports, etc.)? How does it affect teaching and learning?  What impact does this problem have on the school environment? Why does this matter to the school community (students, parents, administrators, board, etc.)? What strengths exist within school community to address this issue? ( Data Source:  California Healthy Kids Survey . Please make sur you add percentage of the data and so on)

https://data.calschls.org/resources/Sunnyvale_1516_Elem_CHKS.pdf

Evidence:  What does the research say about this issue?  What best practices already exist to address this problem?  What does the research say about best practices? with the specific populations served at your site?  MY SITE IS ELEMENTARY SCHOOL  ( kindergarten through 5th grade)

What is your Theory of Action that will guide your interventions?   Based on what you have learned, what intervention (s) do you suggest? Provide an evidence-based rationale for your intervention. What other stakeholders might need to be engaged in the process?  Intervention will be Motivation interviewing, at Sunnyvale school  district they use motivation intervention within the class room, at SARB (School Attendance Review Boards)  meetings, SST (Student Study Team ), IEP individualized education program)  meetings, social worker within the school use the Motivation interviewing assessments, check ins meeting with parents )

What is the difference between a strategy and an operational plan?

How does a customer influence an operation strategy?

In today’s business, it is not all about responding to the campaign of a competitor. Customer purchasing decisions influence the organizations’ external factors such as flexibility in switching costs, digitization and service delivery. Customers are the ones to determine behavior more than the price and quality. Generally, customers are the determining factor of almost every operation in an enterprise; they are the ones to dictate what they want, when and how that product or service should be delivered.

What is the difference between a strategy and an operational plan?

In every organization’s business plan, the strategy outlines the mission statement, vision, and goals to be achieved for the next two to five years. Further, it takes into consideration how the organization will measure the major projects and those goals on how to meet them while the operational plan is an outline of the department’s short term goal  that is  normally projected to occur within the upcoming year.